

BLUE HELMET ODYSSEY



DEFINING INDIA'S UN FOOTPRINTS



Vol - 1

**EDITION
2022**

BLUE HELMET ODYSSEY

DEFINING INDIA'S UN FOOTPRINTS



The 'Blue Helmet Odyssey' Journal aims at showcasing the Indian Army's rich contribution in United Nations Peacekeeping. The articles are a healthy mix of senior leadership valued perspectives, glimpses of mission happenings and personal experiences.

The Journal is Indian Army's first such publication on our contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

I compliment Lt Gen DS Rana, AVSM, YSM, SM, DG SD and the Editorial Team for diligently compiling this Journal to put across our unique perspective on UN peacekeeping to the world.

Jai Hind

Lt Gen Upendra Dwivedi, AVSM
DCOAS (IS&C)

Contribution for the UN Journal (India)

Original articles, ideas and thoughts on contemporary UN matters have been selected for publication. Copyright is reserved by the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping.

Vision and Concept

Lt Gen DS Rana, AVSM, YSM, SM, DG SD

Editorial Team

Chief Editor

Maj Gen Michael AJ Fernandez, VSM
ADG SD

Senior Editors

Brig PS Dagar, VSM
Brig PS Punia, SM, VSM

Editors

Col Kaustubh Kekre
Lt Col Kshitiz Arya
Col AS Negi

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Correspondence Address:-

The Editor
Blue Helmet Odyssey;
Defining India's UN Footprints
Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping
Room No 209 2nd Floor
DGIS Building
Rao Tula Ram Marg
New Delhi – 110010

Designed and Printed at:



S-5-6, 2nd Floor, Sujas Tower, Nehru Bazar,
Jaipur-302003 (Raj.) India
t : +91 141 4016784
m : +91 98294 96784
e : linegraphics@gmail.com
w : www.linegraphics.in

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
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Special Message by Hon'ble Raksha Mantri



As the world stands straddled by COVID-19 pandemic and economic upheaval, the regional and global geopolitics and its associated turbulence continues. The situation in Afghanistan, Middle East, Africa and Central Asia continues to remain fragile. The United Nations, however, has emerged as a catalyst of peace and stability in the areas where it continues to deploy its peacekeeping missions.

Despite ramifications of COVID pandemic, India's role and contribution in peacekeeping continued unabated. Our peacekeeping initiatives on a multinational canvas in the backdrop of the United Nations have left an indelible mark in history. With India's growing role in regional and global geopolitics, the United Nation provides an ideal platform for a credible support to global peace.

This year is a crucial year in defining India's role in United Nations, with India becoming a non-permanent member of the Security Council from 01 January 2021 for a period of two years. India's continued contribution and sterling performance has provided the necessary fillip to our bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council. As one of the founding members of the United Nations, India remains committed in its efforts to seek comprehensive and equitable solutions to all global challenges.

On the occasion of the 74th Army Day on 15th January, 2022, I convey my best wishes to all our troops deployed in United Nations peacekeeping missions all over the world.

Jai Hind

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Rajnath Singh'.

(Rajnath Singh)

Raksha Mantri



Foreword by Chief of Army Staff

While military remains the ultimate tool in the quiver of the polity for furtherance of the nation's objectives, employment of the Armed Forces in United Nations peacekeeping is a complex endeavour, intricately interwoven in the global geopolitics. To remain nonpartisan, professional and effective is a delicate art, nuances of which have been exhibited in an exemplary manner by Indian peacekeepers for several decades, till date. With more than two and half lakhs troops contributed thus far and more than 5000 troops presently deployed in United Nations peacekeeping missions globally, India's contribution to the United Nations has indeed been significant.

The creation of the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in 2000 was a landmark event in the landscape of India's multinational engagement in United Nations. Over the last two decades, the Centre has trained more than 8,500 Indian officers and 1600 foreign officers from over 90 countries. The myriad training capsules, pre-deployment courses, workshops and seminars organised by Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping on national and international level is noteworthy. The roadmap for infrastructure development of Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping having been crystallised, I am sanguine that the Centre will grow from strength to strength as a world class Institute for research, training, bilateral and multilateral engagements with United Nations peacekeeping nations in the days and years ahead.

On this auspicious Army Day, 2022, I would like to express my greeting and best wishes to all our troops deployed in United Nations peacekeeping missions across the world. May you continue to keep our flag flying high as always!

Jai Hind

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'MM Naravane'.

(MM Naravane)
General
COAS

Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping

Message by Defence Secretary



Peacekeeping is one of the United Nations' most valuable representations and collective investment towards global peace, security and stability. It helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. With 12 ongoing peacekeeping missions, the department of United Nations peacekeeping has engaged troops from over 100 countries across the globe as stakeholders in restoring peace and stability in volatile parts of the world.

India remains one of the most important and active troop contributors in the ongoing peacekeeping missions. It has contributed more than 2,50,000 troops in 49 UN peacekeeping missions in which 175 of its peacekeepers laid down their lives. India's contributions to peacekeeping have been underscored by the experience and professionalism of India's armed forces. India was the first country to demonstrate the effectiveness of women as UN peacekeepers with the deployment of the first all-female formed police unit (FFPU) to the UNPKO in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2007.

India has contributed in many ways to strengthen UN peacekeeping and has responded to emerging challenges posed by the Corona virus pandemic. India delivered 2,00,000 doses of made-in-India COVID-19 vaccines, which has helped vaccinate 1,40,000 UN field personnel in 2021. As a response to pandemic, India also upgraded its hospitals in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

India is looking forward to more intense engagements in UN Peacekeeping missions in various formats; provide officials and leadership in key peacekeeping positions, augmenting peace-building activities by strengthening of training and capacity enhancement.

(Ajay Kumar)

Defence Secretary



Foreword by Vice Chief of Army Staff

India's United Nations Journal – 'The Sentinels of Peace', has been conceptualised with the aim of showcasing India's sterling past and ongoing contribution to United Nations peacekeeping missions. The Journal aims at putting together institutional experience of civilian and military officers who have contributed in India's United Nations peacekeeping efforts over the years, in military or diplomatic capacities besides capturing myriad experiences of officers and troops currently deployed in our missions abroad.

The Journal showcases the wide spectrum of India's ongoing United Nations peacekeeping missions. Its content is a vibrant mix of experiential inputs from officers posted in the missions, perspectives of senior leadership and subject matter experts as also glimpses of operational and logistic challenges faced while deployed in our United Nations missions across the world. We aim to institutionalise the publication as a visible platform for showcasing India's vibrant contribution to United Nations peacekeeping efforts.

I wish to place on record my compliments to the editorial team, distinguished experts and officers who have contributed to the making of this maiden United Nations Journal.

Happy Reading

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'CP Mohanty'.

(CP Mohanty)
Lieutenant General
VCOAS

From The Chief Editor's Desk



India's UN Journal, Blue Helmets Odyssey; Defining India's UN Footprints, has been conceptualised with the aim of showcasing India's sterling past and ongoing contribution to UN peacekeeping missions. The Journal aims at putting together institutional experience of civilian and military officers who have contributed for India in UN, in military or diplomatic capacities and also experiences of officers and troops currently deployed.

The Annual publication showcases the entire spectrum of India's ongoing peacekeeping missions. The content is an eclectic mix of experiential inputs from officers posted in the missions, perspectives of senior leadership and subject matter experts.

We aim to institutionalise the publication as a platform for showcasing India's vibrant UN peacekeeping missions and solicit inputs and experiences to add value to further editions. I wish to place on record my sincere thanks and warm compliments to our distinguished experts and officers from various UN Missions, past and present, who have richly contributed to the Journal.

Happy Reading

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michael AJ Fernandez'.

(Michael AJ Fernandez)
Major General
ADG SD

INDIA'S UN FOOTPRINTS

From Korea to Sudan : Snap Shots of India's UN Journey

Introduction

India is one of the founding members of the UN and Indian contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions started with participation in UN Multinational Force in Korea in 1950. Since then, India has participated in 51 out of the 71 peacekeeping missions established by the UN and has contributed over 2,58,000 personnel and is one of the largest contributors of peacekeepers in the world. India has always participated in UN peacekeeping operations without any rhetoric or symbolism, but in clear pursuit of the commitment to the objectives set out in the UN Charter. This commitment is in real terms, even to the extent of accepting casualties to personnel and 159 Indian Army Soldiers have made the supreme sacrifice in defence of the mandate of UN. The rich legacy and saga of India's participation in major UN Peacekeeping Missions is covered in subsequent paragraphs.

UN Multinational Force In Korea (1950 - 1953)

Genesis

The Indian Army's first commitment to UN peacekeeping arose consequent to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The war, which began on 25 June 1950, raged for three years between North Korea supported by Chinese forces and South Korea supported by (US led) UN forces. Troops from 16 countries were constituted as a UN Multinational Force under General Douglas Mac Arthur.


Contribution

India contributed a medical unit, 60 Parachute Field Ambulance, to the UN Multinational Force. 60 Parachute Field Ambulance with a strength of 346 personnel was tasked to operate as two entities; the principal part commanded by Lieutenant Colonel AG Rangaraj, to provide medical

support to multinational troops in the battle zone and the remainder unit under Major NB Banerjee to provide assistance to the South Korean Field Hospitals in the strategic town of Taegu. The personnel of the unit operated in difficult and challenging terrain, weather and operational conditions. Braving the extreme odds, the Indian Field Ambulance attended to more than 1800 battle casualties and 9000 sick and wounded during its eventful tenure of three years. The unit's exemplary contribution was recognized by the Minister of War of Great Britain, wherein a tribute was paid to the unit and the Commanding Officer in the House of Commons. The unit had the unique distinction of receiving a "Meritorious Unit Citation" from the US Army. For their gallant and exemplary actions, the personnel of the unit were honoured with numerous awards to include the award of Maha Vir Chakra to the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel AG Rangaraj.



60 Parachute Field Ambulance Reorganising after Air Drop Operations



Advance Dressing Station of Indian Field Ambulance



Evacuation of Casualties under Progress

Custodian Force India (CFI): Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (1953-54)

Genesis

The cessation of hostilities in Korea was required to be implemented by a UN Armistice and envisaged establishment of a demilitarized zone, from which all military forces would be withdrawn and followed by an exchange of prisoners. However, the exchange of prisoners became a stumbling block with many personnel of the North Korea People's Army (NKPA) and Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) under captivity of UN Command, as well as UN Command prisoners with the North Koreans did not wish to be repatriated to their respective countries. The North Koreans and the Chinese insisted on the repatriation of all prisoners, whereas the UN Command insisted on the choice being left to the individual combatant. In November 1952, India proposed to the UN General Assembly, the creation of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) to facilitate the repatriation of prisoners. The proposal was accepted and a UN resolution was passed on 03 December 1952. As per the resolution, the prisoners who refused voluntary

INDIA'S UN FOOTPRINTS

repatriation to their own countries were to be placed in the custody of NNRC and the commission was also tasked to settle the issue of the non-repatriated prisoners. In order to implement this process, two organisations were established, the first was the NNRC with India as chair of the commission and a Custodian Force consisting of Indian units (CFI), which was to take responsibility for all prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated. An estimated strength of 24,000 prisoners was to be looked after by the CFI.


Contribution

Lieutenant General KS Thimayya, DSO was nominated to chair the NNRC and Major General SPP Thorat, DSO was tasked to command the CFI. The CFI consisted of one Infantry Brigade with five Infantry Battalions, Machine Gun Company, General Hospital, 60 Parachute Field Ambulance and other minor units. The CFI and NNRC rendered yeoman service during the entire span of the mission. The CFI negotiated the complex issue of reparation through compassion, fairness and neutrality. The conduct of the CFI and NNRC was widely acclaimed by the international community. On completion of the mission, the Indian



Indian Troops Guarding the Prisoners Camp in Korea

Government awarded Padama Bhushan to Lieutenant General KS Thimayya, DSO for distinguished service and Kirti Chakra to Major General SPP Thorat, DSO.



Repatriated Prisoners Being Handed Over

UN International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indo-China (1954-1975)


Genesis

Indo-China was a French colony comprising the three states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. During the Second World War, Japanese forces overran this region. Post capitulation of Japan in 1945, France decided to revive its empire. This led to a war between the French Army and Ho Chi Minh's Army culminating in the battle of Dien Bien Phui in 1954, in which the French lost. On 26 April 1954, a nine nation conference began in Geneva to find a solution to the situation in Indo-China. After several rounds of talks, a general agreement on an armistice was reached on 20 July 1954. Ceasefire agreements were signed and Vietnam was partitioned into North and South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia became independent nations. To supervise the implementation of the agreement, three independent International Commissions for

Supervision and Control (ICSC) were established by the UN.

Contribution

India provided the civilian and military leadership, security, logistics and basic communications for the commissions. The Indian Army contingent strength was built up to 946 personnel by year 1955 and consisted of personnel from Infantry Battalions, Corps of Signals, Medical Team, Ordnance Detachment, Movement Control Detachment, Postal Unit and Supply Detachment. Due to ethnic and ideological rivalries, as also the interplay of outside influences, the region remained strife-torn. Indian peacekeepers, continued to play an active role in implementation of the UN mandate, till the withdrawal of the mission.



UN Emergency Force - I (UNEF - I) : Egypt and Israel (1956-1967)

Genesis

The tripartite military action against Egypt by the Anglo-French-Israeli forces in October 1956 resulted in capture of Sinai Peninsula and Gaza strip by the force. A large number of Egyptian troops were taken prisoner. The UN arranged a ceasefire in November 1956 and established a peacekeeping force, UN Emergency Force (UNEF). The creation of UNEF, the first United Nations Peacekeeping Force comprising armed contingents, represented a significant innovation within the United Nations. It was not an enforcement mission, but a peacekeeping mission, to be carried out with the consent and cooperation of the parties. UNEF's mandate was to oversee the withdrawal of the occupying forces and after the withdrawal had been completed, to act as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. UNEF was stationed entirely on Egyptian territory and with the consent of the Egyptian Government, patrolled the Egypt-Israel armistice demarcation line and the international frontier to the South of the Gaza Strip.

Contribution

The Indian contingent consisted of Headquarters, Infantry Battalion, Platoon of Army Service Corps, Detachments from the Corps of Signals, Ordnance, Medical, Military Police and Army Postal Service. The Indian contribution accounted for the bulk of the UN forces and more than 12,000 Indian troops

took part in UNEF. The Indian Contingents were actively involved in exchange of prisoners, monitoring the withdrawal of Israeli Forces and acted as an effective buffer between the opposing forces. In the Indian Sector, several posts were set up to observe the boundary line and the troops had to routinely negotiate anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and sustained some casualties. The mission was withdrawn on the behest of Egypt in 1967, just prior to the commencement of the third Arab - Israel war.



UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) (June 1958-December 1958)

Genesis

In May 1958, an armed rebellion broke out in Lebanon. The disturbance which was

communal in nature started from Tripoli and soon spread to Beirut and Northern and North Eastern areas of Lebanon. On 11 June 1958, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, to dispatch an observer group to Lebanon. UNOGIL was established to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other warlike material across the Lebanese borders. It was deployed in Lebanon only to 'observe and report' and was not tasked to mediate, arbitrate or use force to prevent illegal infiltration.

Contribution

Indian Army contributed 20 military observers out of a total strength of 591 personnel. Colonel Ranbir Singh headed the observer group, which successfully completed its assigned tasks.

UN Operations in Congo (ONUC) (July 1960-June 1964)

Genesis

Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) attained independence on 30 June 1960 from the Belgian rule. Post independence, the Congolese Army mutinied; which prompted Belgium to intervene without the concurrence of the Congolese government. Simultaneously, the mineral rich provinces of Katanga and Kasai seceded from the country. The Government of Congo appealed to the UN for help, which was promptly agreed to on 14 July 1960. The UN Operations in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo) was the largest peacekeeping operation mounted by the UN up to that time, in terms of the

complex responsibilities, the area of operations and the number of peacekeepers involved. This was also the first time a peacekeeping mission was embroiled in a chaotic internal strife. On 21 February 1961, the Security Council adopted a resolution to authorize ONUC to use force, as a last resort to prevent civil war. Indian Army's action in Congo thus became the first peace enforcement operation in the history of the United Nations.

Contribution


India's participation in ONUC began in July 1960 with the deployment of supply, technical and medical personnel. Subsequently, India enlarged its contingent to a Brigade Group. 99 Infantry Brigade Group was deployed in Congo and the formation consisted of three Infantry Battalions, Armoured Squadron,




Rendering Critical Medical Care to the Local Population of Katanga



Difficult Terrain Conditions in Congo



Indian Troops Braving the Odds Against Inclement Weather and Terrain in Congo



Demining Operations under Progress

Heavy Mortar Battery, Engineer Company, Machine Gun Company, Field Ambulance and six Canberra aircraft of the Indian Air Force. 99 Infantry Brigade Group carried out major operations in Katanga province and was successful in clearing large parts from the control of the rebels. In one of these operations, Captain GS Salaria, 3/1 GORKHA RIFLES was awarded Param Vir Chakra (Posthumously) for valour of the most exceptional order. The gallant actions of the Indian Army contingents supported by the Air Force led to ONUC obtaining full control over Katanga in May 1962. Towards the end of 1962, the attacks on ONUC had recommenced. Indian contingents swiftly advanced into the key towns of Katanga, which stunned and surprised the breakaway factions. Many rivers were crossed by improvised expedients in the face of stiff opposition and were ably supported by the air operations. The swift

offensive actions by the Indian Contingents surprised the rebel forces and they capitulated fearing onslaught. The Indian Contingent ensured reunification of Congo and led to the termination of the mission. During the period of deployment Indian Army sustained 147 casualties, including 39 fatal casualties. The professional ethics and determination in conduct of operations drew praise from all quarters. The contingent's valour was recognized and one Param Vir Chakra, three Mahavir Chakras, 14 Vir Chakras and 23 Sena Medals were awarded.

UN Security Force (UNSF) in West New Guinea (October 1962-April 1963)

Genesis

The Dutch retained the control of West New Guinea (West Irian) post independence of Indonesia in 1949. The Dutch control over the territory resulted in deterioration of relations and frequent skirmishes between the Indonesian and Dutch forces. After mediation by UN, the Indonesian and Dutch governments signed an agreement on 15 August 1962, which provided for the administration of West New Guinea to be transferred to a UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and for cessation of hostilities. The agreement also stipulated that UN would provide UNTEA with a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to assist in its tasks.

Contribution

UN Secretary General deputed the then Military Adviser to UN Headquarters, Brigadier Indarjit Rikhye to lead a military observer team, to oversee the cease fire. India also provided two military observers for the mission. Besides supervising the cease fire, the UN observers helped resupply the Indonesian troops with food, medicines and assisted in regrouping at selected places. The observers' mandate was fulfilled and all actions for cessation of hostilities were completed without any incident.

UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) (October 1962-September 1963)

Genesis.

In September 1962, a civil war that broke out in Yemen, which had the potential to cause large scale conflict, due to alleged involvement of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. On 11 Jun 1963, the UN adopted a resolution to establish an observation mission.

Contribution

India provided two military observers. As one of the countries supporting the UN resolution, India also provided technical and economic assistance to Yemen. UNYOM was terminated on 04 September 1963, when the mission had accomplished its mandate.

UN Iran - Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)(August 1988-February 1991)

Genesis

Iran and Iraq have had a long history of border disputes. The Shatt-al-Arab waterway that separates the two countries connecting the Persian Gulf with the inland river systems of the Tigris and Euphrates was a major bone of contention. In 1979, the capture of power by the revolutionary forces in Iran was apparently perceived by Iraq as an opportunity to secure total control of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. This led to an all out conflict between the two West Asian Countries. On 28 September 1980, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, to end the use of force and for a peaceful process of conflict resolution. The resolution had little impact and the conflict ended after eight years. On 09 August 1988, Security Council approved the establishment of UNIIMOG, which had the mandate to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire, and ensure the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement.

Contribution

At its peak, the total military strength of UNIIMOG was approximately 400 all ranks, including around 350 military observers from 26 countries, of which eight were from India. The mission was terminated in February 1991, after Iran and Iraq had withdrawn all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries.

UN Missions in Angola (UNAVEM-I, II, III and UNOMA) (January 1989 - May 1991)

Genesis

The Angolan crisis was inextricably linked to the neighbouring countries of Angola; Namibia and other South African countries. Namibia was initially a German colony. In 1920, however, South Africa received the League of Nations mandate to govern Namibia. Inevitably, in accordance with South African policies, apartheid was introduced in Namibia. In reaction to these policies, Namibians formed the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) in 1960. SWAPO began gaining ground in the late 1970s and active support to SWAPO was provided by Angolan Government, which also provided a covert conduit for foreign weapons shipments from countries to include Cuba. The active involvement of Cuba and South Africa led to a clash in Angola; with both countries deploying troops in Angola.

UNAVEM I

On 22 December 1988, an agreement ending the Namibian civil war was signed between the governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa. The agreement provided for the implementation of a UN plan for the independence of Namibia, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and measures to achieve peace in the region. Angola and Cuba also signed an agreement on the staged and total withdrawal of approximately 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola which was a condition for South Africa's acceptance of the

independence plan for Namibia. UNAVEM I was established to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban Forces from Angola.

UNAVEM II

In 1990, there were inputs that Cuban troops had surreptitiously reoccupied areas which they were supposed to have vacated in Angola. However, on 25 May 1991, the Cuban authorities reported completion of withdrawal of their troops from Angola. On 30 May 1991, in accordance with the terms of the peace negotiations, the UN Security Council established UNAVEM II, which had more multifaceted political and military responsibilities to include observing the conduct of free and fair elections in Angola.

UNAVEM III

In order to bring peace and stability in Angola, the Government of Angola and rebel forces signed a series of protocols on 20 November 1994 in Lusaka. UN established UNAVEM - III in February 1995 with the mandate of implementation of protocols, supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces, monitor the ceasefire, ensure demobilisation of armed groups and complete the political transition.

UNOMA

On 30 June 1997, the UN Security Council terminated UNAVEM III, and replaced it with a much smaller UN Observer Mission under Chapter VI mandate. UNOMA was mandated to supervise the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Lusaka Accord and also with a mandate of maintaining peace and building national reconciliation.

However, the national reintegration process was stalled due to reluctance of the principal rebel group, UNITA to join the process.


Contributions

India contributed eight military observers each to UNAVEM-I and UNAVEM II. The Indian contribution in UNAVEM III was significant and a contingent consisting of one Infantry Battalion, Engineer Company, Mechanized Infantry Company and Staff Officers/ Observers was deployed. The Indian contingent played a significant role in monitoring and implementation of the protocols and provided relief to the war torn population. India contributed one Mechanized Infantry Task Force and observers to UNOMA. The Mechanized Infantry Task Force was repeatedly called into action and provided support for delivery of humanitarian assistance. In one of the most challenging circumstances, the troops of the contingent were surrounded and held hostage for two months by UNITA. The Indian troops refused to surrender and survived on meager rations and supplies. The determination of the hostages not to give in and the mounting international pressure for their release convinced UNITA of the futility of their actions and the Indian troops were released. During entire duration of conduct of peacekeeping duties in Angola, Indian contingents displayed a very high standard of discipline and professional conduct. This conduct contributed towards creating and sustaining a positive Indian image and instilled a sense of respect and admiration amongst other participating countries.

UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) (April 1989 -March 1990)

Genesis

Namibia was handed over to South Africa in the early 1920s by the League of Nations, as war reparations and to administer the territory on behalf of the League. In 1945, the UN requested South Africa to return Namibia as part of their decolonization measures. The political process involved Namibia's transition to a sovereign and independent state. UN established the Transition Assistance Group with mandate to ensure free and fair elections. The military component consisted of three enlarged and reconstituted Infantry battalions, 300 military observers and a number of logistic units. The total strength of the military component was approximately 4500, with its elements deployed in penny packets at almost 200 locations.



Contribution

Lieutenant General Diwan Prem Chand, PVSM (Force Commander) and 15 Military Observers represented India. Lieutenant General Diwan Prem Chand played an active

role in the preparation for the UNTAG Operations and ensured cordial relationship and close coordination with the special representatives and also between the military and civilian components of UNTAG.



UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) (November 1989- January 1992)

Genesis

During the 1980s, armed conflict occurred in most of Central American region. The UN became directly involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in the region in 1989, when the government of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua requested for its assistance in the implementation of their collective agreement - known as the Esquipulas II Agreement and the Guatemala procedure. The Agreement dealt with an end to hostilities, national reconciliation, democratization and free elections, amongst a host of other provisions. Based on the agreement, ONUCA was established on 07 November 1989. The mandate was to conduct on-site verification of compliance of the Esquipulas II Agreement. On 27 March 1990, the Council authorized, on a contingency basis, an enlargement of the

mandate of ONUCA and the addition of armed personnel to its strength in order to enable it to play a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance.

Contribution

India was one of the principal contributors to this mission and contributed 10 military observers. ONUCA operations involved mobile teams of military observers patrolling from verification centers. Because of their professional competence and vast operational experience, the Indian officers were always most sought after especially in crises situations. The mission in Central America was terminated on 16 January 1992, and the military observers of ONUCA were transferred to form the military wing of ONUSAL.

UN Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) (April 1991-October 2003)

Genesis

Following the Coalition Forces action under Operation Desert Storm, forcing the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait, UN Security Council established UNIKOM, on 9 April 1991. UNIKOM was initially set up as an unarmed observation mission, to monitor the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, to deter violations of the boundary and to observe any hostile action.

Contribution

India contributed six military observers to UNIKOM in 2001 and increased the number to eight in 2002. On 17 March 2003, due to safety concerns arising from military campaign against Iraq by a coalition led by the United States, UNIKOM was withdrawn.

UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (March 1992-September 1993)

Genesis

The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. This was the culmination of more than a decade of negotiations in which the UN had been closely involved. The agreement invited the Security Council to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The mandate assigned to UNTAC was verification of the withdrawal of foreign forces, organization and implementation of the demobilization of factional forces, security and destruction of weapons and ammunition, assisting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with the exchange of prisoners and assisting in mine-clearing operations.

Contribution

The Indian contribution to UNTAC was considerable. The Army contingent consisted of a Battalion Group, a field ambulance, anti-mine team, staff officers and observers. The Indian contingent's area of responsibility included three most politically sensitive

provinces. The Indian contingents carried out extensive domination of the area and valiantly fought the Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The bravery and courage of the Indian troops played a major role in breaking the myth of invincibility of the Khmer Rouge. The Indian contingents provided succour to most troubled regions in Cambodia and assisted in successful conduct of elections in May 1993.

UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (May 1993-January 1995)

Genesis


Mozambique underwent political and military turmoil since its independence from Portuguese rule. The country witnessed nearly two decades of savage civil war. A General Peace Agreement was signed between the various belligerent factions in Rome on 04 October 1992. UN was invited to establish a comprehensive peacekeeping operation with a mandate to implement the General Peace Agreement, monitor ceasefire, monitor withdrawal of foreign forces, disband armed groups, provide security for infrastructure development projects and facilitate humanitarian assistance.

Contribution

India contributed an Engineer Company, Logistics Company, Independent Administrative Company, Staff Officers and Observers. The Indian Engineer Company played a pivotal role in various infrastructure development projects to include construction of tracks and helipads, habitat in Southern Mozambique.



Providing Humanitarian Assistance to Local Population



Force Commander Presenting UN Service Medals to Indian Staff Officers

UN Mission in Somalia II (UNSOM II)(1993-1994)

Genesis

Somalia witnessed turmoil since 1969 due to extra regional influences and inter-clan, political fault lines. The polarized conflict led to huge humanitarian crises with a large portion of the population facing famine. The humanitarian crises promoted the world to initiate action to alleviate the suffering of people. In 1992, the UN was successful in negotiating a ceasefire between the belligerent factions; established a peacekeeping mission in Somalia (UNSOM I) with a small observers force and force protection battalion. UN Security Council also authorised USA to lead a Multinational Unified Task Force to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

INDIA'S UN FOOTPRINTS

Both the missions were not successful due to ongoing inter-clan violence. In order to ensure more vigorous implementation of UN mandate, UN established UNSOM II, with a greater operational strength, on 06 June 1993. The mandate laid specific emphasis on disarmament of the Armed Groups, facilitate return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons and rebuilding of Somalian society.



Rendering Medical Aid to Somalian Civilians



Indian Contingents Providing Security to Civilian Convoys and Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia

Contribution

India contributed one Infantry Brigade Group with three Infantry Battalions, Mechanized Infantry Battalion, Independent Armoured Squadron, Artillery Battery, Engineer Company, Signals Company, Field Ambulance and other supporting elements. Apart from the Indian Army deployment, the Indian Navy

also deployed a maritime task force consisting of six ships for delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Indian Brigade was responsible for the largest area and covered 1/3rd of the Somalian territory. The Indian units carried out aggressive patrolling and area domination, conducted search operations which led to recovery of large scale of arms and ammunition. The Indian contingents fought gallantly against the ever increasing violence by the Somalian Armed Groups. The contingents extended the humanitarian assistance and the performance of the Indian medical and veterinary teams was commendable. The Indian contingents also played an active role in the national rebuilding process and were involved in infrastructure development projects. The UNSOM II was withdrawn as the mission was not given a further extension by the Security Council and the violence continued unabated,



Providing Security Cover and Maintaining Vigil In Somalia



Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, DCOAS (Training and Coordination) Visiting Indian Contingent in Somalia

especially in areas outside the area of responsibility of the Indian Brigade.

UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1994-1996)

Genesis

Since its independence from Belgian rule in 1962, Rwanda was besieged with conflict based on ethnic fault lines. The conflict invited the attention of the world community and an agreement (Arusha Agreement) between the belligerent factions was negotiated on 22 July 1992. The UN authorised the establishment of an observer mission in Rwanda to oversee the implementation of the agreement. UNAMIR's mandate included ensuring safety of Kigali City (capital of Rwanda), monitor ceasefire agreement, assist mine clearance and provide security to refugees. However, the mandate did not factor the political resolution of the conflict and failed to settle the conflict. The events of April 1994, led to a large scale genocide and a major humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. As the humanitarian crises loomed large, the UN Security Council expanded its mission with a mandate to provide security to humanitarian assistance operations and also to investigate the causes of genocide.

Contribution

India deployed an Infantry Battalion, Engineer Company, Signal Company, Observers and Staff Officers. The Indian contingent was responsible for safety and security of Kigali and the UN offices. The situation was tenuous and the Indian

contingent through extensive domination of the area, brought stability and restored law and order in the city. The Indian contingent was also instrumental in management of detainee camps and coordinated the humanitarian assistance operations. With hard work, dedication and commitment, peace and stability were restored in Rwanda. The Indian contingent was one of the last contingents to be withdrawn on downsizing of UNAMIR.

UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (October 1999-December 2000)

Genesis

Sierra Leone was troubled by violent political and military strife since its independence in



Vice President of Sierra Leone Inaugurating 'Raghukul', a School Constructed by Indian Contingent




Quick Reaction Company being Mobilised by Air (UN MI-26 Helicopter)

1961. The civil war continued for nearly four decades and witnessed extreme violence especially against the weaker sections. In 1999, UN and other agencies negotiated a series of diplomatic efforts to open a dialogue between the Government and the belligerent forces, to end the hostilities. These endeavours culminated in an agreement being signed for cessation of hostilities and for arranging a power sharing agreement. UN was invited to establish a mission to monitor the implementation.

Contribution

India contributed two Infantry Battalion Groups, two Mechanized Infantry Companies, Special Forces Team, Mechanized Quick Reaction Company, Artillery Battery, Engineer Company, Field Hospital, and an Air Force contingent consisting Mi-8, Mi-35 and Chetak Helicopters. India was the second largest troop contributor with approximately 3000 troops being deployed. Major General VK Jaitley, UYSM was appointed as the first Force Commander of UNAMSIL. The Indian contingents established their bases in the rebel held territories and carried out extensive domination, to deter the expansion of the rebel areas of influence. The Indian troops launched a large number of operations to



Dr AT Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone visiting Indian Contingent in Sierra Leone

clear the rebel held territories and in some cases to extricate the forces of UNAMSIL in challenging terrain and operational



Maj Gen VK Jaitley, Force Commander Interacting with Indian Contingent in Sierra Leone

conditions. The operational success of Indian troops paved the way for stability in Sierra Leone and elections were conducted in May 2002.

Second UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) (1999- 2010)

Genesis

The first UN Mission (ONUC) ensured integration of DR Congo. However, the country continued to be plagued by corrupt autocratic regimes and ineffective administration. This led to wide spread poverty and lack of development in most parts of the country. Armed secessionist groups increased over a period and sought to control the mineral rich areas of the country in East and South. The secessionist groups were supported by neighbouring countries for economic and political reasons. The internal dissensions in the Congolese Army and fighting within the country culminated in a war with active involvement of foreign armies, in 1999. The conflict resulted in large humanitarian crises with displacement of

large proportion of the population. The UN Security Council negotiated a peace agreement between the various countries to cease hostilities and ensure peace. UN established a mission to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces and ensure political stability.

Contribution

India was the largest contributor of troops and contributed one Infantry Brigade Group, with four Infantry Battalion Groups, Aviation Flight, Field Hospital, other supporting elements, Staff Officers and Observers. The Indian Air Force also contributed Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters. The Indian Contingents were actively involved in opening of important axes of communication, conduct of targeted offensive operations and protection of important towns. The Indian Contingents effectively brought peace and stability in their area of operations by extensive area domination and patrols. The training and integration of Congolese Forces was effectively carried out to enhance the capacities of the host nation. With the successful conduct of elections in 2010 and transition to stable government, the mission underwent a change to a stabilization mission (current mission).

UN Mission in Ethiopia Eritrea (UNMEE) (2000-2008)

Genesis

Ethiopia and Eritrea had a long history of conflict based intricate issues to include ethnic, economic and border disputes. In

1998, fighting erupted between the two countries as a result of the border dispute and witnessed major humanitarian crises. The UN dispatched a political mission to the country to resolve the issue and was able to ensure cessation of hostilities. However, the fighting resumed in May 2000, leading to further accentuation of the humanitarian crises situation. Due to international pressure and involvement of UN, the two nations signed a comprehensive peace agreement on 12 December 2000. UN established a peacekeeping mission with a mandate to monitor peace, verify redeployment of Ethiopian Forces and provide technical assistance to de-mining operations.

Contribution

Indian contribution to UNMEE was substantial with an Infantry Battalion Group, Force Reserve Company, Engineer Company and Staff Officers. The Indian contingents undertook various operational, humanitarian, Civil Military Coordination and Cooperation (CIMIC) activities in support of the UN mandate. The neutrality displayed in maintaining constant vigil over the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ); handling and repatriation of refugees, was appreciated by the UN agencies. The medical and veterinarian assistance provided to the local population assisted in creation of a positive image for UN and Indian contingents. The Indian Contingents played an exemplary role to ensure peace between the two nations.

UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (2006-2011)

Genesis

Since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1959, Sudan was marred by religious, tribal and political conflicts. The prominent conflict was between the Arab dominated North Sudan and Tribal dominated South Sudan. By 2003, the constant conflict in Sudan had resulted in a large scale humanitarian crises with wide spread famine. With the involvement of the international community and UN, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 09 January 2005, which provided for autonomy to South Sudan for six years, referendum on independence for South Sudan, equal political representation in the Government and equal economic share to South Sudan. The implementation of the agreement was disrupted due to the death of South Sudanese Co-Vice President under mysterious circumstances, in 2005. The UN initially established a political mission to oversee the implementation of the agreement. However, due to concerns arising over the likely resumption of hostilities, a Chapter VII mission (UNMIS) was established in 2005. The mandate of the mission was support implementation of CPA, promote rule of law, reorganize police forces, support humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced persons and coordinate de-mining operations.

Contribution

Indian Army contribution was substantial with two Infantry Battalion Groups, Engineer

Company, Field Ambulance, Transport Company and a Signal Group. Apart from the above, the Indian Air Force contributed six Mi-17 helicopters. The Indian contingents operated under one of the most challenging and difficult operational, terrain and weather conditions. The Indian Contingents undertook proactive operations to ensure opening of lines of communication, protection of important towns, protection of verification teams and extension of humanitarian assistance. The Indian contingents fought gallantly to protect civilians from attacks by Armed Groups. The CIMIC activities of the Indian contingents included resuscitation of infrastructure to include schools, hospitals and communication infrastructure. The Indian contribution greatly assisted in successful conduct of the referendum in South Sudan and creation of South Sudan State.

**The article richly draws upon the historical and other facts including photographs from the book 'For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping' written by one of the leading doyens of Indian Peacekeeping in recent history, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, Padma Bhushan, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd). We acknowledge his rich contribution to the cause of Indian Peacekeeping.*

Senior Leadership in UN Peacekeeping

S. No	Rank	Name	Mission
Chairman			
1.	Lt Gen (Later Gen)	KS Thimmayya, DSO	UNNRC
Mil Advisor (MILAD)			
2.	Lt Gen	Randhir Kumar Mehta, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM	UN HQ
3.	Maj Gen	Inderjit Rikhye	UN HQ
Force Commanders			
4.	Maj Gen	Inderjit Rikhye	UNEF-I
5.	Maj Gen (Later Lt Gen)	PS Gyani, PVSM	UNEF-I
6.	Lt Gen	PS Gyani, PVSM	UNFICYP
7.	Gen	KS Thimmayya, DSO	UNFICYP
8.	Maj Gen (Later Lt Gen)	Dewan Prem Chand, PVSM	UNFICYP
9.	Lt Gen	Satish Nambiar, PVSM, VSM, VrC	UNPROFOR
10.	Maj Gen (Later Lt Gen)	V K Jaitley, PVSM, UYSM	UNAMSIL
11.	Maj Gen	Lalit Mohan Tewari, SM, VSM	UNIFIL
12.	Lt Gen	Jasbir Singh Lidder, UYSM, AVSM	UNMIS
13.	Maj Gen (Later Lt Gen)	Rajender Singh, SM, VSM	UNMEE
14.	Lt Gen	Dewan Prem Chand, PVSM	UNTAG
15.	Lt Gen	Chander Prakash, SM, VSM	MONUSCO
16.	Maj Gen	IS Singha, VSM	UNDOF
17.	Maj Gen	JS Menon, VSM	UNDOF
18.	Lt Gen	S S Tinaikar, SM, VSM	UNMISS
Division Commanders			
19.	Maj Gen (Later Lt Gen)	Dewan Prem Chand, PVSM	ONUC
20.	Maj Gen (Later Gen)	Bikram Singh, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM	MONUC

In the Line of Duty

S. No	Rank	Name	Arms/ Service	Mission
Param Vir Chakra				
1.	Capt	GS Salaria (Posthumous)	1 GR	Congo (ONUC)
Padma Vibhushan				
1.	Maj Gen	SPP Thorat, DSO	PUNJAB	Korea (UNNRC)
Padma Bhushan				
1.	Lt Gen	KS Thimayya, DSO	KUMAON	Korea (UNNRC)
Param Vishisht Seva Medal				
1.	Brig	KAS Raja	MADRAS	Congo (ONUC)
2.	Maj Gen	D Prem Chand	1 GR	Congo (ONUC)
3.	Brig	RS Noronha, MC*	MADRAS	Congo (ONUC)
Mahavir Chakra				
1.	Lt Col	AG Rangaraj	AMC	Korea (Multinational Force)
2.	Maj	NB Banerjee	AMC	Korea (Multinational Force)
3.	Lt	VP Trehan (Posthumous)	RAJ RIF	Congo (ONUC)
4.	Nk	Mahavir Thapa (Posthumous)	1 GR	Congo (ONUC)
5.	LNk	RB Gurung (Posthumous)	1 GR	Congo (ONUC)
Kirti Chakra				
1.	Maj Gen	SPP Thorat, DSO	PUNJAB	Korea (UNNRC)
2.	Sub	Rawal Singh	RAJ RIF	Cambodia (UNTAC)
Ati Vishisht Seva Medal				
1.	Col	Brijlal Kapoor	AMC	Congo (ONUC)
2.	Col	Lakshman Nandkeolyar	AMC	Congo (ONUC)
3.	Lt Col	MG Hazari	DOGRA	Congo (ONUC)
4.	Lt Col	SS Maitri	1 GR	Congo (ONUC)
5.	Maj	MS Padda	63 CAV	Congo (ONUC)
6.	Maj	Sukhdial Singh	DOGRA	Congo (ONUC)
Bar to Vir Chakra				
1.	Maj	VP Rangaswami	AMC	Korea (UNNRC)
Vir Chakra				
1.	Nk	Nag Sen Singh	AMC	Korea (Multinational Force)
2.	Capt	NC Das	AMC	Korea (Multinational Force)
3.	Capt	Ashoke Banerjee	AMC	Korea (Multinational Force)
4.	LNk	Budh Singh	ASC	Korea (Multinational Force)
5.	Nk	Umrao Singh	ASC	Korea (Multinational Force)
6.	Nk	Rattan Singh	AMC	Korea (Multinational Force)

In the Line of Duty

7.	Maj	GS Sharma	1 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
8.	Lt	SK Sonpar	63 CAV	DR Congo (ONUC)
9.	Lt	OP Bangia	MAHAR	DR Congo (ONUC)
10.	Sub	Sattajit Pun	1 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
11.	Nb Sub	Debjang Sahi	1 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
12.	Nk	Ganga Ram	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
13.	Nk	M Gurung	1 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
14.	Nk	Ram Singh	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
15.	LNk	Gian Singh	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
16.	Sep	Amar Singh	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
17.	Sep	Govardhan Singh	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
18.	Sep	Phole Ram (Posthumous)	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
19.	Rfn	Jethoo Singh (Posthumous)	RAJ RIF	DR Congo (ONUC)
20.	Lt	VN Madan	MADRAS	DR Congo (ONUC)
Shaurya Chakra				
1.	Capt	Pradeep Bhatia	MAHAR	Somalia (UNOSOM)
2.	Sub	Ganga Ram (Posthumous)	MAHAR	Somalia (UNOSOM)
3.	Sub	Dharam Singh	MAHAR	Somalia (UNOSOM)
4.	Sep	Devendra Chand (Posthumous)	MAHAR	Somalia (UNOSOM)
5.	Sep	Thakur Singh	ASC	Korea (UNNRC)
6.	Nb Sub	Balbir Singh	PARA	Gaza (UNEF)
7.	Hav	Dewan Singh (Posthumous)	PARA	Gaza (UNEF)
8.	Nk	Puran Chand	PARA	Gaza (UNEF)
9.	Sep	Beg Raj	PARA	Gaza (UNEF)
Yudh Seva Medal				
1.	Col	AN Bahuguna, KC	JAK RIF	Cambodia (UNTAC)
2.	Brig	RK Mehta, VSM	PARA	Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
3.	Maj	Raj Pal Punia	8 GR	Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
4.	Maj	Harinder Paul Sood	PARA (SF)	Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
Sena Medal				
1.	Maj	BS Cheema	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
2.	Capt	SL Sikand	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
3.	Lt	Gurdip Singh	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
4.	Dfr	Rattan Singh	63 CAV	DR Congo (ONUC)
5.	Nb Sub	Bawa Singh	63 CAV	DR Congo (ONUC)
6.	Hav	Vishwa Raj Singh	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)
7.	Hav	DB Gurung	1 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
8.	Nk	Ranbir Singh	DOGRA	DR Congo (ONUC)

INDIA'S UN FOOTPRINTS

9.	Nk	KB Thapa	1 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
10.	Dvr	Kundan Singh	ARTY	DR Congo (ONUC)
11.	Maj	CB Sahi	5 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
12.	LNk	Bhimbdr Gharti (Posthumous)	5 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
13.	Rfn	Angad Singh	RAJ RIF	DR Congo (ONUC)
14.	Maj	Sami Khan	MADRAS	DR Congo (ONUC)
15.	Maj	Raj Singh	RAJ RIF	DR Congo (ONUC)
16.	Lt	MM Walia	MADRAS	DR Congo (ONUC)
17.	Lt	Hasan Muzaffar	ENGRS	DR Congo (ONUC)
18.	Jamedar	Rajpal	RAJ RIF	DR Congo (ONUC)
19.	Jamedar	IB Gurung	5 GR	DR Congo (ONUC)
20.	Hav	Sarwan Singh	ARTY	DR Congo (ONUC)
21.	Hav	Shankar More	ENGRS	DR Congo (ONUC)
22.	Nk	Issac	MADRAS	DR Congo (ONUC)
23.	Sep	Kadamala Kunchaiah	MADRAS	DR Congo (ONUC)
24.	Hav	Surinder Singh	JAK RIF	Cambodia (UNTAC)
25.	Rfn	Sukwinder Singh	JAK RIF	Cambodia (UNTAC)
26.	Col	DK Mohan	BIHAR	Somalia (UNSOM)
27.	LNk	Sadagar Singh (Posthumous)	MAHAR	Somalia (UNSOM)
28.	Maj	Abhay Krishna	RAJ RIF	Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
29.	Hav	Kishan Kumar	MECH INF	Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
30.	Lt	Sanjay Arya	8 GR	Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
31.	Hav	Rovin Rana	8 GR	Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
32.	Hav	Krishan Kumar	8 GR	Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
33.	Lt Col	Rajinder Singh	MECH INF	Iran Iraq UNIIMOG
34.	Lt Col	Rajneesh Giri	MAHAR	South Sudan (UNMISS)
35.	Nk	Shiv Shankar Chaudhary	BIHAR	DR Congo (MONUSCO)
36.	Maj	Avinash Kumar	KUMAON	DR Congo (MONUSCO)
Vishist Seva Medal				
1.	Maj	KM Ghorpade	16 CAV	DR Congo (ONUC)
2.	Maj	SK Dhar	RAJ RIF	DR Congo (ONUC)
3.	Maj	PA Choudhary	RAJ RIF	DR Congo (ONUC)
4.	Nk	Chhankar Singh	SIGS	DR Congo (ONUC)
5.	Col	FP Shinde	RAJ RIF	DR Congo (ONUC)
6.	Lt Col	DS Randhawa, MC	MADRAS	DR Congo (ONUC)
7.	Lt Col	ZC Bakshi, VrC	5 GR (FF)	DR Congo (ONUC)
8.	Brig	Deepak Kapoor	ARTY	Somalia (UNSOM)
9.	Col	NK Singh	3 GR	Rwanda (UNAMIR)
10.	Maj	SK Singh	AMC	Korea (UNNRC)

TOP DOWN PERSPECTIVES

Countering Volatility and Instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo

By **Lieutenant General Chandi Prasad Mohanty**

Param Vishisht Seva Medal, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal, Sena Medal, Vishisht Seva Medal, ADC, Vice Chief of Army Staff

2010 -11 was a difficult time in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It was faced with a difficult situation where the predominantly Tutsi CNDP had brokered a precarious peace with the government after a serious insurrection. Its cadres were concentrated in the Eastern part of the DRC in the Kivu provinces. Despite having joined the government forces, troops loyal to CNDP continued to covertly support their own set of leaders.

On the other hand, Eastern DRC continued to be flush with Hutu refugees, settled in villages in remote jungles in the Kivu Provinces. This led to a large presence of FDLR militias in these areas as well.

While Hutus and Tutsis; post civil war of Rwanda had their own interests in Eastern

Congo, there existed a number of other smaller armed militias who wanted their writ to run in their own local areas. These were Mai-Mai militias, created for protecting their communities; yet often preying on their own people.

It was in this volatile environment that I took over the Command of North Kivu Brigade on 01 September 2010. The Brigade comprised



four Indian Battalion Groups, a Battalion Group each from Nepal, South Africa, Uruguay (motorised), Jordanian Special Forces and other supporting contingents.

Hitting the Ground Running

On the day of my assumption of Command, there was a high level visit by Additional Secretary General Mr Atul Khare, the SRSg and the Force Commander to my Brigade HQ at Goma. While I was busy with the visit, the Commanding Officer of the South African Battalion informed my staff that there was less strength in his TOB at Kalembe and there was an urgent requirement of sending additional troops to the TOB from the Battalion HQ located on the outskirts of Goma. This helicopter, flown by international contractors, took off in the late afternoon with fifteen South African unarmed soldiers including five women soldiers.

Sometime after dark, the South African Battalion Commander reported that their troops had landed at a wrong place, Kilambo instead of Kalembe, and were surrounded by armed rebels. Hearing this, there was a shocked silence, as everyone was aware that Kilambo, where the South Africans had landed, was the stronghold of Janvier, leader of Mai Mai Janvier; a brutal and unstable leader who was expecting that he would be targeted by the UN.

The Chief of Staff Colonel Sanjay Singh contacted Colonel SK Mandal, Commanding Officer of 5 JAK LI (INDBATT 3) at Sake, who had built excellent contacts across the conflict zone in the area. He gave a call to Janvier on satellite phone, telling him that the South Africans had landed in his area as a result of a

navigational error by the pilot and not as part of any larger plan to harm him or his group. After some difficult negotiations he managed to defuse the situation, asking the armed group to release the soldiers and assured them that they would be extracted by helicopter in the morning.



However, there was to be no rest for the night. After dark, the UN Sector Public Information Officer informed us that the Americans had received a satellite phone intercept of some problem brewing. Meanwhile the South Africans were also worried, since they had been receiving telephone calls from their country to bring back the soldiers immediately. It was clear that if the South African soldiers were not brought back at night, the situation would become international news by the next morning. I took a decision to launch the helicopters at night itself. The South African Air Force contingent volunteered to fly the Oryx helicopters to recover their soldiers.

Much credit goes to the South African pilots who flew through the dead of the night using Night Vision Goggles, landed in a football field at Kilambo with corners lit up by fire to indicate location and rescued their soldiers sometime by 0130 hrs after one failed

attempt to land. I offered a silent prayer to Lord Krishna whose birthday it was for having brought back our soldiers unharmed. The major lessons that emerged from this were the following:-

- ❖ Anything that can go wrong will go wrong!! Who could have anticipated that the pilots would feed wrong coordinates and land at a wrong place? Who could have anticipated that the soldiers would get down at the wrong place and without cross checking where they were, release the helicopter?
- ❖ In UN operations, there is indeed a requirement of maintaining contact even with the armed rebels to diffuse crisis situations.

Securing Rebel Commander by Heliborne Operation.

There had been a brutal incident of mass rapes of around 300 women carried out by Mai-Mai Cheka in the area of village Luvungi in the month of August 2010. A large scale operation code named Op Shop Window had yielded no result. Investigations had revealed that these mass rapes had been carried out by a group of militia under the Chief of Staff of

Mai Mai Cheka, 'Lieutenant Colonel' Mayele. The 'Chief of Staff' and his militia lived deep in the jungles of Eastern DRC near village Irameso.

In the month of October, a very deliberate plan was devised and put into place. This involved giving credible and clear warnings to the leader of this group (Cheka) to give up his own Chief of Staff to the United Nations to face trial or face the consequences. The most dangerous part of the plan involved going right into the heart of the rebel stronghold located some seven days walk from the nearest road head. It was decided to execute the task by heliborne troops of the Indian Contingent along with interpreters and few UN civil Staff.



Heliborne Troops of the Indian Contingent



SRSG being Briefed from Vantage Point

The task was extremely complex and required coordination with a large number of pilots from India & South Africa, flying combination of reconnaissance, transport and attack helicopters. It also involved the coordinating and training of our soldiers including Ghataks of INDBATT I, UN Civil staff, Logistics and many other agencies. The degree of risk was enormous, as we expected between 250 to 300 armed rebels in the area; and that the UN helicopters could only carry about 15 people. The ratio against the UN Military was

overwhelming. This required detailed contingency planning, preparations and rehearsals which was painstakingly carried out by the Chief of Staff.

This mission was led by me, overseeing the operations from a Cheetah helicopter based Airborne Command Post; with Indian Attack Helicopters providing continuous combat patrol over the target area. The ground forces were led by Deputy Commander, Colonel (now Major General) Sanjay Singh, a Para (SF) Officer. We flew low over dense primary forests, through thunder and lightning to land in an improvised football field in the remote village; arrested the Chief of Staff of the armed group and flew him out to justice in Goma. The lesson the Indian contingent sent out was loud & clear. There could be no tolerance for rape. The Rule of Law was supreme.

This unparalleled effort by the Indian peacekeepers was spoken of very highly by no less than the Secretary General of the United Nations. The Special Representative to the Secretary General for Sexual Violence in Conflicts, Miss Margot Wallstrom, visited the mission from New York to laud the gallant action by Indian peace keepers.

Our contingent in the Congo carried out at least six more such heliborne missions deep into rebel areas with a view to prevent adverse incidents. All these missions used the broad pattern evolved against Mai Mai Cheka; with me leading the missions on board Airborne Command Post; and Col Sanjay Singh physically leading the ground troops comprising Ghatak Platoons and other troops of Indian Battalions. We conducted operations deep into the jungles at Oninga, Lukweti and Omate Gold mines. Enormous risks were

taken by the Brigade in such pre-emptive operations; defusing problems before they occurred.



Trek to Nyiragongo – It was Not All Work

The Brigade Headquarters and officers posted around Goma decided to take a trek up to the Nyiragongo Volcano mouth on a Sunday. Halfway up the mountain someone's hand brushed against a beehive located low and below waist level. All hell broke loose. There were thousands of bees all over. We had to light fire to drive the bees away. The bees had gone into the shirts & jackets of soldiers including two to three officers. The Chief of Staff who was just ahead of me had borne maximum brunt of the attack and was critical.

There was no option, given the possibility of anaphylactic shock due to multiple bee stings, but to call for helicopters. Our gallant Indian Aviators led by their Commanding Officer Colonel Sreedharan (now Brigadier), flying Cheetah helicopters, came to the rescue. They flew a number of sorties and airlifted all the casualties on low hover over lava rocks on slopes of Mount Nyiragongo to Indian Level 3 Hospital at Goma. It was truly a test of their flying skills. Our Level 3 Hospital under Colonel Sanjay Gupta at Goma too rose to the

Countering Volatility and Instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo

occasion. Needless to say, everyone survived and in fact went back to the mountain and summited it the next month.

Having interacted with armed forces of many countries during my service, I have come to a conclusion that the professionalism, commitment, dedication and compassion of the Indian Peacekeepers is undoubtedly many notches above other nationalities and they carry out their task well beyond the call of duty; rising to every challenging situation.

Lieutenant General CP Mohanty, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, ADC is an alumnus of RIMC Dehradun, NDA and IMA was commissioned into 6 RAJPUT in Jun 1982. The General Officer has attended the staff course at DSSC, Wellington, HDMC at College of Defence Management and National Defence College. In an illustrious career spanning nearly 39 years, the General Officer has served in varied roles encompassing all possible operational and terrain profiles. He is presently the Vice Chief of Army Staff.

The General Officer is highly academically oriented and has researched extensively on China and South Asia & North East India making him a domain expert of these regions. He has an M.Phil Degree in Defence Studies from Madras University and also holds two Masters Degrees in Defence and Management Studies separately.



Lieutenant General
Chandi Prasad Mohanty

Changing Dynamics of Peacekeeping in MONUC:

Tribute to (Late) Chief of Defence Staff,
General Bipin Rawat, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM,
SM, VSM, ADC, Commander North Kivu Brigade
(2008-09)

By **Lieutenant General Jaiveer Singh Negi**

*Param Vishisht Seva Medal, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal,
Yudh Seva Medal, Vishisht Seva Medal** (Retd)*



This Article is dedicated as a tribute to our (Late) Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, as Commander of North Kivu Multinational Brigade comprising of four Indian Battalions (INDBATT), Air Force contingent of MI-17 and Attack Helicopters and flight of Cheetah Helicopters. The memoirs were to have been written by General Bipin Rawat, but for the unfortunate fatal chopper crash on 08 December 2021, where the Nation and the Armed Forces lost General and Mrs Rawat and twelve other members of the crew and staff. He has left behind a legacy and a huge void. I pen down a brief account of the nostalgic and challenging times of the two conflicts where the North

Kivu Brigade was involved in 2008-09. This period is a testimony to the exemplary professionalism, dynamic and bold leadership and ability to operate in challenging and diverse international environment by Brigadier General Bipin Rawat as Commander of the Indian 301 Infantry Brigade Group (North Kivu Brigade).

Background

Brigadier General Bipin Rawat assumed command of the North Kivu Brigade on 14 August 2008 from Brigadier General Inderjeet Narayan, VSM. The province of North Kivu



Brigadier General Bipin Rawat inspecting INDBATT

under operational responsibility of the Indian Brigade, was in an environment of fragile peace after the signing of Goma Peace Accord in January 2008. The activities of hostile Armed Groups (AGs) like CNDP under Laurent Nakunda and Mai Mai continued creating minor incidents of violence. Both foreign and Congolese AGs operating in the Area of Responsibility of North Kivu Brigade carried out anti national activities of looting and extortion. The CNDP continued to consolidate its economic and military strength. The Brigade was ORBATTED with four INDBATTs and in addition RSABAT and URUBAT were



also placed under command for implementing the UN Mandate. The Brigade was tasked to consolidate the peace process. It was training the FARDC (Government Forces) by deployment of Indian Training Team (TTF) with the two fold aim of enhancing professional acumen and preparing them to undertake operations against the FDLR cadres (Hostile armed group of Rwanda) present inside DRC. Operations against the FDLR were to commence from 01 September 2008.

The MONUC Eastern Division in DRC was being commanded by Major General Bikram Singh, (later General), our COAS. The Division



Headquarters was located at Kishanghani and North Kivu Brigade was initially under it for some time and later the Division Tactical Headquarters was moved to Goma. Number of meetings were chaired by General Officer Commanding Eastern Division on the developing situation and progress of training of the FARDC. The North Kivu Brigade gained a lot on the operational situation and guidance on operations and training of FARDC from General Bikram Singh. On completion of his tenure, General Bikram Singh de-inducted from the Mission in August 2008. The North Kivu Brigade was later placed directly under the Force Headquarters located at the capital Kinshasha.

Evolving Situation

The cease fire signed between FARDC and various armed groups remained in place till 28 August 2008, though punctuated with some cease fire violations, mutual suspicion and exchange of fires between Nakunda loyalists (CNDP) and FARDC. Brigadier General Bipin Rawat on assuming command of the North Kivu Brigade visited all contingents. He rightly appreciated the developing situation and emphasised on the physical and psychological preparation and training of all troops for any contingency. The Force Commander (FC) Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye visited North Kivu Brigade and interacted with Brigadier General Bipin Rawat. After the briefing, the FC remarked **'General Bipin you are a thorough professional, having been here for just two weeks, you have familiarised with every aspect of the mission and grasped the situation so well. I admired what the Indian Generals are made up of'.**

Brigadier General Bipin Rawat after analysing the developing situation on FARDC movements, CNDP activities, increasing incidents of violence, stone pelting, visualised the likely impact on the security situation, and protection of civilian population and UN

assets. Based on the analysis, additional forces were placed under operational command of North Kivu Brigade to include redeployment of one Battalion from South Kivu to North Kivu. Flash points were identified and necessary force protection measures were instituted. An unambiguous concept of operations was spelt out by Brigadier General Bipin Rawat to include



On Ground Recce

correct appreciation of situation, analysis and intelligence build up, synergy with Air Force and supporting elements, activities to win Hearts and Minds and professional conduct of UN troops.

Conflict

The conflict started on 28 August 2008 North of Goma (Headquarters of North Kivu Brigade) and then spread to several other areas with rapid advance by the CNDP. The FARDC panicked and withdrew in a disorganised manner, allowing CNDP to capture their Headquarters as well as large quantity of arms and ammunition. INDBATTs quickly reacted to the challenge and halted the advance of CNDP. The Indian peacekeepers were also able to prevent a large quantity of ammunition of FARDC falling in CNDP hands.



Interacting with Local Population

Changing Dynamics of Peacekeeping in MONUC



Heli Landed Area Domination Patrol

Initial Ceasefire

The situation was stabilised by North Kivu Brigade by employing BMPs and heavy losses were inflicted on CNDP. Unilateral Ceasefire was declared by Laurent Nakunda on 11 September 2008.



Employment of BMPs

Zones of Separation

North Kivu Brigade ensured the redeployment of CNDP and FARDC to create zones of



Zone of Separation

separation for implementing disengagement plan. Though both parties agreed, the zones of separation were not fully implemented.

Uneasy Peace

There were violent actions and agitations by the local population with support and participation of rebel groups against MONUC units, UN officials and humanitarian agencies. The situation was grave. Brigadier General Bipin Rawat had been projecting the changing role of 'Peace Keeping' of the Brigade gradually transiting into 'Peace Enforcement' for which there was need for modifications to




Visiting Injured Soldiers at Level - III Hospital

the Rules of Engagement and equipping of the Indian and Multinational troops. The period was utilised to evolve plans for future




Internally Displaced Persons outside COB

TOP DOWN PERSPECTIVES



Employment of Attack Helicopters

operations and several brainstorming sessions were carried out. After deliberations, the IAF contingent was tasked to employ attack helicopters against the rebel groups as 'Show of Force'. This decision proved to be a critical factor in breaking the advance and strongholds of CNDP and other rebel groups.



Locals Celebrating Halt of Advance of CNDP

Actions in Sake and Masisi

The hostilities between CNDP and FARDC recommenced, with CNDP being better prepared with heavy weaponry including tanks and MBRLs captured from FARDC. CNDP advanced towards Masisi and entered several villages in the area, resulting in heavy exodus of locals. Attack helicopters were launched initially as 'Show of Force' and then were employed for firing rockets on the advancing and entrenched CNDP cadres in



CNDP Firing Rockets from Captured MBRLs

support of FARDC and Protection of Civilians. Similar proactive actions were taken by the INDBATTs by use of BMPs in Sake. The correct assessment, preparations and will to use Force by Brigadier General Bipin Rawat prevented fall of Sake and Masisi.



CNDP Cadres Sitting on Tanks Captured from FARDC

CNDP Enters Rutshuru

The conflict and fighting in certain areas initially caused setback to the MONUC and North Kivu Brigade, primarily because of FARDC abandoning areas occupied by them, without fighting, resulting in massive surge of IDPs, concentration of local population around the Company Operating Bases (COB). Rutshuru had been one of the primary objectives of CNDP. In September 2008, the local population was instigated and a South African patrol was surrounded and their APC



Burnt APC (Mamba) of South Africa

(Mamba) was burnt. In October 2008, when CNDP resumed attacks towards Rutshuru, the NGOs and MONUC civilians were rescued and brought inside the COB Rutshuru. CNDP moved close to the COB, merging with the local population. Two strong patrols which were of out of the COB, could not enter the COB due to huge exodus of locals and IDPs blocking all routes. The CNDP and other groups carried out loot and killings in the town, creating massive humanitarian crises. The COB having limited reaction capability to react, troops could not move out to provide protection to some IDPs. This incident was exploited adversely by the negative and inimical forces as also anti-India media reporters. CNDP occupied Rutshuru on 27/28 October 2008 pushing FARDC towards Goma. Attack helicopters and BMPs were again used against the CNDP. During the



Rutshuru After Hostilities


operations, one of the MI-17 and Cheetah helicopter suffered damages due to ground firing. The Commander North Kivu Brigade had appreciated that the next offensive will be towards Goma, which was under threat from two directions. He issued orders for strengthening the posts, defence of Goma air field and UN assets and even entrenching of troops in case of cross fire as also to retaliate with force, if the posts were threatened. The military observers were integrated with the COBs and posts for protection, thus ensuring their safety.



UN Helicopter After the Attack

Defence of Goma

INDBATT and some South African troops were deployed along approaches leading to Goma along with BMPs, air surveillance by Cheetah



helicopters and support of attack helicopters. Some elements of CNDP and other rebel groups and some rogue elements of FARDC joined hands and entered Goma town carrying out looting, rape and indiscriminate firing on 27/28 October 2008. The entire Government machinery collapsed and the Governor took shelter in INDBATT location. Fire of attack helicopters and BMPs was brought on CNDP positions and FARDC was also motivated to occupy defences for protection of Goma. A stern warning was sent to CNDP not to advance into Goma town. The deployment and use of force along with negotiations had dramatic effect and CNDP halted its advance and thus fall of Goma was prevented. A Buffer Zone was created and patrolled by UN troops. This remained for a few months after declaration of cease fire on 29 October 2008.



Briefing Mr Obasanjo, Envoy of UN General Secretary

Operation NECKTIE II

Brigadier General Rawat planned a bold operation by creating an adhoc Force of Indian and South African troops supported by BMPs and attack helicopters to advance south along the Sake-Minova Axis. This Task Force swiftly advanced, employed BMPs and attack helicopters against the CNDP positions. The CNDP cadres fled on seeing the onslaught. Link up was established between the North

Kivu and South Kivu MONUC Brigades and the connectivity between North and South Kivu was restored. These actions brought relief to the Mission, Government of DRC and was an accomplishment to restore stability and peace in the area. I accompanied the Special Representative to Secretary General (SRSG), over flying the area. He was briefed enroute and on then landing at Pakistani COB, thus assuring him normalcy of the ground situation.



Before the Advance

Impact of Operations.

The Cease Fire by CNDP, after suffering losses brought in restoration of stability in the region, creating Buffer Zones and environment for negotiations. Talks between the warring factions, CNDP and FARDC were conducted. Brigadier General Rawat and Staff of North Kivu Brigade were involved in all these talks and negotiations. Thus the credibility of UN peacekeepers, India and Indian soldiers was redeemed and restored, removing the negative and anti-India feelings and sentiments among the UN community and local population.

Visit of UN Secretary General Mr Ban Ki Moon to North Kivu Brigade

The UN Secretary General visited Congo and Goma to get a firsthand account of the political, social, security situation, derailment of peace process and humanitarian issues. The Secretary General was then briefed by Brigadier General Bipin Rawat on the operational and security situation and dedicated efforts of Indian peacekeepers beyond the call of the UN Mandate were highlighted. The Secretary General lauded the contribution of India and Indian troops to the UN peacekeeping missions and sacrifices made by them to maintain peace in several war torn regions of the world and in Congo. He even mentioned that 'Congo has remained integrated due to the Indian troops and Indian Government in 1961 and now'.



Visit of Mr Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General

The Second Conflict

After the Ceasefire with CNDP and establishment of buffer zones in November 2008, the actions to train FARDC for operations against FDLR were planned.

Rwandan Armed Forces (RDF) Operations Against FDLR.

The uneasy peace prevailing in North Kivu in the month of December 2008 was disrupted with large scale movement of Rwandan troops crossing into Congo. Brigadier General Rawat tasked me along with another staff officer to ascertain the situation and movement. We flew in a helicopter along the border and observed four columns moving into Congo from Rwandan side along the road Axis Goma-Rutushru. The matter was reported to MONUC Headquarters and Force Headquarters. There was panic all over, as fears of mass killing and loot were expected.



Briefing One of the Senior Delegations

Once again IDPs were started concentrating closer to the posts. Meetings were called by Brigadier General Rawat with MONUC officials to take stock of this new and sudden development.

Brigadier General Rawat made a quick analysis and plan of action, put aerial surveillance in place, carried out protection of civilians by reorganising and establishing Temporary Posts (TOBs) and Helicopter Bases. The RDF maintained discipline and did not set up bases nor launched any operations against FDLR. The FDLR melted away without confrontation with joint RDF-FARDC Forces.



Rwandan Troops Crossing into Congo

Operation KIMIA II

The North Kivu Brigade under the leadership of Brigadier General Rawat then planned for the operations of FARDC against the FDLR by training, mentoring, redeploying and providing air and logistic support to them. Consequent to some FARDC operations against FDLR, there were reprisal attacks against the civil population and strategy for protection of civil population had to be put in place by occupying additional TOBs.



Discussions with FARDC Commanders

The North Kivu Brigade and other multinational troops along with IAF contingent continued the untiring and dedicated efforts for maintaining stability, peace, empowering and mentoring the FARDC to enable them to launch operations. The Protection of Civilians, coordination and synergy with MONUC civil

sections, to maintain peace and harmony in North Kivu and DRC continued. Brigadier General Bipin Rawat was called to UN Headquarters to make a presentation on the Peace Keeping Role and recommendations for Peace Enforcement, which he had visualised and apprised the SRSG, FC and Indian Military hierarchy. He completed his command of North Kivu Brigade on 13 August 2009 and de-inducted from the mission area with a feeling of great satisfaction, accomplishment and contribution to the UN peacekeeping and saw a paradigm shift from 'Peacekeeping to Peace Maintenance to Peace Enforcement'.

We later learnt that a 'Peace Enforcement Brigade' was created in Congo. The Indian Brigade along with IAF contingent and other multinational units placed under command had achieved this within the existing mandate and organisation. The Indian contingents and many individuals were awarded SRSG and Force Commanders Unit Citations and Commendations for their courage and dedication to peacekeeping.

As a tribute to our (Late) CDS General Bipin Rawat, I would say that 'General Rawat (then Brigadier General) along with Indian Brigade redeemed the honour and rightful place of Indian peacekeepers steadfastly, amidst most challenging and adverse situation. Standing tall with conviction and courage, he played a crucial role in restoring stability in North Kivu and made immense contribution to the peace keeping efforts of MONUC in Congo.'

**This article has been edited and abridged in conformity with the overall theme and size of the Journal.*

This article is a tribute to our (Late) CDS General Bipin Rawat, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM and brings out the challenges and changing dynamics of peace keeping as part MONUC in DRC under the dynamic and professional leadership of General Bipin Rawat (Then Commander of Indian 301 Infantry Brigade known as North Kivu Multi National Brigade). During the period of 2008-09 the Brigade was involved in peace keeping operation in volatile North Kivu province of DRC. The Brigade with other UN partners was successful in restoring peace and won appreciations for maintaining stability in North Kivu by their professionalism and dedication, under the dynamic leadership of Brigade General Bipin Rawat in the most challenging and changing dynamics of peace keeping.

The author, Lieutenant General JS Negi, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM** PhD (Retired) was commissioned in 16 DOGRA in 1981. He commanded his unit in Operation PARAKRAM and an Assam Rifles Sector in North East. He has been General Officer Commanding 8 Mountain Division, General Officer Commanding 2 Corps and Commandant Indian Military Academy prior to his superannuation in September 2020. He was the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the North Kivu Brigade during the command tenure of Brigadier General Bipin Rawat.



Lieutenant General
Jaiveer Singh Negi

India and United Nations Peacekeeping:

A Saga of Dedication and Commitment

By **Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar**

Padma Bhushan, Param Vishisht Seva Medal, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal, Vir Chakra (Retired)

During much of the seventy five year history of the United Nations, of all its activities peacekeeping operations have attracted maximum attention. Primarily because conflicts make dramatic news and the deployment of an international military force by the Security Council to preserve a fragile peace, makes a good story that captures public interest in this electronic age. As it evolved over the years, peacekeeping became an extraordinary art that called for the use of the military personnel not to wage war but to prevent fighting between belligerents; to ensure the maintenance of cease-fires, and to provide a measure of stability in an area of conflict while negotiations were conducted. Of course, the publicity generated by its peacekeeping activities in the past had for the most part, been beneficial; especially in times when the organisation did not otherwise enjoy public confidence or credibility. Since the mid-1990s however, with the deployment of UN forces in intra-state conflicts and civil war situations where there were perceived inadequacies, even peacekeeping operations have drawn adverse comment. There can be little doubt that United Nations peace operations are at cross-roads. The last thirty years have

severely tested the concept, philosophy and manner of conduct of these operations.

In any discussion on the subject, it is important to distinguish between the concept of “collective security” and “peacekeeping” in the international environment. Whereas “collective security” is a punitive process designed to be carried out with some degree of discrimination, but not necessarily impartially, “peacekeeping” is intended to be politically impartial and essentially non-coercive. Hence peacekeeping was, and has always been, based on a triad of principles that give it legitimacy, as well as credibility; namely, consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force by lightly armed peacekeepers only in self - defence. All three principles have been under severe strain in the last three decades. The premise on which UN peacekeeping was based is that violence in inter-state and intra-state conflict can be controlled without resort to the use of force or enforcement measures. No doubt, some theorists and one may dare say quite a few practitioners, are of the view that force needs to be met with force. An objective analysis of the history of conflicts probably reveals that the use of force and enforcement measures, particularly in

internal conflicts, tend to prolong the conflict rather than resolve it speedily. This is not however, to suggest that the use of force be discounted altogether. In certain circumstances, use of force may well be called for as a catalyst for peaceful resolution. A quote attributed to Al Capone, a notorious Chicago gangster of the early 20th Century is probably appropriate in this context-

“You can get a lot more done with a kind word when you have a gun in your hand, than with a kind word alone”.

In any case, use of force in UN peacekeeping is not a new phenomenon. The UN force in the Congo in the early 1960s was mandated to use force to deal with Katangese secessionists led by Moise Tshombe. An Indian brigade-sized contingent undertook combat operations to stabilise the situation. But at great cost - 36 dead and 124 wounded; a heavy price to pay for a UN peacekeeping operation. Similar operations were undertaken, again by the Indian contingent in Sierra Leone, to rescue hostages taken by rebel forces in 1999.

Hence the 'use of force' for the protection of civilians is not an issue that requires debate or discussion; it is a task that UN peacekeepers should be prepared to undertake. The dilemmas however that arise in the process must be recognised and addressed. One, the United Nation Security Council must mandate the use of force, no doubt easily done, particularly because those who mandate do not provide the 'boots' on the ground as it were, and hence do not have to bear the consequences. Two, adequate resources must be provided for effective

implementation of the mandate, as also political back-up support; on both counts, the situation at the ground level is invariably most disappointing. Three, we must accept the fact that in the combat operations that are undertaken, there will be casualties; to United Nations personnel taking part, personnel from the opposing rebel forces, and possibly some collateral impact on innocent civilians caught up in the fighting. Four, having taken sides in the local conflict, the 'blue helmets' become party to the conflict and are hence perceived as legitimate targets later. And five, United Nations mediators and negotiators could lose their legitimacy and credibility with those against whom the operations are undertaken.

I have long been an advocate of the imperative need to set up a “Standing United Nations Rapid Deployment Force”, if the organisation is to have the capacity to deploy quickly into a mission area following agreement between local belligerents, and a decision taken by the United Nations Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping force. I made an effort to have a recommendation to this effect included when I was a member of Kofi Annan's High-level Panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change”, but without success. The fact of the matter is that today, it takes anything from two to three months for deployment to be affected after a Security Council resolution is passed. The situation on the ground does not remain static in the meanwhile; it invariably worsens, to the detriment of the objective of the UN mission.

Another vital issue I have been raising at every conceivable forum over the last couple of decades merits mention. Namely, that the

developed world must get back to UN peacekeeping if such operations are to be effective, and the organisation is to retain any credibility. (Legitimacy is another matter altogether, given the current lack of representation from Africa and South America in the permanent membership category in the Security Council). Because, it is the countries of the developed world that have the equipment resources and trained manpower so desperately required to make UN peacekeeping effective. To suggest that the countries of the Western world prefer to operate under the auspices of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation because of the “inefficiency” or “incompetence” of the UN system is, in my view, hypocrisy of the highest order. I have not noticed any such reluctance by countries of the Western world in garnering senior positions at the UN Headquarters, or in securing senior civilian, military and police staff positions at the headquarters of the missions deployed.

A point often made in justification, is that the countries of the Western world are the ones that make significant financial contributions to the UN, and hence they are entitled to such positions in UN Headquarters and mission areas. This is a myth that I address from personal experience. Besides being the Force Commander of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), I was also the Head of Mission, in which capacity, the Civil Affairs Department, the Civil Police, as also the Administration were under my oversight. I therefore know for a fact that, at that time (1992/93), every single contract, whether it was for provision of aircraft, helicopters, vehicles, provisions, bottled water, maintenance of equipment, communication

equipment, or whatever, was in the hands of the countries of the developed world. Who therefore got back from the United Nations system as much if not more, than the contributions their governments ostensibly made as financial contributions to the organisation.

On the vital aspect of training for UN peacekeeping, it is no doubt appropriate to place on record the fact that in order to build on our expertise and experience in this field of UN activity, as the Director United Service Institution of India, with support from the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence, and Army Headquarters, I had the privilege of setting up a Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in September 2000. The CUNPK besides overseeing the training of contingents earmarked for peacekeeping operations undertakes conduct of training courses for our sub-unit commanders, military observers, and officers earmarked for deputation on staff appointments. It is a measure of our commitment to the UN, that a minimum of fifteen vacancies on each of these courses, are offered to developing countries, with all expenses incurred on travel from home country and back, training, accommodation and meals, borne by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. A number of developed countries like the USA, UK, Australia, Japan, Norway, etc also subscribe to these courses on a self-financing arrangement. It is indeed a matter of great satisfaction and pride that, in the last twenty years, the CUNPK has established itself internationally as a Centre of Excellence, and is now often called upon to conduct specialised international courses on behalf of United Nations Department of Peace

Keeping Operations (DPKO).

And finally, permit me to stress that since developing countries like India are the ones currently shouldering the responsibilities for United Nations peacekeeping, they must have a decisive say in the decision making apparatus that goes into the setting up of missions, formulations of mandates, resource mobilization, contractual provisions, and so on, and also be given a significant share of positions (including senior ones) in the Department of Peace Operations at the UN Headquarters.

Commissioned into the Indian Army on 15 December 1957, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar's operational experience includes service on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, counter insurgency operations in the North East and active participation in the 1965 and 1971 war. Awarded the Vir Chakra in 1971 for bravery in battle, he was also the Director General of Military Operations of the Indian Army. He was the first Force Commander and Head of the United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia from 3 March 1992 to 2 March 1993. Recipient of the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal in 1991 and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal in 1994, he retired as the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff on 31 August 1994.

A life member of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, he was a 'Distinguished Fellow' at the Institute from 2011 to 2015. The General Officer served for many years as a member of Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), India and was on the Governing Board of the Indian Council for World Affairs. The General officer was conferred the Padma Bhushan by the President of India on the occasion of Republic Day 2009.



**Lieutenant General
Satish Nambiar**

Changing Dynamics of UN Peacekeeping : Opportunities and Challenges for India

By Ambassador (Retired) Asoke Kumar Mukerji

The challenges facing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) have dramatically increased in scope and complexity. In response, the UN's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report of June 2015 recommended "the primacy of politics" to resolve conflicts on the UN Security Council (UNSC) agenda. Achieving this will depend on offsetting the veto power of the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, who decide on PKO mandates. India's proposal for "reformed multilateralism" seeks to amend the UN Charter to ensure equal participation in UNSC decision-making.

Three challenges will have long-term implications for effective UN peacekeeping and these are enumerated in succeeding paragraphs.

Peace Enforcement

On 28 March 2013, the UNSC decided to create a "Force Intervention Brigade" (FIB) as part of the MONUSCO PKO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with a mandate to take "robust" action against the armed militia operating against the DRC government in North Kivu Province to protect civilians. The concerns of the largest Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) of MONUSCO regarding such mixed mandates have been vindicated by the fact that despite the FIB, the number of

civilians in North Kivu caught in ongoing violence has risen from 800,000 in 2013 to 1.6 million in 2020.

Deploying the FIB as an integral part of MONUSCO directly challenges the core principles of United Nations peacekeeping. It makes all peacekeepers in MONUSCO "parties to the conflict" under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), compromising the impartiality and effectiveness of the PKO.

Protection of Civilians

On 9 April 2013, five Indian peacekeepers of the UNMISS PKO in Jonglei, South Sudan were killed by an armed militia. This marked the beginning of a rapid disintegration of the PKO's original mandate contained in UNSC resolution 1996 of 8 July 2011 to "consolidate peace and security and to help establish the conditions for development" of South Sudan. Today, the mandate for United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is "protection of civilians" caught in conflict. Almost two million civilians impacted by South Sudan's civil war legitimately expect PKO protection.

South Sudan's Government has seen this change in mandate as being biased against its interests. The consequent breakdown of relations between the PKO and the host government has constrained the effectiveness and credibility of the PKO. Protecting civilians

is dependent on the UNSC prioritizing the availability of necessary human, financial and material resources to peacekeepers - through training and deployment, budgeting, and equipment.

Terrorism

In two separate incidents on 6 March 2013 and 28 August 2014, terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda in Syria held Filipino and Fijian UN peacekeepers of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) PKO hostage. They were released through back-channel diplomacy. The indifference of the UNSC to investigate, prosecute, and penalize these acts so far has encouraged Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist attacks against PKOs elsewhere. UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has suffered the most. Between 1 July 2013 and 31 August 2016, as many as 69 MINUSMA peacekeepers have been killed by terrorists.

As an elected member of the UNSC and the single largest contributor to UN PKOs (over 250,000 troops till 2020), India has a direct interest in helping the Council to respond to these three challenges. The key lies in direct interaction between the UNSC and TCCs on ground before PKO mandates are decided. India has consistently called for implementing the provisions of Article 44 of the UN Charter for this purpose. This Article provides for TCCs not represented in the UNSC "to participate in the decisions" of the UNSC on deployment of their troops beforehand. The UNSC must institutionalise this mechanism unconditionally.

With the maximum casualties (174) among TCCs, India led the process in the UN General Assembly in 2015 that approved the construction of a Memorial Wall to honour the

4121 UN troops who have given their lives so far in defence of the UN Charter. Prime Minister Narendra Modi committed India's support including financially for this purpose at the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping held in New York on 28 September 2015.

Partnership with other TCCs is essential for India's objective in making PKOs effective. The assignment of a regular military adviser in India's UN mission in New York since 2014 (for the first time since 1948) has given a focal point for this purpose. The outcomes have vindicated this approach. These include training of peacekeepers from Africa and Asia in India's Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK), negotiating higher reimbursements for troops deployed in PKOs since 2014 and leading by example in deploying units of women UN peacekeepers to augment the ability of PKOs to meet their primary mandate to protect civilians.

Ambassador (Retired) Asoke Mukerji served for over 37 years in the Indian Foreign Service, retiring as India's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York in December 2015. Due to his initiative in 2014, India assigned a regular military adviser in its Permanent Mission in New York (for the first time since 1948) to coordinate on UN peacekeeping issues.



Ambassador
Asoke Mukerji

Currently, Ambassador Mukerji is on the faculty of Diplo Foundation established by the Governments of Malta and Switzerland and a Distinguished Fellow of the Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.

Pushing the Envelope in Sudan

By **Lieutenant General Jasbir Singh Lidder**

Uttam Yuddh Seva Medal, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (Retired)

It was a privilege to be part of Sudan's peace process, resulting in the birth of South Sudan on 09 July 2011. During this period, I was Force Commander (FC) United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from January 2006 to April 2008 and Deputy Special Representative of Secretary General (Political) from January 2010 to December 2011. Sudan had been in civil war for decades since its independence in 1956 - but the war between Government of Sudan (GoS) and Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) ended with signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) at Nairobi in 2005. UNMIS was established in 2006 through UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), to support the implementation of CPA with an authorized military strength of 10,000 troops.

Sudan Mission was unique, as never before had UN navigated birth of a new nation. Political complexities demanded comprehensive partnerships with a wide range of international and regional stakeholders, which was accomplished through institutionalized dialogue. The Mission Senior Leadership (MSL) worked as an integrated team, rising above turf egos. CPA was identified central to the mission objectives and shared strategies evolved at mission headquarters towards attaining that. Political-military consonance was encouraged in the field to operationalize plans contextually

and maximize finite resources. National Elections (2010) and South Sudan Referendum (2011) could thus be conducted smoothly with international verification.

Critical to CPA's implementation was creation of safe and secure environment and orderly 1956 trans-border movement of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA. Military's footprint covered six geographical sectors, where operations were conducted with robust maneuver. Joint long-range patrols (air, land and riverine) and temporary operating bases (TOBs) were innovated in Sudan to dominate entire geographic space – which stand formalized as UN concepts. Since helicopter fleet was overstretched, military's needs were prioritized through Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC).

Redeployment of SAF and SPLA was monitored through an elaborate network of ceasefire monitoring structures. As Force Commander, I chaired Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (CJMC) while sector commanders staffed Area Joint Monitoring Committees (AJMCs). For impartial jurisdiction, it was essential that CJMC got built into a vibrant institution. This was achieved through series of structural, procedural and social initiatives, including holding of retreats in Kenya, Uganda and Egypt. Importantly CJMC held its critical

meetings at conflict spots, moving beyond Juba-based bureaucracy. When intense fighting broke out between SAF and SPLA in Malakal in November 2006, nearly leading to relapse of war, CJMC met under fire to cease fighting – an incident that won widespread recognition for UN's proactive role.

There was hesitancy on part of few contingents and military observers to move outside their bases. This was attempted to be overcome through regrouping, motivation and in-mission training. As the UN gets more kinetic, troop contributing countries (TCCs) need to resist micro-managing tactical operations through their national seniors or state capitals – but empower their junior leadership to take time-critical decisions. I found sectors with multinational profiles performed better than country specific deployments, since they cross-fertilized best practices and remained transparent in their actions. By instituting deliberate measures to instill battlefield discipline, UNMIS posted a good record in respect for human rights and denial of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). System of Unit Citations and Force Commander Commendation Cards was introduced to incentivize operational effectiveness.

UNMIS was amongst the first to produce protection of civilians (POC) strategy document, incorporating joint interventions with the host nation. Community networking, an inescapable part of POC, was established with civil affairs pillar in the lead. However, I found military personnel handicapped in protection tasks due to lack of local language and inadequate women representation. During 2006-07, DPKO fielded new structures of Joint Operations Center (JOC) and Joint

Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). The military component helped to raise these organizations with qualified staff and standard operating procedures.

Meaningful interface with host nation is fundamental for mission delivery. Though legitimacy comes through the mandate, credibility can only be achieved once local leaders are on board. Building trust helped us to resolve sensitive issues like freedom of movement and use of local facilities with both Khartoum and Juba.

Finally, leadership is the key for UN's success. We need to select competent leaders who are willing to work under adverse conditions and collaborate for the good of humanity.

Lieutenant General Jasbir Singh Lidder, UYSM, AVSM (Retired) has a military career spanning over 40 years. He has held various senior UN appointments to include Chief of Staff of the UN Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1994-95, Force Commander in Sudan (UNMIS) from 2006-08 and Deputy Special Representative of Secretary General (Political) in the same mission from 2010-11.



**Lieutenant General
Jasbir Singh Lidder**

The General Officer is involved with multiple UN offices and global institutes as an expert and mentor.

Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping: The South Sudan Experience

By **Lieutenant General Shailesh Tinaikar**

Sena Medal, Vishisht Seva Medal,

Force Commander, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

Background

Peacekeeping operations till around mid-1990s were limited to observing and mediating conflicts between nation states under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (peaceful settlement of disputes). Internal strife within States did not draw much attention and where necessary was addressed by regional or ad-hoc group of nations through selective intervention. However, the rise of political violence in weakly governed, fragile States and the consequent impact on the lives and livelihood of the innocent demanded a new concept for peacekeeping. Multidimensional peacekeeping was shaped to implement a negotiated agreement between warring parties within a State that included strategies for state capacity building going beyond reconciliation and mediation processes. A peaceful transition to durable peace was the expected outcome through a participative democratic progression.

South Sudan came into existence post a six-year transition provided in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/

Army (SPLM/A) representing the Southern region of Sudan ending more than 20 years of civil war. In the referendum to determine its future status in January 2011, where a United Sudan was an option, 98.83% of participants voted for independence from Sudan. A new Nation of 11 million came into existence. On independence, the leadership of the SPLM/A was faced with the daunting task of building a state from the ravages of civil war, exploitation, and neglect. Unity of purpose and exemplary statesmanship is essential to build the foundations of a State. The resource rich Nation lacked the skill and expertise and needed help.

UNMISS and its Unique Mandate

Recognizing the needs of the people of Sudan, proliferation of small arms, the diversity between and within its regions, the Security Council mandated the UNMISS as a capacity building mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) on its independence on 9 July 2011. UNMISS would support peace consolidation and foster longer-term state-

building and economic development. Its mandate was to advise on an inclusive constitutional process, formulation of national policies, establish the rule of law and strengthen security and justice sectors. A troop reduction to the sanctioned strength of 7000 was to be considered in three to six months based on ground conditions.

On 15 December 2013, just over two years into independence, violence broke out in the capital city of Juba as the ruling SPLM split with the President accusing the Vice President of planning a coup d'état. It quickly spread across the country and thousands of civilians arrived at UNMISS bases seeking protection. UNMISS was re-prioritized in 2014 to protect civilians in imminent danger-capacity building mandate was shelved as assistance in capacity building could further empower the State to act against its own citizens. The re-prioritized mission had four pillars which continue till date; protection of civilians, monitoring of human rights violations, creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and support implementation of IGAD (regional organization of eight East African States) led peace process. UNMISS military strength was raised from 7000 to 17000 troops and a Police component of 2100 was formed over three years as insecurity and violence showed no sign of lessening. IGAD played the lead role in getting the parties (SPLM and SPLM-In Opposition being the principal) sign the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in December 2017 and the Peace Agreement (Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan) in September 2018. The ceasefire and implementation of the

agreement is monitored by joint mechanisms of all parties overseen by IGAD. UNMISS supports implementation of the Peace Process along with international partners.

Fragile Peace and Protection of Civilians

The Republic of South Sudan was ten years old on 11 July 2021. The implementation of the Peace Agreement has seen uneven progress till date. The Ceasefire continues to hold. A transitional government of National Unity (incorporating all parties) with a joint Presidency is in power. The Transitional National Legislative Assembly has been sworn in, State Governors and County Commissioners have been appointed. The displaced population is returning in small numbers and new habitations are coming into existence. Implementation however falls well short of timelines and some key provisions unfortunately defy implementation.

Protection of civilians is a state responsibility and where the State is unable or unwilling to protect, a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission is compelled to fill the gap. Protection is always a "Whole of Mission" responsibility. It involves much more than robust use of military force. Communities need to reconcile, disputes suitably mediated and justice served as per existing laws. Security sector to include policing and the rule of law may require reform. Women suffer disproportionately and must be a part of conflict resolution with their rights protected. Enhanced human security is essential for protection and durable peace; timely and efficient delivery of humanitarian services;

food and clean water, child protection, education and health care particularly related to women, girls and boys. Conflict related sexual violence (prevalent in South Sudan) requires urgent intervention and human rights violators must be called out. UNMISS provides a security environment that enables a whole range of political, civil and humanitarian activities to promote peace and stability. Deploying pro-actively in conflict spots, UNMISS reconciles communities, mediates disputes cooperatively with the local administration and saves lives.

UNMISS continues to use its good offices engaging parties and stakeholders encouraging implementation of the Peace Agreement. State Executive Retreats to build trust for an inclusive government, Governors Forums to enhance cooperation between different state governments, round -table conferences on shared reflections on developments in the country and way forward in nation building are some of the political initiatives of the recent past.

The peace mission can only succeed in step with the will of the political leadership of the State to steer the nation on the path of inclusive peace and economic growth. Vigorous consultations across political divides become necessary, calling for compromises for the larger good, looking beyond narrow self-serving agendas. It behoves on the national leadership as the ultimate custodians of South Sudan to deliver in national interest. No amount of outside intervention can work. The United Nations to include UNMISS, UN Agencies, Funds and Programs, Regional Organizations (IGAD) and the International Community will always

have a supportive, encouraging role.

Future Prospects

As South Sudan stands today, building durable peace is a work in progress. The slow implementation of the Agreement and hesitation in advancing a key provision; Unification of Forces, has caused significant frustration. It threatens to unravel the Agreement as political and military leaders defect and parties split, undermining the relevance of a principal signatory. There are hold-out groups fomenting insurgencies inviting unrestrained response from State Forces. Villages get destroyed and people are displaced. A civil society movement of non-violent protest and demonstration is beginning to take shape quite like the one in neighbouring Sudan that upturned the dictatorial regime. Violence continues at the sub-national level in different parts of the country sometimes engineered by political elites. Rule of Law and Justice has not yet made appearance in credible ways. Well-armed community militias can easily overwhelm State Forces. People of South Sudan are yet to experience the dividends of peace and look askance at UNMISS - the most visible UN presence in South Sudan.

There are questions regularly raised on effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, the huge expense involved, their ability to build durable peace when conditions may not be appropriate for a peacekeeping mission, the seemingly endless nature of peacekeeping operations and the general (often incorrect) perception of their underperformance and accountability. There are adequate examples

of successful peacekeeping missions; political reconciliation and timely exit that has placed a once fragile Nation State on a development trajectory through efforts of multidimensional peacekeeping. There are also instances where the outcomes have fallen short of expectations. Success or failure of a mission does not lie with the Mission alone. It reflects the united will and purpose of the International Community including neighbouring countries and regional organizations acting through the peacekeeping mission.

Humanity has a duty and responsibility towards the less fortunate, the innocent victims of political violence. The international community should not be a mute spectator when a part of humanity is in grave distress. Devising suitable strategies, reducing it to an operational workable plan of action across civilian, police and military pillars with cooperation of all stakeholders is a necessity. United Nations is the ideal multilateral institution to build peace and it devolves on every other organization; national, regional and international to support the unique endeavour and make it a success.

Indian Contingent : An Appraisal

A few words on the Indian Contingent in UNMISS. It is 2500 strong with two Level II hospitals, two infantry battalions (850 troops each), an Engineering Company and Signal and Petroleum Unit. Each unit independently has made a mark in efficient execution of the mandate in very difficult operational and terrain conditions, having risen to the occasion each time. Peacekeeping is people

centric and what distinguishes the Indian Contingents from the rest is their felicity in dealing with the locals with care and empathy that is genuine and spontaneous. Through their actions they endear themselves to the people of South Sudan with whom they have built an everlasting bond of trust, confidence and friendship.

Lieutenant General Shailesh Tinaikar, SM, VSM was commissioned into the Parachute Regiment in December 1983. The Officer has served as a Military Observer in UNAVEM-III Angola in 1995-96 and was the Chief Operations officer in UNMIS, Sudan in 2008-09. Currently, he is the Force Commander, UNMISS since 30 June 2019.



Lieutenant General
Shailesh Tinaikar

Ambiguity in Normative UN Norms: A Challenge to UN Peace Operations

By **Major General (Doctor) AK Bardalai**
Vishisht Seva Medal (Retired)

Introduction

When peace operations get deployed, they are expected to follow the UN norms. Following the norms provides credibility and legitimacy to peacekeeping. The list of the norms is not finite, and it can range from anything that is expected from a peacekeeper such as adherence to the principles of peacekeeping, maintaining good conduct and discipline, sensitivity to gender, environmental friendliness and respect for human rights etc.¹ Barring the principles of peacekeeping, most of the norms are clear cut. In the case of peacekeeping norms, there is however a huge gap between the theories of the principles of peacekeeping and their practice. As a result, interpretation of the principles is highly contested impacting the implementation of the mandate. In the following section, I will argue how the ambiguity in the interpretation of the three basic principles of peacekeeping impacts the performance of peace operations.

The Ambiguity in UN Norms: Principles of Peacekeeping and Challenges to UN Peace Operations

As mentioned, the first aspect affecting mission performance relates to the principles of peacekeeping. Consent, impartiality and

use of minimum force are the three principles of peacekeeping, which at times are referred to as the *holy trinity*.² Adherence to these three principles is crucial because it provides legitimacy to the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO). Whalan noted that “Peacekeepers are legitimised when the local actors perceive them to be legitimate.”³

Consent

Consent at the strategic level for the deployment of the PKO does not necessarily mean that there will be consent at the tactical level. Availability of consent at strategic, operational and tactical levels is rare. Often, consent given is out of compulsion, either due to threat or some other incentive. And when any of these is diluted, consent is withdrawn. Withdrawal of consent at the tactical level does not necessarily mean the withdrawal of consent at the strategic level (because there are smaller groups in intra-state conflicts and because the orders originating at the apex level need not necessarily be strictly complied with at the lowest level). However, the withdrawal of consent at the strategic level is bound to affect the PKO at the operational and tactical levels. Curran noted that the absence of the main parties to the conflict risk drawing

the peacekeeping mission to the conflict and enforcement action. He mentioned that at the same time, "a blind reliance on the consent of all parties (large and small) may lead a peacekeeping force to lose not only effectiveness but also legitimacy."⁴ Somalia can be cited as an example of how the mission leader managed to persuade the rebel leader to give his consent - a consent that was initially denied, then given and later again withdrawn, with catastrophic results for the mission.

In peace operations in a complex intra-state conflict where there is no effective government, from which to obtain consent, a strong regional consensus is needed.⁵ In an environment, where there are a large number of armed groups, external powers intervene and it becomes extremely difficult or near impossible to obtain the consent of a similar degree from all the parties to the conflict. This was the case in Somalia where there was an institutional collapse by the time the PKO was to be deployed in Somalia.⁶ Because of the lack of legitimate central authority in Somalia, most local warlords favoured war to maximise their control over their territory.⁷ Given the events leading to the civil war, no leader could give consent. Between two primary disputants who were fighting for power, Ali Mahdi consented. But Aideed had to be persuaded by Mohamed Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), to accept the deployment of 500 peacekeepers for the protection of humanitarian convoys. However, Aideed withdrew his consent when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested to the Security Council to deploy 3,000

peacekeepers without consulting either Sahnoun or Aideed. This enraged Aideed, who considered this a breach of faith. What followed immediately was an escalation of violence, and its consequent effect on the subsequent missions elsewhere (for example, in Rwanda), is a sad commentary on the UN's peacekeeping history.⁸

Impartiality

Impartiality, the second principle, is either not understood or is confused or deliberately misinterpreted. It was Dag Hammarskjöld's study of peacekeeping, which was presented to the UN General Assembly after deployment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1958 that led to the identification of certain basic principles that would later provide an acceptable framework for the subsequent PKO.⁹ One of the three principles identified by him was the neutrality of the peacekeepers. Hammarskjöld reported: 'In the case of UNEF, the policy has been to exclude military personnel belonging to any of the permanent members of the Security Council or any country which, for geographical or other reasons, might have a special interest in the conflict.'¹⁰

However, given complex internal conflicts where extreme violence has become the norm, reining in warmongers (multiple parties to the conflict) requires well-trained and well-equipped military peacekeepers, who have always been at a premium, except for the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and a few other developed nations. Therefore, the very rationale of neutral troops does not make a lot of sense. As

observed by Frazer, “The decision to deploy peacekeepers in and of itself is not neutral and is reflective of the political and strategic interests of the UN Security Council in general, and the P5 in particular”.¹¹ Even the UN official document mentions impartiality as a principle.¹² Even then, neutrality and impartiality were often confused; they have different meanings and significance: neutrality usually means not taking sides with warring parties, and impartiality refers to non-discrimination, ie., that peacekeepers must be neutral but implement the mandate without favour and prejudice to any party.¹³ Describing this as ‘the neutrality-impartiality dilemma’, Malito has questioned the very concept of the possibility of peace in a neutral space.¹⁴ While the principle of neutrality has been replaced by impartiality, given the multiple groups fighting in the same conflict and with high chances of either lack or withdrawal of consent by one or more groups, the peace operation cannot remain impartial even in principle.¹⁵

However, to some, impartiality is synonymous with neutrality, and not taking action against perpetrators of violence because of a lack of understanding of the mandate is considered being impartial. Impartiality is not limited to deeds alone but also to the way stakeholders look at the peacekeepers’ impartial status. There is no better example to understand this relationship than what happened when Hutu militias came down on the Tutsis in Rwanda on 06 April 1994 and killed Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana who was a Hutu, in addition to killing ten Belgian peacekeepers.¹⁶ Even though General Dallaire, the Force

Commander of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, tried his best to protect the civilians with whatever little means the mission had, one of the military contingents stood by silently as mute spectators to what was happening, possibly waiting for orders from their national capital. These nations probably wanted to remain neutral by not taking action against the perpetrators of violence. According to General Dallaire, it was ‘cynical manoeuvring by France, Belgium and the USA’.¹⁷ Commenting on the implications for the impartiality of UN peace operations, Rhoads quoted Mona Khalil (former senior UN legal officer), ‘requires UNPKO to act independently when host government is unable or unwilling and even to take action against the host government forces where and when they pose a threat to civilians.’¹⁸ Rhoads’s observation was in the context of lack of response on the part of UN Mission for South Sudan (UNMISS) during the violence between Kiir and Machar in July 2016, when the government forces were the perpetrators of the violence.

From the time the Belgian contingent of 450 para commandos landed in November 1993, Belgium’s impartial status, being the former colonial master of Rwanda, has been doubted by the Government of Rwanda. Their attitude further vitiated the atmosphere. Most of the soldiers had joined UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) after their tour of duty in Somalia, which was a Chapter VII mission. General Dallaire noted that the inertia and interference from the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) cost many innocent lives in Rwanda.¹⁹ Therefore, the need to deal with the humanitarian crisis has necessitated

revisiting 'neutrality' and replace it with 'impartiality'. The principle of impartiality is also intrinsically connected to the third principle—the use of force, which is the most controversial of the three.

Use of Force

Even though Hammarskjöld believed that PKO, in general, did not involve the use of force as envisaged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a PKO under Chapter VI can also use force in self-defence. There is an intentional or perceived misunderstanding that force can be used only under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Guidelines for the use of force come in the form of Rules of Engagement (RoE), which is approved at the level of UN Headquarters (HQs). The RoE, though exhaustive, are only general guidelines to the commanders for their intelligent interpretation on a case-by-case basis. There have been many instances in the past when peacekeepers did not use force even in self-defence. The hesitation to use force could have been caused either by an obsession with strict adherence to the principles of peacekeeping and the fear of loss of legitimacy or by the fear of sustaining casualties as a result of retaliation from rogue elements. Howard and Dayal argued on similar lines. They noted using force not only compromises the principle of impartiality but also makes the peacekeepers vulnerable to attacks by the armed groups against whom force is used. Besides, when the peacekeepers fail to implement the important mandated tasks such as the protection of innocent civilians, it can be perceived by the local population as a consequence of either

inadequate troops or a weak mandate. Therefore, a stronger mandate to use force generates hope in the peacekeepers' ability to achieve something which they could not do earlier. Such high expectation is another negative effect of using force by the peacekeepers.²⁰

Besides, the force also can be used to ensure mandate compliance in the challenging and unpredictable environment where peacekeepers are required to work. Whalan explained that peacekeepers at times use coercion to shape the behaviour of the warring groups as well as the host population. She however cautioned that coercion by using force may tend to breed resentment which adversely affects the quality of behaviour that is expected to be shaped.²¹

The likelihood that the use of force leads to fatal retaliation is probably the primary factor dwelt upon by the commander whether to use force or not. Such was the case in Bosnia when, between 07 and 11 July 1995, Bosnian Serbs attacked Srebrenica, killed innocent civilians and took 50 Dutch peacekeepers hostage. Repeated requests for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes by the Dutch battalion against the attacking Bosnian Serbs went unheeded until 11 July 1995. Akashi, the HoM's, and French General Bernard Janvier's obsession with the UN's commitment to the rule of neutrality, that is, not to use force, which eventually resulted in the UN's failure to protect the safe-havens.²² According to a Human Rights Watch report, had the airstrikes been done on time, the fate of Srebrenica would have been different.²³ Quoting from the UN inquiry by the UN official, David Harland, Porter stated that the

request for an airstrike by the Dutch contingent commander, Colonel Ton Karremans, was deliberately delayed by Janvier.²⁴ In this regard, quoting what Tripodi observed 'when peacekeepers are placed in a position to prevent moral catastrophes, they cannot step aside and "allow" the killing of those who believed the soldiers were there to protect them—both Akashi and Janvier did not fulfill their moral obligation.²⁵

For peace operations to succeed, the legitimacy of the operation, both at the strategic and local levels, is necessary. When a peace operation can implement a large part of the mandate, it gains credibility. Newby put it as the ability to deter conflict and provide human security. Therefore, it has to be earned and constantly supported by evidence. Once a mission has established credibility, it earns confidence. On the other hand, local legitimacy enables the mission to win cooperation from the local population. Hence, local legitimacy is linked to trust but can be eroded over time by unreliable behaviour on the part of those who are trusted.²⁶ Simply because a PKO is a multinational force that is either led or authorised by the UN does not mean that it will be viewed as legitimate by the local population.²⁷ Explaining this as local legitimacy, Whalan noted that "Local legitimacy refers to evaluations by local actors about a peace operation's rightness, fairness and appropriateness – that is, whether its practices rightfully cohere with the relevant framework of rules and values, are fair, and produce appropriate outcomes."²⁸ In Bosnia, in the evaluations by the poor Bosnian Muslim population, the UN operation failed to protect their lives. Howard stated

that 'the UN gains enormous moral and ethical legitimacy in the field by not using force'.²⁹ But not using force in Bosnia, while technically legitimate, was both morally and ethically wrong and illegitimate.

Conclusion

UN norms like consent, impartiality and use of force would stay in concept and part of the rhetoric the politicians use in their public discourse. The shift in the practices of the norms has been forced by the changed circumstance. But to say that all practices by the peacekeepers conform to the spirit of the norms is like in the words of Laurence "glossing over contestation and pre-empting concerns about partiality in UN peace operations."³⁰ As it would have been seen from the past as well as current peace operations, the inherent ambiguity is used to cover the lack of will to implement the mandate. In principle, these norms enjoy the support of the member states, but the ambiguity is taken advantage of and interpreted based on the TCC's calculations of the associated risk in adhering to the norms in letter and spirit. Ambiguity in the UN norms is not going to go away soon and will continue to be contested in the UN peacekeeping debates.

Ambiguity in Normative UN Norms: A Challenge to UN Peace Operations

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**Major General
(Doctor) AK Bardalai**

Major General (Doctor) AK Bardalai, VSM (Retired) was commissioned into the RAJPUT Regiment in June 1977. The General has drawn rich experience from his earlier assignments as a UN Military Observer in Angola, Director Staff Duties 3 (UN Peacekeeping) at Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Army), a Research Fellow (UN Peacekeeping) with United Service Institution (USI) of India, New Delhi and the Deputy Head of the Mission and Deputy Force Commander in UNIFIL (Lebanon) from March 2008 to March 2010.

Air Power in UN Peacekeeping

By **Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur**
Vayu Sena Medal (Retired)

Air power has made its presence felt ever since the Wright Flyer took to the air in 1903. The air domain, over the years and in all conflicts, has established itself as a pivotal tool in the hands of the politician and of course, the military exponent. Its attributes of speed, reach, mobility and flexibility along with the ability to be employed in a logistics, humanitarian and/ or an offensive role positions it as an ideal tool to be used in all aspects of peace operations. Indeed, India has been at the forefront of such missions for bringing-in peace in troubled lands far and wide.

As is well known, there are three basic principles in UN peacekeeping, viz., consent of the parties involved, absolute impartiality and non-use of force except “in self-defence and defence of the mandate.” In the not too distant past, the Security Council introduced a concept of a ‘robust mandate’ in certain situations, authorizing peacekeepers “to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/ or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.” While this is different from a Chapter VII authorisation, it is imperative to examine the effect of the highly potent capabilities that air power brings to peacekeeping for their

optimal utilisation under the ambit of a given mandate. The effects, when seen from a strategic perch, can be broadly categorised under three heads – capability enhancement, conveying of intent and the net result of the two which can be termed as boosting the credibility of the UN as a whole.

Capability

The aim of any UN Mission is to, not only get peace during the deployment of peacekeepers but, more importantly, to leave behind an environment that engenders it even after the ‘blue berets’ have left. Thus, the availability of quick transportation means – of logistics as well as peacekeepers – which is vital for implementation of the mission mandate, is brought about through equipping the mission leadership with adequate air power tools. The task of protection of civilians, building up of development infrastructure and setting up of institutions that support nation building (like, a force for internal security, a legal framework, education backbone etc) gets a fillip if there are adequate transport aircraft and helicopters to help shape plans made on paper. While ‘robust peacekeeping’ is generally associated with timely use of force by ground troops, the availability of offensive air assets like armed/ attack helicopters impregnate the mission with deterrence

capability of a higher dimension, as seen in mission in Congo (MONUC / MONUSCO). A similar deterrence effect was seen in the 1960s in UN Mission in Congo, ONUC, due to the availability of six B-57 Canberra Bombers of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Intent

The equipping of any UN Mission is a pointer to the intent of the mission. The author of this essay was the Contingent Commander of the first Indian Aviation Contingent in the UN Mission in Sudan, UNMIS, in 2005-06. The basic aim of UNMIS was to get the belligerents to eschew violence and start a dialogue so that favourable conditions could be obtained for the conduct of a referendum in 2011 on the question of the future of Sudan. The IAF Mission was equipped with six Mi-17 helicopters for logistics support only; no armament was authorised to be carried to the mission area. Other aviation contingents, viz., from Pakistan and Russia had a similar inventory. The intent of the presence of UN peacekeepers was, thus, clearly laid-out. As 2011 approached, violence had raised its ugly face and one can argue whether the presence of offensive air assets could have deterred some amount of bloodshed that took place. Did the non-availability of offensive air power emasculate the 'defence of the mandate' task of UNMIS is a question that can be debated; did it effect the credibility of an international force? These are issues that go much beyond just the 'military arm' of the United Nations and strike at the credibility of UN peacekeeping as a whole.

Credibility

The first Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, had famously said, "peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only soldiers can do it." It is in this context that the credibility of the United Nations in peacekeeping becomes vital. While it is well understood that the Security Council is as political a body as it gets, the members (especially the P5) must equip every UN mission with adequate and relevant resources to implement the mandate given to it. Here, the importance of aerial assets become vital, especially due to the new capabilities becoming available through rapid technological advancements in the field of aviation. It is well known that behind the scenes political wrangling delayed the entry of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for many years; the cost could be counted in terms of lives lost and a sub-optimal utilisation of a ground force that could have benefitted immensely from the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities of the UAVs; also delayed was the ability of UAVs for utilisation in humanitarian tasks. And, it would not be wrong to say that troop contributing countries would soon ask for using armed drones so as to avoid putting their soldiers in harm's way.

Low casualty threshold is no longer the 'preserve' of advanced nations, who have hitherto contributed to peacekeeping mostly through financial resources. It is imperative that adequate emphasis is placed on equipping missions with cutting edge air power assets, to include those that harness the opening up of space and artificial intelligence. The arena of peacekeeping in the

coming years would, in any case, have belligerents that would be using the vast horizon opening up with the synthesis of the two, a situation that needs to be factored in the equipping process of UN missions. If this is not done, the blue berets on the ground would always be playing 'catch-up' while the UN, as the international watchdog, would suffer a dent in its credibility. If it comes to that, Dag Hammarskjöld, if he was alive today, would certainly not approve.

Summation

Air power assets, adequate and relevant, would be vital in the employment of UN peacekeeping forces in the coming decades. They do not come cheap, and no country procures them for an 'anticipated' UN tasking. Thus, planners in New York would always have a problem of immense measure while fixing mission mandates. There are no easy solutions as instituting aviation squadrons as part of a rapid reaction force would demand political sagacity and financial commitments of no mean proportions. The international community has to rise to meet this demand for the sake of world peace.

Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur, VM (Retired) was commissioned in the IAF on 29 December 1976. He was the Contingent Commander of the first IAF United Nations Mission in Sudan and was the Head of Training Team (Air) at Defence Services Staff College. The Air Marshal has lectured at the National Defence College and at war colleges in India and abroad. His columns on military and strategic affairs appear in leading newspapers and professional defence journals.



**Air Vice Marshal
Manmohan Bahadur**

Against All Odds: The Forgotten Tales of Independent India's Tryst with Peacekeeping

By **Colonel (Doctor) DPK Pillay**
Shaurya Chakra (Retired)

Abstract- There is a part of history that many in India are not familiar with today. This article is an account of Independent India's first overseas mission under the UN - The unique role that the Indian military played in the Korean conflict.

Background

India became one of the founding members of the United Nations on 24 October 1945. Established to ensure world peace after a ruinous World War, the UN has had a mixed track record. One of its successes, however, was the bringing of the Korean War to a close.

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 and raged for three long years between the Western alliance led by the US under a United Nations resolution called the UN Command and a Socialist Alliance of North Korea and China (known as the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) supported by the Soviet Union. The two sides reached a military stalemate by mid 1953 and agreed on the terms of a ceasefire. That war was interestingly the first commitment by independent India and Indian Army to a UN assignment. India played a unique role in bringing the conflict to a speedy conclusion by advocating against a policy being debated at the UN which could have led to prolonging or further escalation of the war.

Indian Role

India played a laudatory role by supporting the UN Security Council Resolutions of June 25th and 27th, 1950, which named North Korea as the aggressor. This localized the conflict and later, led to peace in the war-torn Peninsula. India's approach to the Korean issue was to recognize that the aggression undertaken by North Korea was a wrong act; that in so far as possible, the war should not spread beyond the Korean Peninsula; and that no other questions should be linked with the Korean struggle. India also felt that the future of Korea must be decided entirely by the Koreans themselves. The Secretary General of the United Nations, under the provisions of Security Council Resolution of July 7th, 1950, requested UN member states to furnish military assistance to repel the aggressor. Under this agreement, it was decided that India would provide a medical contingent, the country's first overseas mission after independence. India contributed three different elements to Korea namely the 60th Parachute Field Ambulance, the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

(NNRC); and the Custodian Force India (CFI), which was a brigade size force.

60th Parachute Field Ambulance

Many may recall the popular 90s TV Series featuring a field hospital in Korea, called MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital). The 60th Parachute Field Ambulance was India's MASH and was led by Lieutenant Colonel AG Rangaraj. They arrived in Korea in November 1950 with about 300 men and with orders to move out from Korea only after the CFI had completed its mission; this would make it India's longest overseas mission.

The 60th was blooded in as soon as they landed, taking part in US 8th Army's withdrawal from North Korea. The Inchon Landings of September 1950 were led by the US and were a major counter-offensive in support of South Korea. The Communist forces then counter-attacked in November 1950. Within hours of their arrival, the Indian Medical Mission provided medical cover to the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade with whom they remained attached throughout the Campaign. An interesting anecdote revolves around the evacuation, which was ordered as Chinese forces swarmed through UN held lines. The 60th had no transport allocated for their hasty withdrawal and were reluctant to abandon their first-class medical equipment and supplies. Colonel Rangaraj would later say, "We would have been of little use without [our equipment] and could not afford to lose it as soon as we arrived." They found an unused train with its engine and formed a 'Human Bucket Brigade' from the river, getting the steam engine running in time to cross the Han River Bridge to Seoul,

before it was blown up by communist forces.

Throughout their Campaign the Indian medics marched in lockstep with the troops they were supporting, earning the respect of the UN troops by refusing to abandon the wounded and setting up and dismantling as many times as was required. During **Operation TOMAHAWK** in March 1951, the second biggest airborne operation of the war, led by the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment, Colonel Rangaraj landed with his detachment, all of whom adapted for an airborne role. There were many American casualties during that bloody landing and the small medical unit carried out 103 operations and saved 50 lives with utmost commitment and professionalism.

The aim of this specific military operation was to disrupt enemy's lines of communication, throw them into disarray and subsequently neutralize and decimate them with the ground link-up, which was expected on 25th March, 1951. However, the expected link-up never came on the day of reckoning. On the contrary, resistance increased. There was no alternative but to dig trenches and hold casualties in them along with stretcher cases; the chilly winds and snow of Purunli were warded off with little more than the fine fabric of retrieved parachutes. The 60th worked relentlessly during this operation, many living on biscuits and tea. The desperately awaited link-up finally arrived on the evening of 27th March. During Operation Commando in the second week of September, 1951, the unit treated a total of 348 casualties during six days of fighting. In June of 1952, there were six casualties among the 60th Para Field Ambulance unit due to adverse weather

conditions and continuing enemy attacks and indiscriminate firing.

In the meantime, both sides accepted a UN resolution sponsored by India, and a ceasefire was declared on 27th July, 1953. The War had resulted in the capture of a large number of prisoners, many of whom refused repatriation to their countries of origin. For this purpose, the UN set up an NNRC. The 60th treated more than just the UN forces; a detachment at Taegu continued to work untiringly, treating North Korea's Army and civilian casualties. In addition to the military detachments they manned, they also ran three hospitals; the British Hospital, the Presbyterian Mission Hospital, and Taegu Civil Hospital, popularly known earlier as 'Death Hospital'. The Indian Medical Team worked day and night and changed the Hospital's status to 'Life Hospital'. They also ran the First Republic of Korea Army Hospital and trained local Korean doctors and nurses.

At the end of their tenure 60th Parachute Field Ambulance had treated about 195,000 cases, and had performed nearly 2,300 field surgeries. They endured in far-off lands to bring cheer and hope to victims of violence, serving with an unstinted devotion to duty amidst toil, sweat and blood. Tasks performed by the 60th Parachute Field Ambulance in Korea have gone down in the annals of the Indian Army, serving as an inspiration for future generations of soldier medicos. It is to the credit of the South Koreans that they have not forgotten the sacrifices and contributions of India. The Korean Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs named Lieutenant Colonel A G Rangaraj, the Commanding Officer of 60th Parachute Field Ambulance of the Indian

Army, as the Korean War Hero for the month of July 2020.



Member of Indian Medical Team Interacting with Injured Soldier

Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee (NNRC)

The NNRC, including the CFI, were responsible for manning and gathering non-repatriated prisoners into camps within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and explaining their rights and privileges to them. Prisoners were offered the option of choosing where they would like to return to; one of the two, Korea or China. There were many among the nearly 170,000 prisoners held by the UN forces who didn't want to return to China or North Korea. China demanded all soldiers be returned, whereas the UN was against forceful repatriation. Those who did not want to be repatriated to their home country had to be retained for 90 days in order to give them time to change their minds.

In retrospect, the Korean War would have come to an end in 1952 if the peace talks held at Panmunjom on 25 October 1951 had decided on the issue of 'prisoner swaps'. The fate of the remaining 20,000 PsOW and their repatriation was called the **BIG SWITCH**; it followed Operation **LITTLE SWITCH** that saw the exchange of wounded and sick soldiers held by either side between April and

Against All Odds: The Forgotten Tales of Independent India's Tryst with Peacekeeping

May of 1952. The NNRC, headed by India, was to provide the middle ground; prisoners were handed over to them instead. Led by General KS Thimayya as Chairman and Ambassador BN Chakravarty, as the alternate Chairman, the NNRC had Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Eastern Bloc and Sweden and Switzerland from the West. An Indian contingent of nearly 6,000 troops called CFI was to take over physical custody of prisoners. The mission of NNRC in Korea was a task that many did not think India would either be able to handle because of its layered complexities and intrigue.

Ultimately India did find the elusive solution to the prisoner of war question, allowing for the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. The agreement stipulated that a NNRC would be established with two countries from each bloc and headed by India, given our Nation's reputation as a neutral country. It was an unenviable task and in the end, less than 100 prisoners, who wished not be repatriated to either North or South Korea or China, came back to India after winding up of the NNRC and CFI. A few Koreans chose India to resettle while others were repatriated to Brazil.

Custodian Force India

The CFI was sent to Korea at the specific request of the UN Command, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers Command. The task of the Indian troops was not to guard a ceasefire line or to fight an enemy, but to hold custody of 22,959 PsOW of various nationalities and facilitate their repatriation or disposal otherwise.

President Rhee of the Republic of Korea had taken a very unreasonable and anti-Indian attitude, saying if Indian troops attempted to land on South Korean soil, he would oppose their entry by armed forces. The United Nations Command was therefore forced to transport the CFI to the DMZ without the Force touching South Korean soil. Despite difficulties faced by the Indian troops, their task was ably accomplished, raising the stature of India in international fora.



Formation Sign of Custodian Force India

Some PsOW at times resorted to violence, due to political pressure placed on them. India, with its brigade-sized contingent, provided security to the PsOW camps. The 6,000 soldiers who formed the CFI were headed by Major General SPP Thorat, a seasoned veteran of World War, who later rose to be an Army Commander. Officials of Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs, who were language experts and interpreters, also accompanied the CFI.



Indian Troops Guarding the Prisoners Camp in Korea

The prisoners often revolted due to various pressures and even detained Major General Thorat in an incident. The General refused permission to use force, instead joking with the prisoners that he had looked after them when he was in charge and now, he expected a hot cup of tea, a cigarette and a pack of cards for recreation. After this and a few other episodes, the Communist prisoners wrote an apology, stating that *'The whole thing is now clear to us and we are sorry for holding demonstrations under some misunderstanding. We hope you will kindly excuse us. We shall co-operate with you to the end'.*

In his final message, General Hull, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), UN Command, said of the CFI, "The Custodian Force of India, including officers and all other ranks have earned the respect and admiration of my Command for its outstanding performance while exercising custody over these personnel". No military force could earn higher praise as was bestowed to the Indian Army.



Colonel (Doctor)
DPK Pillay

Colonel (Doctor) DPK Pillay, SC (Retired) is a decorated veteran. During his military career, he served as Senior Defence Specialist in the National Security Council Secretariat, Planning Officer (Defence) in the Planning and International Cooperation Wing of Ministry of Defence.

After his retirement from Army, he has served as a Military Advisor with the ICRC for the after-action reviews for the wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In 2019, he was nominated as 'Researcher who changed the World' for his paper on Food Security by Taylor and Francis, London. He holds a PhD from Punjab University and is also an alumnus of Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Fordham University, USA. Currently, he is a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar-Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

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Mission Brief: UNIFIL

By **Colonel MS Grewal**

*Sena Medal, National Senior,
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*

Introduction

UNIFIL is the result of Israel's first major invasion of Lebanon on 14-15 March 1978, termed "Operation Litani", as a response to Palestinian gunmen launching an attack in Israeli territory on 11 March 1978, leaving over 30 civilians dead. Before this, the Lebanese civil war of 1975 led to a power vacuum and confrontation between Israel and its Lebanese proxies on one side and the "Joint Forces" of the PLO and Progressive Lebanese Movement on the other. This continued for almost two years and ended with the US-backed (and Israeli approved) deployment of Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), a peacekeeping force mostly comprising troops from the Syrian Army.

On 19 March 1978, the UN Security Council adopted UNSC Resolutions 425 and 426 calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and authorizing the establishment of UNIFIL. Security Council Resolution 425 mandated UNIFIL to confirm

the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, restore international peace and security in the border area, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on 23 March 1978. Norway was one of the troop contributing countries at that time, along with Sweden, Nepal, Ghana, Finland, France, Italy, Ireland and Fiji. Norway remained part of UNIFIL for 20 yrs from 1978, until it was replaced by an Indian Contingent in 1998. The first Indian contingent took over the operational responsibility in November 1998. Since then, 22 Battalion groups have served in UNIFIL including the one presently deployed.

The 2006 War

Hostilities on the Israeli-Lebanese border started on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah launched several rockets from Lebanese territory across the Blue Line towards Israeli

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Defence Force (IDF) positions near the coast and in the area of the Israeli town of Zarit. Simultaneously, Hezbollah fighters crossed the Blue Line into Israel, attacked an Israeli patrol and captured two Israeli soldiers, killed three others and wounded two more. The captured soldiers were taken to Lebanon.

The IDF launched a ground invasion of Southern Lebanon. It attacked both Hezbollah military targets and Lebanese civilian infrastructure. Israel also imposed an air and naval blockade. The conflict is believed to have killed between 1,191 and 1,300 Lebanese people and 165 Israelis. It severely damaged Lebanese civil infrastructure, and displaced approximately one million Lebanese and 300,000–500,000 Israelis. The intense fighting in July and August injured 16 United Nations staff and tragically caused the death of five.



Targeting of Civilian Infrastructure by Israeli Airstrikes

Leaders Flourish in Times of Crisis

As the war progressed, UNIFIL turned its main effort to the rescue and support of the civilian population, trying to organize safe passage for those trapped in villages and allow them to leave the area. This effort proved to be a difficult undertaking and UNIFIL struggled due to the damaged communications and the destroyed road

network to send relief convoys to the villages. It was during this time that the Indian contingent (INDBATT VIII) went beyond the call of duty in ensuring that the civilians in need were reached and helped. This was an act which has made an indelible mark in the memories of the locals within the Indian Battalion area of responsibility. The work done by the Battalion in those challenging times, without concern for own safety, not only won the hearts of the people but also ensured that the future Indian peacekeepers will be seen as professional and compassionate soldiers. The tales of valour of the Indian peacekeepers, in particular the Commanding Officer, moving from one village to another without concern for own safety and rendering all possible assistance to all those in need, are still popular conversation amongst those who witnessed the war.


UN Security Council Resolution 1701

On 11 August 2006, the Security Council, following intense negotiations, passed calling for a full cessation of hostilities in the month-long war based upon, in particular, “the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations” in Lebanon. The Security Council created a buffer zone free of “any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL” between the United Nations-drawn Blue Line in southern Lebanon and the Litani river and called for both Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive solution to the crisis.

The Tragic Beirut Port Blast

On 4 August 2020, a large amount of ammonium nitrate stored at the Port of Beirut in the capital city of Lebanon exploded, causing 218 deaths, 7,000 injuries, and 15 billion USD in property damage, leaving an estimated 300,000 people homeless. A cargo of 2,750 tonnes of the substance (equivalent to around 1.1 kilotons of TNT) had been stored in a warehouse without proper safety measures for the past six years, after having been confiscated by the Lebanese authorities from an abandoned ship.

Following the port explosion, a widespread protest started in the country against the government. This resulted in resignation of



The Sight of the Beirut Port Blast

various ministers and subsequently on 10 August 2021, Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab stepped down from office. President Michel Aoun accepted the resignation of the government and the Prime Minister and asked the government to stay on in a caretaker capacity until a new cabinet was formed. This arrangement continued for 13 months without a government in place with Mr Saad Hariri as PM designate, who ultimately could not prove his majority. Subsequently, on 10 September 2021, Mr

Najib Mikati as Prime Minister, managed to form a new government.

The country which was already grappling with rampant corruption, COVID-19 pandemic and worsening economy, suffered a huge blow due to the blast. The inability of the political class to join hands at this critical juncture proved that none of the political groups wanted to leave their seats of power. The delay in formation of government not only delayed the international assistance but also pushed the country to a dire economic state with 78% of population below poverty line, out of which 50% were added in just two years.

The Mandate

The Security Council on 30 August 2021 extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until August 2022, reiterating its call for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the principles and elements set out in resolution 1701 (2006). It was for the first time that the resolution mandated UNIFIL to take temporary and special measures to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support for a period of six months.

INDBATT Deployment

INDBATT is deployed along the North-Eastern flank of the UNIFIL Area of Operations (AO). It dominates a rugged and mountainous terrain of approximately 115 square kilometers and monitors an un-demarcated and unfenced

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stretch of Blue Line (BL) of approximately 16 Kms. The AO is extremely sensitive owing to its juxtaposition with the tri-junction of occupied Chebaa Farms, Syria and Bekaa Valley, as also its proximity to Syria. Indian Battalion carries out its operational activities with dominance over the Blue Line with a static and mobile deployment which comprises the following:-

United Nations Positions (UNPs)

Eight UNPs (maximum and highest UNPs occupied by any contingent) are organized in three tiers covering the entire AO of INDBATT. The Battalion Mobile Reserve comprising Armoured elements are deployed in the third tier to provide quick reaction capability to react to any contingency in the entire AO. One of the positions i.e. UNP 4-7A, located at an altitude of 4500 feet is the highest position of UNIFIL.



Observation Posts (OPs)

Six permanent OPs are occupied to maintain continuous visual domination over the entire stretch of Blue Line. OP-1 located at an

altitude of 5910 feet is the highest OP in UNIFIL AO. The battalion also occupies two OPs along the Blue Line. Quick Reaction Teams are activated on daily basis and as per dynamic operational situation, to ensure complete domination of Battalion AO.

Check Points (CKPs)

Three CKPs are established on daily basis along critical ingress/ egress points of the AO from the sensitive region of Bekaa. Two of the CKPs are established jointly with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and are manned 24 x 7. They maintain a constant watch over vehicle movement in and out of UNIFIL AO, to act as a deterrence against Armed Elements.

'Hot Spots' within AO

The disputed Chebaa Farms, which remains a bone of contention between Israel and Lebanon, falls within INDBATT AO. The areas of Pond, Kafer Chouba, Propaganda Board, areas near OP-3, Hassan Gate and Bastarra Farms are the other major 'Hot Spots' in the AO. Since its inception, INDBATT has constantly maintained a proactive stance to keep the dynamic operational environment under control and incident free. Prompt and impartial reporting at all levels with mature handling of incidents even to the extent of deploying to form barrier between LAF and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has prevented escalation of any situation on various occasions, thus maintaining a harmonious and peaceful environment.

Kazakhstan Component

UNIFIL is also a classical example of military cooperation among various nations. Many of



INDBATT Troops during Foot Patrol Along Blue Line



Joint Indian and Kazakhstan Contingent during Medal Day Parade



Joint Patrol of INDBATT Troops with Lebanese Armed Forces

the Battalions have got one or the other component from a different country e.g., El Salvador and Serbian companies with Spain, Irish company with French and Irish and Finnish companies with Poland. Indian contingent also has a company component from Kazakhstan since 06 November 2018. The joint deployment of these contingents is a fine portrayal of close military cooperation among nations towards the peacekeeping operations under the UN umbrella.

Tasks and Activities

Operational Activities

The Indian Battalion is located on the strategically important tri-junction of Israel-Lebanon-Syria, manning and ensuring sanctity of 16 kilometers of Blue Line by carrying out multiple operational tasks. This is achieved through the conduct of joint helicopter and vehicle/ foot patrols with LAF, occupation of sensitive positions along the Blue Line, carrying out counter rocket launching operations at likely sites and maintaining an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) based company strength as Battalion Mobile Reserve to cater for any contingency.

Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) Activities

The professional aspects of Indian contingents have always been augmented by a well-coordinated outreach programme for the local population as part of CIMIC activities. The inherent advantage of having a dedicated team of doctors with the Battalion gives the added payoff of conducting medical and veterinary camps for the locals within the

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AO. The professionalism and empathy with which our doctors, over the years have performed their duties has helped in establishing long term rapport with the locals.

Showcasing Indian Culture

Seeking an opportunity to showcase our rich and diverse cultural heritage, the Indian contingent annually celebrates 26 January as National Day in UNIFIL. An annual event, this day is marked with the presence of imminent personalities from UNIFIL hierarchy, LAF, other contingents and civil society. The events also include a cultural show which depicts and showcases our diversity. We have also started celebrating 21 June as International Yoga Day, eliciting a large participation from the TCCs.



Way Forward

UN – A Gender Sensitive Environment

Lebanon today is going through one of the worst economic crises of its time. The deteriorating state can be gauged from the fact that over 78% of population is under poverty line with approximately half of them

added in just two years. This dire economic state fueled by the sectarian rift that is prevalent in the country, is likely to adversely impact the weaker section of the society in



future. This calls for a softer outreach by all the stakeholders especially UNIFIL, to protect and safeguard the interests of the vulnerable sections of society. Women peacekeepers, therefore, are going to play a pivotal role in times to come. The present women peacekeepers of India at various appointments and in the Indian Medical Team at Force Headquarters have proved their mettle by displaying the highest standards of professionalism.

Enhancement of Mandate

UNIFIL currently is a Chapter VI mission which seeks to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes between Lebanon and Israel. The relevance of this mission also depends upon the prevailing geopolitical environment. At a time when the internal fault lines are exploited by the non-state actors, possibility of heightened conflict in near future cannot be ruled out. In the absence of any other alternate conflict

management tool, the role of UN peacekeeping operations may change and the TCCs would have to be prepared for it.

Challenges of COVID-19.

The outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020, posed a challenge in the peacekeeping operations in UNIFIL. Although, over a period of time, various drills and procedures have been put in place, the emergence of new variants and reactions from various countries, especially from those enroute for movement of troops, remains a cause of concern. The planning, preparation and psychological conditioning of the contingent before induction into the mission gains more importance.



COVID-19 Screening in Progress

Conclusion

UNIFIL, even though considered a traditional peacekeeping mission, is unique in many ways. It is deployed in a geopolitically sensitive area and has witnessed the recurrence of violence and major conflicts between Lebanon and Israel. If a new conflict arises again in near future, the scope of violence is likely to expand within the

geographic regions of the Middle East.

Indian contingent brings with itself a vast operational experience in UNIFIL and portray its professional competence and abilities through various operational activities. It also provides the contingent the exposure to learn and imbibe the best practices from other contingents.

Colonel MS Grewal, SM was commissioned into The MADRAS Regiment in June 2003. The officer is currently serving as Contingent Commander and National Senior in UNIFIL.



**Colonel
MS Grewal**

Mission Brief: MONUSCO

By **Brigadier Arindam Saha**

Sena Medal, Yudh Seva Medal, Sector Commander, MONUSCO

Overview

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is Central Africa's second largest country with an area of nearly 2.345 million square kilometers which is comparable with Western Europe. Ever since its independence in 1960, DRC has faced turbulent times with civil wars, internal unrest and absence of governance under Mobutu and Kabila rule. The country inherited mineral wealth worth estimated US \$24 trillion and was destined to be among the richest nations. However, intrinsic fault lines, corruption and ethnic strife coupled with vested interest of other nations dragged DRC to become one of the poorest nations in the world.

With sustained efforts of the UN and Government of DRC, the conflicts were contained and were limited toward the Eastern part of the country. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in resolutions 1279 (1999) and 1291 (2000) of the UNSC to monitor the peace process of the Second Congo War, though much of its focus subsequently turned to Eastern DRC. The mission was known as the MONUC until 2010. United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was established in 2005 wherein Indian Armed forces contributed troops, equipment and

specialist manpower to ensure peace, safety and security of lives of locals of DRC. Since then, the Indian Armed Forces have been regularly sending troop contingents and Military Observers/ Staff Officers under the UN flag.

Geo-Political Situation in Eastern DRC

Geographical Significance

DRC has been in a state of turmoil ever since its independence in 1960. The two civil wars and vested interest of nations as well as individuals have kept the pot simmering in DRC. The recent history of DRC has been one of civil war and corruption. The war had an economic as well as a political side. Fighting was fuelled by the country's vast mineral wealth, with all sides taking advantage of the anarchy to plunder natural resources. DRC has nine neighbouring countries. Because of the partial absence of state control in several regions and because of its geography and vegetation conducive for hiding out, DRC often serves as a base of operations for foreign armed groups from where they launch attacks against their home countries.

Political Situation

After President Kabila decided to move ahead with democratic elections in 2016, the first

democratic elections were conducted in 2018 where opposition leader candidate Félix Tshisekedi became the President in January 2019 after protracted political wrangling in the wake of a controversial election. Rival opposition candidate Martin Fayulu accused him of cutting a deal with his rivals. The new President also came from a political dynasty, as his father Étienne was opposition leader and later Prime Minister under the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in the 1980s and 1990s.

Security Situation in Eastern DRC

Eastern DRC has been a volatile part of DRC. The area consists of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu along with the five major lakes of Great Lakes Region of Africa. Eastern DRC has contiguous and porous border with South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. In the year 2021, the DRC witnessed multitude of landmark events, which would shape the country's future in years to come. The overall security situation in DRC has remained as precarious as before, despite attempts of national, regional and international agencies in bringing peace to the country. Out of an estimated population of 10.32 crore, the UN



Indian Contingent Patrols through a Village in DRC

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recognises about 2 crore locals to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021, with about 1.4 crore recognised as “people in need of acute support”. Armed conflict remains as the major cause for the continued dire state in DRC. An evaluation of the number of human rights (HR) violations in DRC during first quarter of 2021, indicates that more than 58.7% of HR violations occurred in North Kivu Province.

Even in 2021, it is estimated that more than 120 Armed Groups (AGs) continue to plague the Eastern DRC, forming the root cause of insecurity in the region. The foreign AGs like Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) continue to exploit the resources of DRC to sustain them, while carrying out gross HR violations to instill terror among the local populace. However, the internal AGs (IAGs) continue to be the major players in the armed conflict. These AGs have at times transcended ethnic rivalries to establish coalitions for mutual benefits and survival. Each province (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tanganyika) has its own unique blend of AGs, agenda of which mainly percolates down to economic and political reasons. The State of Siege, which was announced by the Tshisekedi government in May 2021 to curb the violence due to armed conflict, has only seen partial success in form of surrenders by approximately 1000 cadres. Moreover, the lack of sustainable DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement) programme eventually results in failure to capitalise on the successes of surrenders, thus resulting in recurring spiral of conflict-

insecurity-lack of state authority and proliferation of AGs.

Contribution of Indian Peacekeepers

India stands solidly committed to assist the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security with a proud history of UN peacekeeping dating back to its inception in the 1950s. India is among the largest troop contributing country in DRC which includes military and police. The image of Indian Peacekeepers in Congo is that of a highly competent and humane force that is very professional. The overarching role and commitment of Indian peacekeepers in DRC placed under command of the Indian Brigade again came into the global limelight recently post the eruption of Mt Nyiragongo on 22 May 2021.



Long Range Mission

Protection of civilians and stabilisation are among the strategic priorities of the mission. Indian peacekeepers ensured that proactive deployments are undertaken to deny maneuver space to AG cadres. Static Combat Deployments (SCDs) in the areas affected by

most dreaded group like ADF or helicopter launched patrols in the areas controlled by local Mai Mai groups were efficiently conducted by Indian peacekeepers deployed in Northern and Southern parts of North Kivu Province of DRC.

Eastern DRC has always considered itself as neglected part of DRC. This ensures that within days of any political decision or rule there are protests in major towns including Goma, Butembo and Lubero. Blue Helmets from the Indian Peacekeeping contingent have been involved in successfully controlling a number of extremely volatile incidents which could have easily led to loss of lives and property.

Relentless operations by contingents in concert with multiple agencies have deterred armed cadre actions in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) thereby creating a safe and favorable environment for surrender of cadres. Indian Peacekeepers in conjunction with civil sections and FARDC facilitated the extrication and surrender of more than 1000 AG cadres including child cadres from various AG groups. In one of the incidents, Indian troops extricated eight cadres from Oninga



Surrender by Armed Groups



which was a stronghold of the same group. These cadres were lifted by helicopter and later handed over to demobilizing agency for further reintegration in society.

Joint Operations with Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC)

State Security Forces have major stakes in ensuring security and peace in the region. In order to assist and provide a helping hand to undertake this herculean task, Central Sector organized a number of meetings and interactive sessions with FARDC Commanders. In addition, Staff and Command Level Meetings were conducted on regular basis to render any assistance required by FARDC. The Sector was also involved in planning Joint Operations with FARDC against FDLR in Rutshuru Territory.

Eruption of Mt Nyiragongo

Mt Nyiragongo, an active volcano overlooking the skyline of Goma town in DRC erupted with no prior warning or intimation at approximately

1830 Hours Goma time on 22 May 2021. The major flow of lava was in the North East and East directions towards Virunga National Park entering Rwanda. One smaller lava stream also flowed towards South East direction coming close to Goma International airport. The sudden eruption caused huge panic in the Goma town due to large number of conflicting reports and rumours doing the rounds. Indian Brigade located adjacent to the airfield, responsible for its protection established an Observation Post to monitor the threat of lava flow towards the airport and Goma Town. Indian troops continued holding their positions to ensure security of UN assets and also provided incidental security to empty aviation bases and aviation fuel stored close to airport. The observation post provided real time update on lava flow movement to the mission leadership in Goma. In addition, the patrols also assisted the movement of locals towards safer locations, regulating traffic at choke points and provided security to internally displaced persons (IDPs) along the road axes.



Community Outreach and Female Engagement

Community Outreach is an essential component of UN peacekeeping. Indian women peacekeeping teams including women medical and nursing officers travelled to active hotspot locations to spread awareness on women health care and to conduct medical screening of the women and children beneficiaries. The women and children were visibly benefitted by the Indian presence around their locations. Female Engagement Teams (FETs) are the drivers of gender responsive peacekeeping. They adopt a coherent approach towards gender concerns,



Community Outreach

implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in political, economic and societal spheres benefiting women and men equally. Since 2017, Indian FETs are working as part of Indian contingents in MONUSCO. They have been instrumental in providing the much needed role model image of a woman in small villages of DRC infested with AGs which undermine the role and importance of women in society.

Keeping in line with the humane assistance motto, Indian peacekeepers have been undertaking several medical evacuations during various deployments. These medical



Evacuation of Civilians in Progress

evacuations include harassed civilians, FARDC troops as well as injured AG cadres. Troops on ground have done exceptionally well to provide initial first aid and then in planning and executing the evacuations through helicopters.

As part of COVID-19 support, MONUSCO was in dire need of special staff in its Level -II hospital. The Indian Peacekeepers immediately swung into action and the Indian Level -III hospital was beefed up by specialist team of doctors from India to serve as UN Peacekeepers. Looking beyond, the Indian Peacekeepers organised frequent awareness session on COVID-19 during conduct of Long Range



Arrival of Medical Staff and Medicines

Missions (LRM) and Static Combat Deployment (SCD). Going by the theme "Awareness is Bliss" posters on the pandemic were distributed in local language to target maximum population.

The Indian Peacekeepers under the aegis of MONUSCO took a lead to not only provide direct but even indirect support to various COVID Response Teams (CRTs) operating in the area and also spearheaded the COVID-19 vaccination drive for MONUSCO personnel. Various pro-active actions and engagement of various communities were also undertaken through educative forums and vaccination of own troops at the nearest respective COVID Treatment Centers.

Conclusion

The efforts of Indian peacekeepers have been exceptional; they struck a chord of compassion with the local populace and have given them the invaluable gift of humanity. While operating in a fragile atmosphere with poorly defined ceasefire, the contingents uphold the mandate of UN and have won the hearts of the locals by professional handling of crisis situation and a humane approach. The success of the Indian contingent lies in this very balancing act. In addition, these peacekeepers have also brought the ancient Indian practice of yoga, cultural activities, music and Bollywood to DRC. They also play a part in cultural and heritage exchange while serving the aggrieved locals with a humane smile and strong grit in the conflict areas. The dedication towards duty and selfless service under UN umbrella is exemplary and a step towards making the globe a better place to live.

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Brig Arindam Saha, YSM, SM was commissioned into is an infantry officer who recently commanded the Indian Brigade Group at MONUSCO from December 2020 to December 2021. He has been a Military Observer in Congo in 2009. An alumnus of NDA, the Officer was commissioned into the KUMAON regiment in 1993. A graduate of DSSC, Wellington and CDM, Secunderabad, the Officer has been contributing for various journals on issues of National Security. The Officer is currently attending the course on National Security and Strategic Studies at NDC, New Delhi.



Brig Arindam Saha


MISSION BRIEF: UNMISS

By **Brigadier Dhananjay Joshi**

Vishisht Seva Medal, Sector Commander, UNMISS

Historical Perspective

On 09 July 2011, South Sudan became the youngest country in the world, following a referendum and partition from Sudan. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) started the same day, following UNSC Resolution 1996, for capacity building in the newly formed state. Independence brought the curtains down on a 22-year liberation struggle, better known as the 'Second Sudanese Civil War (1983 – 2005)'. It was preceded by the 'First Sudanese Civil War (1955 – 1972)' over autonomy.



Sadly, peace eluded South Sudan which witnessed another Civil War in 2013 over sharing of power between rival political factions led by the President and the Vice President. The war killed thousands and displaced millions triggering a humanitarian crisis. There was another flare up in 2016. In

2018, a Revitalised Agreement was signed to form a Transitional Government. But some factions still remain opposed to the agreement. Presently a fragile peace prevails, with slow progress on implementation of various clauses of the peace agreement which calls for drafting of a constitution, formation of various state institutions and unification of all armed groups into a national army. As a result, the mandate of UNMISS has also changed from building state capacity to the protection of civilians, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, protection of human rights and helping the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement.

Commencement of UNMISS marked the culmination of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) which started in 2005 in the run up to the referendum. The initial forces for UNMISS were mustered by side-stepping contingents from UNMIS. The Indian Army component that sidestepped consisted of two Infantry Battalion Groups, one Engineer Company and a Petroleum Company. Over the years this has been augmented by two Field Hospitals, a Signal Unit and around 70 Staff Officers and Military Observers. Today, UNMISS is one of the largest UN missions with a sanctioned strength of 17,000 including 14,000 military personnel, 2,100 police and 900 civilian staff. It has contingents from 14 countries while individual peacekeepers are drawn from 56 different countries. With nearly 2400 peacekeepers, India is one of the largest

contributors to the mission. It is a matter of pride that an Indian officer, Lieutenant General SS Tinaikar, SM, VSM is presently the Force Commander since June 2019.



Lieutenant General SS Tinaikar,
SM, VSM, Force Commander

The mission is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) supported by two Deputy SRSGs, the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner and other enablers. To give teeth to the mission, the UNSC has empowered the forces to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect UN resources and the lives of civilians under imminent danger.

Operational Dynamics

South Sudan is a large land-locked country, spanning 600 kilometers North to South and 900 kilometers East to West. Drained by the river Nile and its tributaries, the terrain consists of equatorial forests, sub-tropical grasslands and large swamps. It is among the least developed nations in the world with just 250 kilometers of metalled roads. Heavy rains, seasonal flooding and soft soil make all tracks impassable for six months in a year, severely restricting movement.

The population of 13 million is composed of 64 different tribes. Tribal identity is very deep

and overshadows the sense of national identity. As a result of the liberation struggle and civil war, the country is flooded with arms. It is common to find even cattle herders armed with AK 47s. Rule of law is weak and Gender Based Violence and Conflict Related Sexual Violence is common. The major political factions are signatories to the Peace Agreement and are not fighting each other. But there are many conflicts at the sub-national level and local militias are used as proxies by the bigger factions.

The rural economy is pastoral and revolves around cattle. While cattle raids between communities have always been a way of life, the proliferation of lethal weapons has added a new dimension of brutality to the tradition. Thus, violence escalates rapidly involving mass killings, burning of villages, looting and severe human rights abuses. The scars are not easily forgotten and become the source of a continuing cycle of revenge.

The Civil War in South Sudan left 1.6 million people displaced internally with another 2.2 million refugees in neighbouring countries. Even as the return and rehabilitation of these people is slowly being facilitated, any fresh violence creates new waves of displaced people. During the Civil War, more than 110,000 people poured into five UN bases seeking protection. While comprising only 10 percent of the displaced community, the five Protection of Civilians (POC) sites presented a unique situation that led to the deployment of UN Police units to administer them. Gradually four out of the five POC sites were handed over to the local authorities and only one remains under UN control.

The distances within the country are huge

and switching of forces is not easy. The deployment consists of a 'grid' pattern of operating bases with a 'hub and spokes' concept of operations. Each battalion or company sized operating base acts as the hub while the patrols that it sends out act as the spokes. Thus, the entire area is covered by foot, vehicle, riverine or aerial patrols. The patrols may be of short or long duration lasting from one to 14 days. At times Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) are established at sensitive places for one to three months.

UNMISS is an 'integrated mission' where the force element is one among many components. The civilian vertical includes sections for political affairs, gender, human rights, refugees, UN Police etc. The force component comprises troop contingents and the Military Observers. The humanitarian actors include the WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR etc. All agencies work in coordination and most patrols undertaken are 'Integrated Patrols' though pure military operations are also conducted. The aim is to engage with communities, promote dialogue, prevent violence, protect those who are under threat, facilitate return and reintegration of displaced people and deliver humanitarian aid.

Indian Contingents in UNMISS

The Force component is divided into six Sectors or Brigade sized forces. The Indian units are deployed under command of different sectors and not as a cohesive Indian contingent. The Military Observers and Staff Officers are also spread across the country. Apart from the Force Commander, India is

represented by Brigadier Dhananjay Joshi, VSM who is Commander Sector South. He also acts as the Senior National Representative (SNR) and serves as the focal point for all issues involving Indian units and personnel.

INDBATT-1 is deployed in Upper Nile state under Sector North. The sector borders Sudan on three sides and is strategically important because it is an oil rich region with operational oil wells. The area is low lying and prone to flooding and logistics sustenance is mainly through barges on the Nile. The area is a stronghold of the Nuer and Shilluk tribes which are the second and third largest factions in the country. Malakal town, the state capital, witnessed some of the bloodiest fighting during the Civil War. As the state slowly limps back to normalcy, INDBATT-1 is actively involved in patrolling the area, engaging with communities, facilitating delivery of humanitarian aid and assisting the local administration. Malakal also has the last remaining POC camp under UN control.

INDBATT-2 is deployed in Jonglei state under Sector East. Jonglei state is divided between three major tribes which makes it operationally sensitive – Dinkas (at Bor), Murles (at Pibor) and Nuers (at Akobo). The area saw bloody clashes during the Civil War wherein even UN peacekeepers were attacked in which five Indian troops made the supreme sacrifice. INDBATT-2 has actively been patrolling the vast area to break the cycles of revenge killings and building bridges between communities. It has also been reaching out to people affected by violence to render aid and restore confidence.

Indian Horizontal Mechanical Engineer Company (IND HMEC) is deployed at Malakal in Sector North Area of Responsibility (AOR). In a country with just about 250 kilometers of black top roads, the role of engineers to keep the Main Supply Routes (MSR) open is a colossal task. Indian HMEC is one of the six such units in the mission. Every year, after the rains recede, the HMECs commence repair and resurfacing of the arterial roads that sustain all UN and civilian traffic. Though primarily responsible for road maintenance, IND HMEC has also been assisting in construction of shelters, repair of security walls and improvement of drainage in all UN bases. The tireless work by Indian engineers has earned them a reputation of competence and dependability.

Indian Force Signal Unit (IND FSU) is responsible for providing seamless radio



Maintenance of Supply Routes by Indian HMEC

communication across the mission using the UN communication architecture. It mans all HF, VHF and UHF links down to the Company Operating Base (COB) level. The Control Room is located at Juba with outposts at all UN bases. An added responsibility with the IND

FSU is the management of the Flight Monitoring System at Juba which entails maintaining contact with all UN aircraft. The efficiency with which the signalmen have adapted to this new role, which requires fluency in English, is a measure of their motivation and professional excellence.

Indian Petroleum Platoon (IND Pet Pl) is responsible to assist the UNMISS Fuel Unit in the provisioning, issue and accounting of fuel to all units in the mission. During normal times, the supply is outsourced to a civil firm and the unit performs a supervisory role. But during crisis, the entire operations are supposed to be taken over by the unit. With its HQ at Juba, the unit has detachments in all major UN bases in the country. The IND PET PL is known for its commitment and integrity. During the crises in 2011, 2013 and 2016, it ably ensured uninterrupted fuel supply across the mission.

Indian Field Hospital, Level-II (IFH Level-II) is deployed at Malakal under Sector North. It is tasked to provide basic specialist care to all UN civil and military personnel in the far-flung areas of Upper Nile State. The specialists available are surgical, medical, orthopaedic, gynaecologist, anaesthetist, radiologist and aeromedical. The skill, dedication and promptness of Indian doctors have saved lives and comforted hundreds of people. The Hospital has also been providing relief and succour to the local populace as part of its humanitarian outreach.

Indian Field Hospital, Level-II Plus (IFH Level-II Plus) located at Juba is the highest UN

medical facility in South Sudan. It provides medical cover to all personnel in the Force Headquarters and units in Juba and patients referred from other Field Hospitals. It is also responsible to carry out all air evacuations to Level III and IV hospitals in neighbouring Uganda and Kenya. The hospital has a heavy workload especially the aero medical specialists. The onset of COVID posed new challenges for the IFH but despite limited infrastructure and guidelines, it setup the first COVID facility in entire South Sudan and continues to remain at the forefront of managing the pandemic.

Apart from the contingents, the Indian Army is represented by close to 70 Staff Officers and Military Observers, the highest for any country. The experience, competence and professionalism of Indian officers is respected in the mission and they invariably get assigned to all sensitive appointments. The officers have always set high standards for other peacekeepers through their commitment and selfless service.

Looking Ahead

Though the country has not seen large scale political violence since 2016, the slow progress on implementation of the Revitalised Agreement is a cause of concern. The economy is in dire straits while substantial revenue that the country earns from oil exports remains unaccounted for. The unification of the armed forces has not taken place and the ground work for holding elections in 2023 has not even commenced. The mistrust and frustration over what is being perceived as a deliberate ploy by the acting President may derail the entire peace

process. Thus, the grounds for renewed political violence remain and UNMISS has its task cut out.

On the politico-diplomatic front, a major role is being played by the regional neighbours under the umbrella of IGAD Plus (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), which consists of six countries that form the Horn of Africa along with the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), US, UK, Norway, China and the UN. This has prompted the President to constitute the basic structures of governance like the parliament, state legislative assemblies and the various ministries.

Apart from the efforts of the Indian peacekeepers in UNMISS, India can do a lot in this fledgling nation. As a country with a vibrant democracy, India can offer expertise in building public institutions, governance, law & justice, education, agriculture, health and IT besides assisting in infrastructure development. This will deepen our ties not just with South Sudan but with the AU as a whole.

Brig Dhananjay Joshi, VSM was commissioned into the Infantry in 1993. The Officer has served extensively in varied terrain and operations. He has previously served in UNIFIL as part of contingent and is currently posted with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as a Sector Commander. The Officer is a graduate of the US National Defence University, Washington DC.



**Brigadier
Dhananjay Joshi**

FIRST HAND GLIMPSES

An Experience in Military Leadership as a Sector Commander in UN Mission in South Sudan

By **Lieutenant General KS Brar**
Director General Armoured Corps

Introduction

South Sudan gained its independence on 09 July 2011, post an overwhelming referendum held in January 2011 and became the youngest Country of the World. Although this historic event brought an end to Africa's longest civil war, the celebrations were short lived - as power struggle between Mr Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President (belonging to the majority Dinka tribe) and Dr Reik Machhar, the First Vice President (from the second most populous Nuer tribe) started the cycle of violence which is even continuing presently, with some other causative factors not restricted only to this confrontation.

It was a singular professionally enriching military experience to command Sector East (SEAST) UN mission in South Sudan

(UNMISS), comprising forces from all countries from December 2016 - December 2017 in one of the most challenging missions of the UN during that period. In addition, there was a dual and diverse charter as National Senior of the Indian Contingent, which was the largest in South Sudan. Going to the ground in conflict zones provided much greater insights on the causative factors and approach to be adopted. This greatly assisted the Mission Leadership in defining their strategies for the mission.

Challenges to Execution of the Mandate

Mandate

Primary mandate of UNMISS was protection of civilians, assist in humanitarian support

and investigation of human rights violations. Though appearing simplistic, there were humongous complexities to ensure this with a meager force of only two battalion groups and other resources in a large area of responsibility spanning 600 x 500 kilometers area. Challenges faced in execution of mandate are covered in succeeding paragraphs.

Cycle of Violence.

The unprecedented degree of violence was largely attributed to the fighting between SPLA/ Govt of South Sudan (GoSS) forces and the SPLA-IO forces, traditional inter-tribal rivalries ie Dinka-Murle ethnic clashes in SEAST, violence perpetuated due to cattle raids, ethnic issues related to abduction of children and age-set clashes and criminal activities and gun culture due to lack of governance. All armed groups irrespective of their affiliations were carrying out atrocities against other tribes to include human rights violations and sexual/ child abuse. The power struggle within each group and corruption (charges) and defections/ splintering amongst groups and coming of 'new factions' adding and increasing the volatility and the violence.

Impact of the Cycle of Violence

The continuous 'violence cycle' had its evident debilitating results - displacement of population leading to sufferings especially women and children, food shortages/ famine and refugees. Denial of access to UNMISS/ UN Humanitarian Agencies/ NGOs to affected areas by the warring factions aggravated the humanitarian issues. Economic/ commercial activity was non-existent, with negligible agriculture or manufacturing activity. Oil

fields had closed operations or were non-functional due to the conflict except for an oil bloc in the North of the country being operated by a Chinese Company. Due to lack of roads and tracks, airfields which are also passable only in dry season, air move to locations with graveled airstrips/ helipads is done primarily by UN and in limited measure by Government of South Sudan which has few aircraft which they utilize to support the logistics for ongoing fighting. Salaries to Govt staff were not being paid regularly, furthering the increase in lawlessness and criminal activities/ looting.

SEAST Command

Command of Sector East, UNMISS was a challenging task. Northern part of the Sector was a bastion of SPLA-IO (Riek Macchar-RM) and witnessed bulk of fighting between Govt Forces and SPLA-IO (RM). The Sector has had the bloodiest inter-tribal clash in the Country i.e. between Dinka and Murle tribes.

Sector command involved command/ functioning of Sector Headquarters, Military Liaison Officers, two Infantry Battalion Groups, Cambodian Military Police, Engineering Company and Sri Lankan Aviation and Military Hospital. Coordination of mandate/ other tasks were essential with Nepal Armed Police Unit, United Nations Police (UNPOL) and United Nations Dept of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and high degree of understanding was required with the political pillar especially human rights, child protection, civil affairs etc for execution of the mandate.

Operational Strategy

Mandated tasks necessitated a strategy and its implementation was through planned tactical level actions. Periodic assessments were carried out on likely future predictions and the SRSg and Force Commander relied on this and interacted regularly. All UN deployments operate from their bases. Hence, it was important that Dynamic Air Patrols (DAPs) were increased to assess the ground situation, obtain intelligence and also for execution of the mandate. This assisted in ascertaining the ground situation as well as developing a connect with the senior hierarchy of parties to the conflict. A major weakness identified regarding night move was suitably addressed by conducting routine Night Patrols and Long Duration and Dynamic Air Patrols with overnight stay for two-three days. Timely interventions by the Sector assisted in de-escalation of tensions, especially in ethnic conflicts. Additional effort was required to raise the professional standards and fluency in English language of some of the Staff Officers. Regular turnover of key appointments and staff officers coupled with some inadequacies in documentation, like record of earlier inquiries, operational



Monitoring of Conflict Between Government Forces and Rebel Forces

actions suffering fatal casualties, information on forced abandonment of bases, etc had to be catalogued at Sector server for future reference.



Negotiations with a Tribal Community

National Senior in Mission

As the National Senior, ensuring high professional standards of the Indian Contingents (largest in the Mission) was the focus. It was ensured that all Indian peacekeepers upheld the image of the Indian Army by their professionalism. The charter also involved administrative and logistic issues including reimbursements from UN, disposal of old vehicles, equipment including ammunition, rotation of contingents and maintaining high serviceability state of operational equipment had to be ensured. Better synergy with Indian Embassy facilitated many aspects of diplomacy. Republic Day/ Independence Day at the Indian Embassy were celebrated, also Kathak Dance Troupe was sent to South Sudan, as part of cultural exchange by the Ministry of External Affairs. This was appreciated by peacekeepers from all countries.

Conclusion

Leadership lessons from the account given are self evident. Militaries the world over respect professionalism and know it very clearly if it exists and respond accordingly. Leading by personal example, courage, decisive decision making under stress, professional capability, fairness, integrity, foresight & planning were qualities which were essential in such high risk missions. The mission also gave a good experience on negotiating at state level and coordination of relief resources, execution of developmental projects, medical and healthcare. With respect to inter-tribal wars, the various tribes also see-through intent(s) and only respond if genuine. The locals despite their outward appearance of being big (normal height was 6' 3") and being part of extreme violent incidents are still victims of circumstances and seeking competent and sincere leadership which can bring peace and get them basic amenities - food and shelter. This was woefully lacking largely due to high levels of corruption and vying for power amongst various political leaders & 'generals'. UN Mission in South Sudan is a challenging mission and requires a robust response by the UN peacekeepers, and in which the Indian Peacekeepers are performing exceptionally. However, resolution of the sufferings of the locals can only be obviated if there is a genuine effort from all especially the major stakeholders (Permanent Security Council members) to collectively address the issue rather than following their own national agendas.

South Sudan is geo-strategically located in epicenter of Africa sharing borders with seven countries. It is resource rich (oil, gas, minerals)

and in future holds promise for investment. Indian diaspora though limited in numbers, has a positive influence and has generated goodwill with people of South Sudan. A diplomatic-military cooperation engagement initiated now will stand India in good stead and provide grounds for greater engagements in future.

Lieutenant General Karanbir Singh was commissioned into Armoured Corps on 14 June 1986. In his illustrious career, he has commanded an Armoured Regiment, an Armoured Brigade and has been General Officer Commanding of Assam Rifles Sector. He has served as a Military Observer in Congo from 2001-2002 and he has also been a Sector Commander in United Nations Mission in South Sudan from 2016-2017. He is an alumnus of DSSC, Wellington (Competitive vacancy) and NDC New Delhi. He assumed the appointment of Director General of Armoured Corps on 21 December 2020.



Lieutenant General
Karanbir Singh

An Insider's View from United Nations Department of Peace Operations

By **Lieutenant Colonel Amit Kumar Yadav**

Assessment Officer, United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO)

India had given the world 'Buddha' and not 'Yuddha'

-PM Narendra Modi at 74th session of United Nations General Assembly

India is one of the largest contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations and it has contributed more than two lakh peacekeepers in 51 missions from 1950 till date. Presently more than 5000 troops are keeping the tri-colour flying high in eight missions across the globe. India's unwavering support to peacekeeping and unparalleled professional competence of the Indian Army in these missions is duly supported by the Indian military officers on secondment to the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) at the UN Headquarters (HQ). Secondment to this vital organ of the UN provides the officers with a deep insight and memorable experience of working in such a unique Headquarters.

United Nations Department of Peace Operations currently has around 150 officers, representing 93 countries, working in close coordination with each other to provide doctrinal and operational support to 21 missions. The unity in diversity is accomplished through the amalgamation of ideas from different national strategies emerging as unified UN policy guidelines. The multi-national, multi-

cultural and multi-lingual environment functions in close coordination without any discrimination based on gender, race or ethnicity. For instance, having Indian and Pakistani officers working on the same project or American and Russian officers sharing the same desk is indeed a unique sight. The commonality of goal, collective cause and focused approach, irrespective of differences, is an example for life time learning. The actual realisation of a concept of integration which encompasses divergent perspectives, accepting conflicting national caveats and



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accommodating unrealistic demands is worth emulating.

United Nations Department of Peace Operations provides an opportunity to observe diplomats at work in various organs of the United Nations, their negotiations, transactions, verbal duels and bonhomie in the aisle of the world's parliament. The work in United Nations Department of Peace Operations exposes the officer to deeply researched ideas, well-articulated speeches, aggressive lobbying and art of political maneuvering.

Experience in such a unique milieu teaches the intricacies of international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, African Union and European Union, their work dynamics, power relations, and how the strategic priorities of these entities are translated into operational processes and activities. Presence in high level meetings, briefings of the Security Council, visits to field locations, attendance in international discussions and being part of global study groups broadens the horizon and exposure

level of the officers.

The world's most integrated theatre impresses that international crises require integrated solutions. Working within United



Nations Department of Peace Operations ingrains eloquent diplomacy which can prevent minor differences from escalating into wars. It is difficult for a soldier to understand at the outset; however, one eventually acquires the fact that peace cannot be achieved through violence, it can only be attained through understanding. Peacekeeping is political and its ultimate success depends on active and sustainable political processes or the real prospect of a peace process becomes a hard-learned fact. United Nations Department of Peace Operations provides a personalised computer system to every staff member and every staff member has around the clock access to permission-based memory drives. It precludes the use of paper, whilst facilitating swift movement of inter / intra office documents and permanent storage of official mail trails. During the COVID-19 pandemic, this system proved a blessing in disguise as it resulted in smooth and immediate transition from in-person to virtual office and prompt return to offices



An Insider's View from United Nations Department of Peace Operations



when the situation improved. This experience can form the base of a customised cyber environment in national armies.

India's representation in such an important organisation demands intensive knowledge, unflinching commitment and regular skill set updating. One's performance in United Nations Department of Peace Operations is generally gauged as an indicator of the staff member's national culture and thus the officers become ambassadors of India in this international environment. It provides an immense sense of pride and achievement that we, while representing India, are part of an organisation which provides a few more sunrises to many people affected by unending violence.



Lieutenant Colonel Amit Kumar Yadav was commissioned in Intelligence Corps on 11 June 2005. The Officer is presently posted as Assessment Officer, UNDPO, New York.



**Lieutenant Colonel
Amit Kumar Yadav**

The Fragility of Peace: UN in Abyei

By **Lieutenant Colonel Sandeep Kumar**
Chief Operations Officer, UNISFA

Genesis

Landlocked and lawless, the region of Abyei straddles Sudan and war-torn South Sudan's borders, yet the arid expanse belongs to neither country. When the two countries signed a comprehensive peace agreement in 2005, which led to South Sudan's independence, they couldn't agree on boundary lines. As a result, Abyei's status remains unresolved to this day. This area is traditionally a territory of the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, which the British transferred in 1905 from Bahr-al-Ghazal Province in southern Sudan to Kordofan Province in the North. Initially the struggle associated with this region was about land and pasture claimed by both the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya communities. With the onset of the first Sudanese civil war (1956–1972), these two communities took separate paths, with the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka supporting the North and the Southern Anyanya rebels respectively. Most recently this local dispute exacerbated a wider political conflict between two warring groups which subsequently became Sudan and South Sudan.

Historically, the Misseriya have been passing through Abyei region annually (November through April) in search of dry-season grazing for their cattle. However, the first recorded major disturbances to Ngok Dinka-Misseriya relations occurred during the period when Sudan was under Turkish rule (1820–55).

By the middle of the century, large slave and ivory-trading firms were active in Bahr-al-Ghazal and South Kordofan forming alliances with Misseriya groups principally active in Abyei region. These groups regularly raided the Ngok Dinka areas for slaves. Under the leadership of various leaders, Dinkas attempted to resist the attacks. Dinka tribals complained about this raiding to the British frequently which led the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government to transfer the territory of Dinkas from Bahr al Ghazal to Kordofan Province in 1905. This colonial policy of keeping feuding groups within the same administrative territory for the ease of exercise of authority led to further fomenting of this problem. This transfer of the Abyei region to Kordofan in 1905 became an issue of major importance just over a hundred years later.

The Arab Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka ethnic groups have long held competing claims for access to the cattle grazing pastures and resources of the oil-rich Abyei region in Sudan. Unable to resolve the dispute during negotiations on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Government and Southern representatives agreed to the establishment of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) and tasked it with evaluating historical and conflicting claims to the land and demarcating a border between

the groups. Unfortunately, inadequacies in contemporary maps and inconsistent nomenclature of rivers posed major challenges for the Commission to determine exact boundaries of Abyei.

Evolving Security Dynamics

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)-2005

The friction between Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka was further catalyzed by the annual Misseriya migrations leading to continued low-level hostilities in the Abyei region culminating in a deteriorated security situation. This led to full-scale invasion of the territory by Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in May 2011 which resulted into what was described as the worst violence since the second Sudanese Civil War. It was a result of the failure of both parties to abide by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 to agree on the modalities for the separate referendum for Abyei, resulting in death, displacement and severe destruction in the Abyei town.

Role of African Union and United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The African Union later intervened and facilitated the signing of the Agreement on 20 June 2011 in Addis Ababa between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on the interim security and administrative arrangement for Abyei. Consequent to the agreement in Addis Ababa, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized the establishment of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) through United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1990 of

27 June 2011. The deployment of UNISFA in 2011 restored relative peace and calm and the armed forces of both countries successfully redeployed outside the Abyei Administrative Area.

Lack of Political Will

The current rapprochement between the Sudan and South Sudan notwithstanding, little progress has been made at the political level thus far on resolving the Abyei issue. This lack of progress on settlement of the Abyei issue at the political level also had a severe spill-over effect at the grassroots level interactions of the communities.

Dangers to Lasting Peace

UNISFA continues to maintain relative peace and calm in the disputed territory despite intermittent turmoil caused by intra/ intercommunal and reprisal attacks, armed incursions and criminal activities. However, despite efforts by UNISFA to maintain peace in the area, undermentioned issues continue to plague the relative peace in Abyei Box:-

Regular Forces from Sudan and South Sudan

Reportedly, there is a deployment of South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) regular forces along the Southern border of Abyei Box and presence of an independent brigade within Abyei disguised as locals. On the other hand, SAF also has regular forces deployed along the Northern border of Abyei Box and confirmed presence of regular forces within Abyei. Incursions into the Abyei Area by these elements poses a major conventional threat to the peace in Abyei.

Militias and Armed Groups

There has been an increase in movement of armed groups from the Misseriya and Nuer communities who mostly gain access to the area by exploiting the exposed flanks. They commit crimes such as cattle rustling, armed robbery among other criminal acts which result in increased tensions between the two communities. In addition, armed militias from both countries attack communities and commit various crimes.

Communal Attacks

The main threat of inter-communal conflict may openly proceed from confrontations between Misseriyas and Dinkas over land, water and grazing rights. There are also inter-communal attacks between Nuer and Misseriya and further, even within the Ngok and Twic Dinka.

Civil Unrest

Protests are common in Abyei, especially by the Ngok Dinka tribe. More so, local staff of individual contractors continue to agitate for unpaid salaries and better conditions of service, sometimes culminating in protests and picketing at UNISFA camps.

Criminal Gangs

Rogue elements from within and outside the area continue to raid, attack and commit heinous crimes in several communities mostly along the main arterial tracks.

Illegal Arms and Gun Culture

Despite Abyei being a weapons free zone, locals continue to acquire and carry arms covertly, citing threats to safety and security. Muglad in Sudan, Mayom in South Sudan and

Amiet Common Market are suspected to be the areas for illicit arms trade.

Challenges in Accomplishment of Mission Mandate

UNISFA is confronted with serious challenges that impact its seamless mandate implementation. The key challenges are as follows:-

Lack of Host Government Support

Sudan maintains sovereignty over the disputed Abyei territory, and this at times interferes with UNISFA operations. Delay in issuance of entry/ residence visa and required clearances to UNISFA has had negative impacts on peacekeeping operations.

Lack of Political Mandate

UNISFA lacks the political mandate and tools to bring together the contending parties to a negotiated settlement of the Abyei conflict. UNISFA has relied on African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to assist with the political process to determine the final status of Abyei with little success. This is worsened by lack of political will of the governments of Sudan and South Sudan and their entrenched positions on the future status of Abyei.

Lack of an Effective Local Administration

Abyei territory is governed by two Independent Local Administrations established along ethnic lines and loyal to respective Governments based on allegiance. This is in direct contradiction to the 20 June 2011 agreement signed by both parties to the

Abyei conflict. UNISFA is therefore constrained to seek mutual consent in support of its operations.

Lack of Capacity to Deal with Crime

UNISFA lacks capacity and capability to deal with crime due to lack of prosecutor powers and the absence of a Police Unit.

Poor State of Communication Network

The infrastructure and road connectivity are very poor within the Abyei Box with restricted ground mobility especially during the rainy season. Movement of troops, stores and logistics is a major challenge. Some camps could also be entirely cut off during the rainy season forcing them to be air maintained.

Inadequate Troops to Implement UNISFA Mandate

The gradual and continued force reduction has limited the capacity of the Force to provide security for the communities in Abyei. The available force is fully stretched with limited reserves to simultaneously respond to threats at different locations.

Way Forward

Going ahead, following are the imperatives for lasting peace in the Abyei region

Political and Diplomatic Arrangements

African Union should revitalize political process for effective implementation of bilateral agreements between the contending parties. In addition, diplomatic pressures from UN and international community maybe used to leverage on both governments for compliance to find peaceful solution.

Conflict Management

Mission must continue with a flexible and tailored "Conflict Management and Mitigation Strategy", in close consultation with the two communities to further improve inter-communal relations and peaceful co-existence. It should continue to keep a tab on the movement of weapons and armed groups in the region.

Establishment of Abyei Police Service (APS)

Sudan and South Sudan should be encouraged to withdraw all unauthorized forces from Abyei Area and to provide security through the creation of APS which will take over policing functions throughout Abyei Area, including the protection of oil infrastructure.

Community Engagement

The long-term solution to Abyei conflict lies in communal harmony between Misseriya and Ngok Dinka community. UNISFA should continue its efforts for meaningful engagement between two communities to resolve inter communal issues with peaceful negotiations and prevent violence.

Economic and Infrastructure Development

The economic upliftment of the area will go a long way in reducing the communal clashes by just being able to meet their basic requirements.

Conclusion

The main drivers of conflict in Abyei Area are communal tensions between the two dominant tribal groups – Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. Their claims over land, pasture, water and migratory rights routes remain a

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bone of contention. The seasonal migration of the Misseriya within Abyei Area and into the Southern portion heightens tensions between the two tribes particularly along the grazing routes.

The continued presence of UNISFA military personnel has played a key role in reducing the tension among the Abyei communities and acted as deterrence to full scale hostilities between the contending parties. The current security situation remains fragile and unpredictable intertwined with the internal political and security challenges of Sudan and South Sudan and the regional security dynamics. The restoration of relative peace and calm in the disputed Abyei territory should be utilised by both parties to the conflict to reach a negotiated settlement through political dialogue and final status of Abyei be decided through referendum.

Lieutenant Colonel Sandeep Kumar was commissioned into the Corps of Infantry in June 2006. The officer is currently posted as the Chief of Operations at United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).



Lieutenant Colonel
Sandeep Kumar

Integration with Kazakhstan: Unity in Diversity at United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

By **Lieutenant Colonel Vaibhav Attri**
Post Commander, UNIFIL

Introduction

An Armoured Squadron of the Indian Army at UN Position (UNP) - 4-3 of Indian Battalion (INDBATT) forms part of Battalion Mobile Reserve (BMR) in UNIFIL. Since 2018, the squadron has had the unique privilege of serving with Kazakhstan troops who are deployed at the same UN Position as the infantry component of BMR. Thus, the squadron of "LIGHTNING STREAKS" along with troops from Airmobile Peacekeeping Regiment of Kazakhstan became a unique UNP where two different components from separate countries are deployed as a single entity. The interaction with the Kazakh soldiers over the last three years has been an enriching experience for the Regiment and all the soldiers carry fond memories of working with the modest yet robust Kazakhs. The operational activities undertaken by BMR include regular vehicle patrols, manning of checkpoints on entry exit routes to INDBATT Area of Responsibility (AOR) and Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) - all of which include troops of the Indian Armoured Squadron and Kazakh Platoon. Interestingly, some joint patrols are undertaken with the Lebanese

Armed Forces, integrating troops from three countries in conducting operations as a single entity.

The Cultural Melting Pot

The soldiers on both sides were initially hesitant and took time to mingle due to language and cultural barriers. However, militaries all across the world operate in a similar manner. Soon a common military language and culture developed wherein the operating environment and the tasking bonded the soldiers together. Daily routine at the post, which included physical training, games and operational activities further brought the soldiers closer to each other as they formulated their own signals and sign language to communicate. Breaking bread together (sharing each other's cuisine) and celebrating each other's festivals created a deeper bond amongst all the soldiers. When INDBATT XXII was inducted in the mission area, the strength of Kazakhs was reduced from erstwhile one company to a platoon. The balance of the troops were made up from the infantry soldiers of the MADRAS Regiment. The BMR is now more diverse with Black

Berets, Valiant Thambis and Kazakh Telnyschkas working together for a common goal. Being unique in composition, the post also had the opportunity to host multiple dignitaries from India, Kazakhstan and UN who saw the functioning of two different set of soldiers working together seamlessly. Some of the Kazakh dignitaries included Lieutenant General T Mukhtarov, Deputy Kazakh Defense Minister, Major General Nurlan Yernekbayev, Minister of Defence, Kazakhstan, and General Major Ospanov Daulet, Commander, Kazakhstan Airmobile Forces.

Another opportunity for multinational experience presented itself when the soldiers of BMR interacted with the Jaeger Company of Finland which was part of Force Commander's Reserve. The restrictions due to COVID -19 reduced such interactions, but with the situation stabilising, the interaction could once again commence. It was an enriching experience where both sides shared ideas, drills and best practices. The Indian soldiers, having served in varied terrain and operating environment back home, were able to provide valuable insights and share their experience with the largely conscription

based Finnish Contingent. Interestingly, the real interaction took place at the dining table. Finnish soldiers, being from a Nordic state, were particularly interested in the drills and procedures of the Indian Army in snow clad areas. 'Thambis' shared their experience of their tenure at Super High Altitude while the troops of the Armoured Squadron gave insights on employment of tanks in High Altitude.

The sharing of the same UNP over the last three years with Kazakhstan and regular interaction with troops of other nationalities makes one realize that Armies all across the world, are almost the same at their core. They have the same values - discipline, integrity, loyalty, honour and courage. And that is why these are called 'Military Ethos' and is not connected to only a particular nation. The Tri - colour stands steadfast, proud of its history, centuries of tradition and rich glory while the Steppe Eagle soars high on its achievements in World War II – something very close to the heart of this relatively new Army. The Finnish Blue Cross also stands tall remembering the winter war and bolstered by the zeal of its fresh conscripts. At the heart of every soldier, is a sense of pride, for he represents his country, irrespective of the flag he bears allegiance to.



Professional Interaction



Lieutenant Colonel
Vaibhav Attri

Lieutenant Colonel Vaibhav Attri was commissioned into an Armoured Corps in June 2006. He is presently a Post Commander in UNIFIL.

Medical Challenges during Covid Pandemic and Mitigation Strategies in United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

By **Lieutenant Colonel Gurdarshdeep Singh Madan**
Classified Specialist (Radio Diagnosis)

Background

In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic which has severely ravaged health systems, economic and social progress worldwide. As I write (end July 2021), 191 million confirmed COVID-19 cases and over 4.1 million deaths have been reported globally. (DRC), a conflict torn country, has also seen recent surge in cases with high fatalities. It immediately brought into notice the gross inadequacies/ deficiencies in infrastructure, equipment, supplies, manpower, training, capacities and capabilities in handling such a large-scale pandemic. The knowledge about the disease and treatment was largely fluidic and protean with continuous changes in strategies, making it even more difficult to learn, train and contain. It was compounded by the fear of unknown, non-availability of a definitive treatment, rapidly spreading nature and a wrongly perceived high mortality rate, creating widespread panic and stigma.

Blue Helmet Medics

The UN peacekeeping forces being frontline workers are high at risk of contracting disease due to nature of their operations and intermingling with local populace. Lack of COVID-19 vaccination drive in host country and the poor and protracted mode of evacuation to higher medical echelons outside the country further decreases the chances of a patient to benefit from tertiary level health care.

The advent of this pandemic has unearthed manpower, medical and non-medical logistics and training challenges. UN Medical establishments are primarily designed to handle military medicine and field surgeries with minor component to handle infectious and respiratory diseases. The COVID - 19 pandemic brought a radical change in the morbidity profile, disease variant and higher and prolonged admission rates of the hospital. The ramification on the hospital working included increased working hours of hospital staff in uncomfortable Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), preventing medical staff even to drink water, unforeseen logistics

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challenges like increasing isolation facility to 40% of hospital bed capacity, non-availability of medicine in the local country, increase usage and difficulty in refilling of oxygen; protracted procedure and hurdles in medical evacuation of critically ill COVID patients to a respiratory center. A major challenge was to ensure early turnaround of the diagnostic COVID RT-PCR report which was affecting

Primarily, the infrastructure was augmented by increasing the dedicated COVID bed complement of the hospital by 19 beds which included Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The expansion of the accommodation was completed with patient beds and related stores, equipment such as ventilators, multipara monitors and oxygen concentrators. Additionally consumables like



Manpower and Resource Augmentation through Indian Air Force Flight

timely medical care of the patients. Preventing accidental exposure of non COVID patients was an additional challenge to limit hospital staff and its clientele from peril. Decongesting the living area of medical personnel to prevent accidental spread caused by occupational exposure was a major challenge too.

Mitigation Strategies

Manpower and Resource Augmentation through Indian Air Force Flight amidst this stir and principally to face the challenges of this pandemic, the capabilities of Level - III Hospital were augmented in terms of infrastructure, manpower and equipment.

full body PPE, sanitizers, cleaning disinfectants, drug injectables were made available by the Indian and UN logistics agencies. Through a special military flight, India assisted in induction of a 15 member COVID augmentation team along with other essential medical resources. Flu Clinic and screening center was established to ensure profiling of the clientele. Dedicated diagnostic facility with Radiological and RT-PCR lab was established in the Flu Clinic at Indian Field Hospital Level - III, bringing down the turnaround time to four hours, which is comparable to international standards.

Patient entry zones and direction of patient flow were regulated and reoriented to

Medical Challenges during Covid Pandemic and Mitigation Strategies in MONUSCO

segregate COVID suspects from non COVID patients. Dedicated COVID - 19 ambulances with earmarked manpower was instituted. Regular and stringent training protocols for COVID appropriate behaviour, use of PPE, disposal of hospital waste and handling of emergencies were continuously revised and drills rehearsed. Team concept of COVID-19 medical staff was implemented to ensure functional continuity in event of occupational exposure to hospital staff. A 24 X 7 helpline and tele-consultation center was established to streamline appointment-based consultation and follow-up of quarantined patients. Decongestion in the living area of medical personnel and ensuring recommended gap of minimum two meters between beds was catered by re-appropriation of recreation room and common areas as barracks. Even in the peak of COVID 19 pandemic, when the hospital was receiving a large volume of COVID patients, the hospital continued running regular Out Patient Department (OPD) services, and attended to routine non COVID workload and providing life and limb saving surgeries to battle casualties and other trauma cases along with routine medical emergencies.



COVID Ward and ICU Complex at IFH Level III



Conclusion

The challenges of COVID 19 pandemic were many and appeared insurmountable. However, difficulties create window of opportunities to augment the processes and demonstrate the capabilities to the fullest. This hospital with thorough planning, team-work, appropriate and timely augmentation and replenishment of resources and manpower has successfully managed more than 450 COVID patients till date, in addition to the regular hospital workload. High morale, standardized policies and protocols and continued training have been force multipliers which helped to mature the theme ***“Together we can and together we heal.”***



Lieutenant Colonel
Gurdarshdeep Singh

Lieutenant Colonel Gurdarshdeep Singh Madan was commissioned in the Army Medical Corps in 2003. He is presently tenanted the appointment of Classified Specialist (Radio Diagnosis) and Chief Logistics Officer at Indian Hospital Level III (MONUSCO) in Democratic Republic of Congo.

MISSION READINESS

Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations and India's Envisaged Role

By **Lieutenant General DS Rana**

Ati Vishisht Seva Medal, Yudh Seva Medal, Sena Medal, Director General Staff Duties

United Nations has been the most prevailing multilateral organization that aims to maintain international peace and security through friendly relations and cooperation amongst nations. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are being undertaken by the UN in various war-torn/conflict-ridden countries to assist them in achieving peace, security and rebuilding the nation. The most complex and dynamic aspect of the UN charter involving a large number of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and host countries, is to support peace agreements and quenching inter-state conflicts.

Contemporary PKOs has evolved to involve asymmetric use of force by key player sand violent extremist groups. The domain of PKOs has stretched to state-building, stabilization,

protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, institutional capacity building and robust use of force. Shifting geopolitical and regional dynamics also has a profound influence on PKOs. The paper would critically examine the future landscape of PKOs, which would help India and other countries to prepare for the developing challenges/opportunities.

Changing Nature of Global Conflict

The global conflicts and emerging security environment are radically different from what they were a decade ago. Inter and intrastate conflicts have crossed borders and have expanded their influence to include terrorism, insurgencies, religious fanatics and ethnic interests. While there has been a

steady and sustained decline in inter-state conflicts, the incidents of intrastate conflicts are on the rise, which is characterized by a fragile government, armed groups, economic collapse and a large displaced population. Some of the important factors driving the growing complexities are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.

Global Crime and Involvement of Non-State Actors

Armed groups have been building shadow economies through global networks thus altering the political/economy of the country which has a detrimental effect on governance, undermining state authority and weakening its capacity. Similarly, the involvement of Non-State Actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon has changed the dynamics of PKOs.

External Players

In 1919, fewer than 5 percent of civil wars involved military involvement by external actors; by 2015, that number had grown to 40 percent. The involvement of Russia, the US and Iran in Syria, Uganda, Rwanda and other neighboring forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) highlights the level of external involvement in internal conflicts. The presence of foreign/ proxy forces present complex challenges and risks and have led the UN to deploy large peace operations in various parts of the world.

Multipolar World Order and Complex Mandates

Shift in traditional world order towards multipolar structures, complex and variable support of number of TCCs and Police

Contributing Countries (PCCs) in global power politics has led to divided Security Council in the face of conflicts. Such shift indicates a reduction in missions across the world due to a lack of cooperation between nations. In such a scenario, the only operations that the Security Council would manage to agree on would likely be traditional UN PKO which would be neutral and predominantly military and deployed at the fringes of or both the poles (Lijn, 2021).

Technology, Climate and Demography

The emerging trends in technology, climate and demography have a profound impact on the conflict landscape. Technology has enabled a various range of actors to influence conflict of a country through social media, dark web and weaponization of technologies along with superimposition of AI and other disruptive technologies. Climate changes to include changing rainfall patterns and extreme weather are driving the population towards poverty, illegal activities, armed groups and large-scale displacement. Also in such nations, demographic growth is much higher than the global average thus putting pressure on national resources thereby increasing the conflict risks.

COVID-19 Pandemic

COVID-19 has led to a severe economic downturn globally. Effects of this may be more felt in fragile/ weak states with few financial or social safe guards resulting in greater inequalities and potentially greater risks for social unrest. The poor health infrastructure is overburdened and widespread disparity would increase the risks

of emerging unrest. Demand for global support in terms of health infrastructure support through PKOs would increase substantially.

Future Trends in Peacekeeping Operations

The earlier mentioned factors have modified the emerging trends of conflicts. These trends will have major ramifications for PKOs in the future. Also, the decline in the global economy, rise of regionalism/ nationalism will have a direct bearing on the funding and budgetary support to UN PKOs. The dynamics of PKOs in the changing landscape of global conflict are summarized below.

Increased Scale, Scope and Hostilities

Changes in global conflict dynamics have increased the scale and scope of modern PKOs to address intra-state conflicts directed towards the stabilization and protection of civilians. Peacekeeping operations are in a process of transition and are now more skewed to the domain of peace enforcement and peace building. In the present milieu, when budgetary constraints and troop reduction have increased pressure in the closure of missions, there has been a greater focus on the protection of civilians, increasing the robustness of operations and the use of intelligence for improving the effectiveness of the UNPKOs with lesser resources. There is a rising trend of hostilities towards UNPKOs and in many cases such as in Mali, the Peace Keepers have been targeted.

Focus on Force Enablers/ Force Multiplier

With troop reduction and budgetary cuts, the UN will have to focus on the provision of 'Force Enablers' and 'Force Multipliers' to fulfil its mandate and role. Large-scale operations in Africa will need a significant number of enablers in such large theatres with little infrastructure and troop strength. UN operations will have to increasingly rely on police contingents and information-gathering capacities to supplement military units. Thus future PKO will have to focus on a wider range of enabling units like helicopters, drones, engineers, riot police, special forces and protection units, field hospitals and maritime capabilities. Also, highly skilled specialists like air planning and movement specialist, information specialist, chemical weapon experts and security sector and defence reform specialists are required to be supplemented to UN staff in future PKOs.

Budgetary Cuts and Troops Reduction


The current trend indicates a reduction in budget/ troop contribution over some time. The UN budgets for peacekeeping operations have been reduced substantially. The PKOs budget has seen a decrease from 8.2 Bn USD in 2015 to 6.4 Bn USD in 2021. Besides, there has also been an overall decline in UN troops from 1,07,088 in 2015 to 81,932 in 2021. Many of the missions are nearing an exit strategy. Troop numbers are likely to be reduced further in missions like MONUSCO, UNIFIL, UNMISS and MINUSMA. It is also likely that the UN will have an increased number of political missions in areas including the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. The enhanced role of regional

Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations and India's Envisaged Role

players and stakeholders and their acceptance by the UN have resulted in troop reduction in the conflict trodden countries.

Infusion of Latest Technology

The future PKO will require the latest technology to enable the peacekeepers to



Source : Annotated by Author from data accessible at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/infographics>

Closure of Large Missions

Since the beginning of PKOs missions, the emphasis was on large missions with huge deployment of forces on the ground. As per the SIPRI report, there were 62 multilateral peace operations active in 2020. Two operations in Guinea-Bissau closed in 2020 and along with one more operation in UNAMID which is likely to be closed by June 2022. UNAMID's closure will be a landmark in contemporary PKOs as it is the fourth major UN PKO to close since 2007: other beings MINUSTAH, UNOCI both closed in 2017 and UNMEE in 2008 (SIPRI, 2021).

effectively manage the situation in operational areas. The technology infusion should specifically cater for ISR, communication and logistics. TCCs needs to provide force multipliers and modern equipment. Infusion of this technology will greatly enhance the PKO in the phase of dwindling budgetary support and reduced troop contribution.

Robust and Expanded Mandates

The Brahimi report of the year 2000 highlighted the requirement of enhanced rapid deployment of PKOs, along with strengthening the relationship with the member states. The HIPPO report, in the year 2015, highlighted the need to make the required changes in the approach, as more

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PKOs have now shifted from cease fire zones to conflict zones. Following the Brahimi Report, robust and integrated operations were launched and are now mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such missions will however, need to abide by the principles of impartiality, proportionate use of force and pragmatic risk-taking. Now almost 97% of PKOs have a Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate. Current conditions in the Middle East, CAR, Somalia and Syria suggest missions involving hybrid and sub-conventional threats. More PKOs will soon transit into the domain of peace enforcement and peace building with new mandates covering disarmament and de-mobbing, assistance to police empowerment, government capability building, election conduct, national reforms, security sector transformation, capacity building and extension of state authority. Future PKOs should also be based on a pragmatic exit strategy with definable objectives.

Specialized Missions including Humanitarian Operations

Budgetary constraints will limit the size of missions in the near term, potentially leading to peace operations with small military components or none at all thus increasing the importance of unarmed protection strategies (Razza et al, 2020). There is a felt need for custom-curated specialized missions to cater for pandemics, climate-induced disasters and massive population movements, warranting expanding the protection role of peacekeeping missions beyond the issue of physical violence. Peacekeeping missions around humanitarian goals such as delivering

assistance in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters, as also state collapse, support to health response and pandemics, serve as both providers of assistance and barriers against waves of migrants and refugees may emerge in future. This kind of mission may blur the distinction between humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping's POC and stabilization. Such missions are also likely to operate in a complex ecosystem of protection actors and entail important partnership arrangements and coordination requirements.

India's Envisaged Role

Leveraging India's Contribution in UNPKOs

India is one of the founding members of the UN. Indian contribution to UN Missions started with participation in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) in Korea (1950). Since then, India has participated in 51 out of the 71 peacekeeping missions and has contributed over 2,58,000 personnel, wherein 175 Indian Peacekeepers have made supreme sacrifice. India is the third-largest TCC in UN PKOs today and its deployment has been in most challenging missions, unlike countries like China and others, which avoid high-risk missions. India has the unique distinction of being the first country to send an all-female contingent to UNMIL in 2007. India's contribution to UNPKO has been defined by years of experience and professionalism with myriad facets, which projects India as a responsible nation and a potential permanent member of the UNSC. There is a need to analyse India's role and contribution to UN PKOs and align itself to the requirement of future PKOs to

meet the changing global dynamics. To enhance India's footprint in future PKOs and proactively adapt to changing requirement of the UN, India's envisaged role is elucidated in the succeeding paragraphs.

❖ *Provider of Agile and Flexible Units*

India needs to redefine its troop contribution with a focus on agile and flexible units such as Rapidly Deployable Forces, Quick Reaction companies, Special Forces units and other enabling units like Engineers, Signals, Medical, Aviation assets, UAVs, EOD/ IED Disposal Teams and Female Engagement Teams in coming days. This will not only increase its footprint but also enable her to maintain/increase troops on grounds in future PKOs.

❖ *Sustainable Fund Contributor*

To enhance our stature in the UN and a shift in operation philosophy, India may rethink the enhancing contribution of funds to the UN. India is presently contributing 13.5 million USD yearly to the UN. On other hand, the UN is reimbursing India approximately 140 million USD annually for equipment and manpower deployed in UN missions and a portion of these reimbursements can be redirected to various activities. A contribution of 1.5 billion USD (approximately 1% of reimbursements) will increase India's contribution substantially. Also, India should focus on contribution towards various UN initiatives other than mere peacekeeping.

❖

❖ *Participation in Multilateral Peace Initiatives*

Countries like Japan and USA sponsor major global peace initiatives like ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting (ADDM) Plus and Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). India can co-sponsor and actively participate in these initiatives in future. India's role in such initiatives will make her position relevant and important in future PKOs.

❖ *Higher Level Appointments*

India should proactively bid for more higher-level appointments in particular Indian Armed Forces representatives in UN Headquarters through the Permanent Mission of India (PMI).

❖ *Develop CUNPK as Centre of Excellence*

The present Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in India needs to be upgraded in terms of infrastructure to allow world level peacekeeping training to personnel of FFCs and give them exposure to UN missions, if necessary as part of Indian Contingents to enhance diplomatic relations. CUNPK should also include nation building, encourage think tanks on UN aspects and create a pool of personnel who are trained in languages like French and Arabic to ensure more intimate support to PKOs.

Develop Soft Power

India should explore its soft power and military diplomacy in various UN-related initiatives to enhance India's stature in the UN. Various initiatives wherein India can play positive roles in future are as under:-

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❖ *Triangular Partnership Project (TPP)*

TPP should aim to enhance the capacity of engineering and medical contingents of predominantly African TCCs through funding, training and provision of equipment

❖ *Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM)*

LCM is established to strengthen the UN's efforts to identify training requirements and support the capacity building of TCCs. India can assist TCCs in training their contingents, as part of bilateral or trilateral engagements for future PKOs and also offer co-deployment for friendly countries such as Bhutan, to assist these countries in gaining experience in UN PKOs.

❖ *Conduct of Training of Friendly Foreign Countries (FFCs)*

India can use the expertise of the Indian Army to conduct training of the TCCs by sending Mobile Training Teams (MTT), conducting training exercises and sponsoring them in various UN courses held at CUNPK so that the TCCs can contribute to future PKOs.

❖ *Technical Infusion*

India has a demonstrated capability in developing low-cost technology to include software and applications which can be exploited in improving the efficacy and to enhance the visibility of own PKOs. Future PKOs will be technology-heavy and India can make a positive contribution to the same.

Conclusion

The role of UN Peacekeepers in modern conflicts and to maintain world order will remain critical. The UN must assume a leading role for a stronger global-regional partnership for ensuring peace and security. There is a need to re-evaluate the structures, processes, embrace creativity and adopt flexible doctrines. The mechanisms, processes and structures need to be resilient in consonance with the charter to negate future threats. India as a growing power has to align its strategic goals with actions on grounds commensurate to that of a responsible and strong nation of the 21st century.



**Lieutenant General
Dinesh Singh Rana**

Lieutenant General Dinesh Singh Rana, AVSM, YSM, SM was commissioned into infantry in December 1987. The General Officer is an alumnus of NDC (India), CESEDEN (Madrid, Spain) and NDU, Washington, DC. Besides other important assignments and courses, the General Officer has served in IMTRAT, Bhutan, UN mission in UNIFIL (2004) and was selected and has undergone UN Senior Mission Leadership (UNSML) course in 2017. He has authored research papers on leadership and strategic issues (with focus on China). He is currently tenating the appointment of Director General Staff Duties at IHQ of MoD (Army).

India's Contribution to Current UN Peacekeeping Missions

By **Major General Michael AJ Fernandez**

Vishisht Seva Medal, Additional Director General Staff Duties

Changing Nature of Conflicts

Conflicts traditionally have been understood as armed combat involving states over conflicting interests. However, since the end of Cold War in early 90's, there has been a perceptible decline in inter – state conflicts and on the contrary proliferation of intra – state conflicts. These conflicts are characterised by a weak and fragile Government machinery, armed/ terrorist groups trying to establish control by violent acts, economic collapse and a sizeable internally displaced population. The recent COVID pandemic has further accentuated the problem in such countries due to severe economic downturn, creating turmoil in fragile economies with lesser financial and social safeguards.

Due to the changing nature of conflict, UN peacekeeping operations are becoming more complex and diverse encompassing a wide range of activities. In departure from traditional peacekeeping and post conflict assistance, recent years have witnessed UN peace operations directed towards stabilization and protection of civilians. Peacekeeping operations have now transited to the domain of peace enforcement and peace building. The mandate assigned to units has evolved and not only encompasses the

conduct of military operations against armed groups but also includes aspects like humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians, supporting the political process and assisting development in the region.

Peacekeeping undoubtedly remains the most visible activity of the United Nations and one of its most important contributions to what the charter of the United Nations calls 'the maintenance of international peace and security'. The role of United Nations peacekeepers in pursuance of the changed mandate is humungous. Given the new realities, the major challenge before the United Nations lies in aligning its peacekeeping operations in tune with the changing conflict dynamics and empowering its peacekeepers by providing a clear and well defined mandate.

Peacekeeping Environment and Requirements

With significant budgetary cuts, the UN has been forced to reduce its spending on peacekeeping operations resulting in troop drawdown in several missions. More complex mandate, fewer resources and the requirement to operate in a hostile multidimensional environment pose a major

challenge to the peacekeepers today. Current operating environment not only require a strengthened command and control system but also better situational awareness, greater interoperability and force protection measures. Knowledge of local language is crucial as missions need to communicate and establish connect with the host population.

The need to orient peacekeeping training as per the prevailing operating environment and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the United Nations has to be judiciously pursued. While mission specific requirements may vary, nuanced understanding of issues like mine/UXO awareness, urban and jungle warfare techniques, protection of civilians, riot control and rendering humanitarian assistance by peacekeepers merit consideration. Requirement of rapidly deployable units, special forces teams, quick reaction companies and formed police units is the need of the hour. Enabling units such as engineers, signals, aviation and medical entities facilitate peace building operations and must form a critical component in resource planning.

Indian Contribution to the United Nations

For nearly seven decades now, India has played a stellar role in assisting the UN in maintaining global peace and security. Commencing with UN operations in Korea in 1950, India contributed more than 2,58,000 peacekeepers in 51 of the 71 peacekeeping missions thus far. Her spontaneous and ever willing participation in UN peacekeeping operations across the globe has been a clear demonstration of her commitment to the

objectives set out in the UN charter.

Indian Army has participated in some of the most volatile missions across the globe. Indian peacekeepers have displayed exceptional levels of professionalism in protecting the mandate and adhering to the principles set out in UN charter. 158 peacekeepers have made the supreme sacrifice till date while serving in various missions across the globe. Currently, India is one of the largest military troop contributors to UN peacekeeping in the world, with deployment in over eight missions across the globe.

Way Ahead in Indian Context

India needs to proactively adapt to the changing requirements of peacekeeping to sustain and further enhance its stature in UN affairs. Our contribution must be aligned to the changing requirements and the mandate assigned by the United Nations. Certain recommendations in this regard are elucidated in succeeding paragraphs.

With shift in operational philosophy from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peace enforcement, India needs to redefine its troop contribution with focus on Rapidly Deployable Forces and Enablers. For this to fructify, we need to analyse the gaps projected by UN in its peacekeeping missions and pledge agile and flexible units such as Quick Reaction companies, Special Forces units and other enabling units to include Engineers, Signals, Medical and Aviation assets.

Peacekeeping intelligence is another area which needs due impetus. Advanced technology in terms of communication and surveillance equipment, drones and

interceptors must be integrated with human intelligence to prevent violent activities by Armed Groups.

Training of peacekeepers has to be multidimensional with the sole purpose of empowering prospective peacekeepers. Pre-deployment training must factor the operating environment and focus on issues such as gender parity, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, language training and other socio- ethnic factors. Indian Centre for UN Peacekeeping must emerge as a Centre of Excellence at par with world class training institutes having niche integrated training capabilities.

Women Participation

Apart from a Women Engagement Team deployed in Democratic Republic of Congo, India presently deploys 18% peacekeepers as observers and staff officers in UN missions. This is an important aspect as women and children are often the main victims of violence in such conflicts, particularly Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). UN as part of its gender parity drive has adopted 11 resolutions to promote participation of women peacekeepers. An increase in women participation, both in the number of women contingents and observers would undoubtedly bolster our ability to deal with empathy when engaging with women and children related issues.

Protection of Civilians

As missions graduate to peace building and stabilisation, Protection of Civilians (PoC) assumes priority. PoC entails active patrolling in hostile environment and

providing physical protection to thousands of internally displaced population. Peacekeepers need to be aware of innovative measures for early warning like community alert networks, community liaison arrangements, public information and reporting and riot control training. These aspects must form part of our Pre - Deployment Training curriculum.

Matching Logistics Capabilities

Our desire to enhance footprints in the UN has to be supported by matching logistics capabilities. We need to enhance our readiness levels by creating reserve of equipment brick as per the equipment profile specified by the UN. This would provide us the flexibility to undertake deployment in new missions at short notice. As a major power, India must utilise its own integral fleet of transport assets for moving own contingents and logistics to mission areas. This would not only reduce dependency on UN hired assets but allow us to showcase our equipment and logistics capacities to the international environment.

Capacity Building

As part of exit strategy, capacity building of host nation forces is required to be carried out through training and provision of equipment. This can be executed through UN lead partnerships or bilateral engagements.

Some countries are actively pursuing various Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities in UN missions by financing a number of Quick Impact Projects (QIP). As part of outreach programme in mission areas, we also need to consider various capacity building activities in close coordination with

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our Embassies/ Ministry of External Affairs. Such activities should be aligned to our overall strategic and economic cooperation with the host country.

Information Operations

Information operations play a critical role in executing the mandate of UN. The achievements of Indian Peacekeepers in pursuance of the mandate must be highlighted in international and national media to positively contribute towards peace building.

Conclusion

The world today continues to witness volatility in several hotspots across its continents. Inflamed regional dynamics, shifting geo-political graphs, greater involvement of non state actors coupled with widespread economic slowdown in a post pandemic world continue to be causative destabilizing factors around the globe. The United Nations would continue to play a key role in peacekeeping endeavours around the world.

As a major military and economic power, with significant contribution to peacekeeping operations, India needs to continue championing this yeoman cause, in keeping with her global stature as a responsible nation with proven credentials. She also needs to adapt and evolve her peacekeeping commitments in accordance with the changing ground realities and evolving operating environment.

- *"The only thing constant is change".*



**Major General
Michael AJ Fernandez**

Major General Michael AJ Fernandez, VSM was commissioned into the Corps of Engineers on 11 June 1988. In his career spanning over 33 years, the General Officer has served in varied operations and terrain in command, staff and instructional assignments. He has been part of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1989 to 1990 and as a Sector Engineer on staff in UNIFIL from 2001 to 2002. He has commanded his Engineer Regiment in Plains Sector and High Altitude Area, an Amphibious Infantry Brigade and an Infantry Division in the Desert Sector. He is an alumnus of DSSC, Wellington (competitive vacancy), Higher Command Course and NDC, New Delhi. He is currently posted as Additional Director General Staff Duties at IHQ of MoD (Army).

Annual Report: Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK), New Delhi, India

By **Colonel Kaustubh Kekre**

Colonel CUNPK

Background

CUNPK was conceptualized and raised in the year 2000 with an aim to impart quality training to Indian Peacekeepers who are representing India in the multitude of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions all over the world. It is the nodal agency for UN pre-deployment training in India which conducts tailor made national and international courses for Indian Armed Forces officers, select personnel from all services, Central Armed Police Forces and officers from Friendly Foreign Countries (FFCs).

The Centre is a joint venture of Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Service Headquarters and serves as a Centre of Excellence in collaboration with Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) and various other Governmental and Non-Governmental agencies. The Centre offers a plethora of courses as part of pre deployment capsules for contingents, military observers and staff officers. Theme based Table Top Exercises, Field Training Exercises, Seminars and panel discussions on peacekeeping operations at the national and international level are a regular feature in the curriculum of the Centre in its

yearly training calendar.

To ensure world class training, the Centre has a pool of approximately 300 serving officers, senior retired officers and distinguished civilians with experience of UN in military, police and diplomatic sphere. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from academia and officials from other agencies like UN Women, International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR) also form part of the Expert Panel.

CUNPK is a member of International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centre (IAPTC) and Association of Asia Pacific Peacekeeping Training Centres (AAPTC). CUNPK has had the proud privilege of holding the Secretariat of IAPTC for two consecutive terms from 2006 to 2016.

Vision

To be India's premier integrated UN peace operations training institution incorporating best practices and impart hands on training to prospective UN peacekeepers at tactical, operational and strategic level.

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Mission

To be an International Centre of Excellence for UN, promoting niche training, multinational collaboration and contemporary research in the field of UN peace operations.

Events and Activities

In addition to training of own contingents, CUNPK has trained 1605 officers from 96 countries. At an average, 650 officers are imparted training every year. An overview of courses and other activities undertaken by the Centre is shown below:

Nodal Training Institute

■ Student and Instructor Exchange.

The Institute engages in reciprocal exchange

of students and instructors from friendly foreign countries for UN pre deployment courses on an annual basis.

■ Mobile Training Teams.

CUNPK has been regularly deploying mobile training teams for training and capability development of potential troop contributing countries on bilateral basis as also on behest of UN.

■ Table Top and Field Exercises

Exercises with friendly foreign countries are a regular feature on the event calendar of CUNPK. Bilateral and multilateral table top and field exercises are undertaken by the Centre in coordination with the concerned formations in India and overseas with an aim to increase cooperation, share best practices

Courses		
National Level		
Ser	Course	Frequency
(i)	UN Pre Deployment Course	Six Courses per year
(ii)	Training of Trainers Course	Twice a year
(iii)	Logistics Training of Trainers Course for Contingents.	Twice a year
(iv)	Courses for Minor Units	On required basis
International Level		
(v)	United Nations Staff and Logistic Officers Course (UNSLOC)	Twice a year
(vi)	United Nations Military Observers Course (UNMOC)	Twice a year
(vii)	Training of Trainers on United Nations Pre Deployment Training Course (ToT on UNPDT)	Twice a year
(viii)	United Nations Peacekeeping Course for African Partners (UNPCAP)	Once a year
(ix)	United Nations Female Military Officers' Course (UNFMOC)	Once a year
(x)	Thematic Courses and Command Post Exercise / Field Training Exercise	Once a year

and enhance the global footprint of the Centre.

■ Visits, Conferences and Seminars

The Centre has a regular schedule of conferences and seminars with institutes like International Commission for Red Cross, UN Women, United Services Institute of India and various other organisations. Hosting foreign delegations to witness training is also undertaken from time to time.

■ Training Conducted in 2020-21

Training at the Centre has continued during the COVID 19 pandemic with necessary precautions. The need for combat worthy and trained troops to represent the country at the United Nations has driven the Centre to evolve innovative and effective means to ensure turbulence free quality training to all contingents, military observers and staff officers prior to their deployment into the mission area. During the last one year, CUNPK conducted numerous online/ offline courses and training events as part of the yearly calendar. A total of approximately 5000 troops were trained during the last year which included validation training of contingents and pre deployment courses for officers.

Capacity Development Plan

■ Training Enhancement

In the short and medium term, the Centre aims at increasing the number of international engagements for training. These shall include courses under the UN umbrella, table top exercises, bilateral instructor exchange for capacity development of countries deploying contingents to mission areas and also seminars and webinars with

Indian think tanks. CUNPK will be conducting two pilot courses namely the Contingent National Investigation Officers Course and the UN Contingent Commanders Course for international peacekeepers in collaboration with Global Peace Operations Initiative, USA and Integrated Training Services in 2022. With the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Government of India and UN Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Academy, Entebbe, Uganda, CUNPK has been designated as the nodal Centre for capacity building and training of UN peacekeepers in collaboration with the C4ISR Academy. This will include conduct of training at New Delhi and Entebbe as well as exchange of instructors from India and other countries for UN peacekeepers.

■ Infrastructure

The Centre is presently in the process of expansion of its scope and capacity. The new campus is planned over a sprawling 10 acres with an outlay of approximately Rs 52 crores. The campus has been conceptualized as a Centre of Excellence with state of art infrastructure, auditoriums and classrooms and theme-based technology driven training



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UN Women Military Officers Course - 14 (Nov 2019)



Online UN Pre Deployment Course 79 (Mar 21)



UN Pre Deployment Course 81 (Sep 2021)

laboratories. In the years to come, CUNPK shall expand its scope to creation of a resource hub and sponsoring research in the field of United Nations Peacekeeping.

Conclusion

CUNPK has a vision and road map crafted for the next few years. The creation of infrastructure and revamp of the training curriculum will provide the required impetus towards achievement of the objective of turning the Centre into a premier research and training institute with world class standards.



Colonel
Kaustubh Kekre

Colonel Kaustubh Kekre was commissioned into the 8th GORKHA RIFLES in 1999. The officer was the Chief Logistics Staff Officer of a Sector in MONUSCO and later a Contingent Commander of an Infantry Battalion Group in the same Mission. The officer is presently tenanted the appointment of Colonel, CUNPK

End to End Logistics Connect

By **Colonel Rajiv Shekhar**

Colonel Staff Duties 3B

'The Line Between Disorder and Order Lies in Logistics'

-Sun Tzu

Introduction

Operational Logistics is always a challenge due to the inherent mismatch between requirements of field armies and the resources available. Logistics support for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions is particularly unique and more complex due to large operating distances, difficult terrain and hostile environment. Intricacy of the sustenance model is further accentuated by the limited (and invariably degraded) infrastructure and resources available in the host nation.

Within these constraints, maintaining a multi-modal trans-continental supply chain requires foresight, innovativeness and detailed execution. Logisticians serve as a bridge between the supplier and the supplied and contribute significantly toward achieving the mandate of the Peacekeeping Force. Therefore, end to end connect between the logistics support echelon and contingent is critical in achieving optimum levels of logistics sustenance.

India in the UN

India's unique combination of being the largest democracy in the world with a strong

tradition of respect for rule of law and its successful experience in nation building makes it particularly relevant to the task of peacekeeping. India is at the forefront of UN's peace efforts and is contributing to various missions across Africa and the Middle East. Effective administrative, logistical and specialized support arrangements for these widespread peacekeeping operations is crucial for ensuring success of Indian UN contingents in successful implementation of the UN mandate.

Indian Army (IA) presently has more than 5000 peacekeepers from various arms and services deployed in Lebanon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan on peacekeeping duties. Due to different mandates, operating environment and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) conditions, each of these contingents requires its own unique logistics model. For instance, within DRC (MONUSCO), one infantry battalion group is performing the duty of a Rapidly Deployable Battalion (RDB) while the other is a Standard Infantry Battalion Group. Similarly, UNIFIL is a 'Dry Lease' Mission while UNMISS and MONUSCO are on 'Wet Lease'. These nuances of UN logistics demand

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intimate coordination and supervision between mission area and support echelons located in the rear at India.

UN Logistics Model

UN missions are deployed in nations with volatile security situation and depleted economic infrastructure wherein local sourcing of logistics becomes challenging. Missions such as MONUSCO and UNMISS entail a logistics supply chain over 6000 kilometers employing multi-modal transportation and trans-continent shipment. Movement of stores, particularly in the backdrop of COVID-19 pandemic bring their own set of challenges such as restricted port functioning, international backlog of shipping, global shortage of containers, closure of airports for inbound aircrafts etc. Any such adverse situation has a cascading effect on the logistics sustenance of UN contingents. Global transportation challenges are compounded by local law and order problems such as looting of convoys which impinge on container movements. While these are functional constraints, response and actions of Host Country also sometimes negatively impact logistics support. To cater for these unforeseen challenges, a robust logistics model has been evolved by UN Headquarters in concert with Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). This is tailor-made to optimise resources as per needs, size and mandate of the peacekeeping missions. Large missions such as MONUSCO are provided Integrated Logistics Support while TCCs are responsible for logistics in Medium size missions. Small missions such as UNDOF have small reception teams to maintain

supply link with the TCC and they rely on local contractors and local economy.

UN Peacekeeping mandates shape the field missions and guides the corresponding logistic support. Any commitment of troops in UN Mission is dictated by three documents viz. Statement of Force Requirement, Statement of Unit Requirement and Rules of Engagement. Logistics needs of the contingent are thereafter worked out from within these three documents. TCCs such as India submit their acceptance to deploy in a Mission and forward their recommended organisation and Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) capability. Once accepted, a MoU between United Nations Headquarters and TCCs is finalised. This document serves as the bedrock of logistic support and all actions are oriented towards meeting MoU obligations.

IA Logistics Support for UN Mission

IA has an optimised Logistic Model that is providing dedicated support to United Nations contingents in Mission Area. Each Mission has a different MoU and requires tailor-made provisioning and sustenance methodology. In addition, procurement of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), its transportation to Mission Area and subsequent maintenance forms a key responsibility within the logistics chain. Some initiatives that ensure seamless logistic support across various missions are covered briefly in succeeding paragraphs.

Expedited Procurement Policies

Peacekeeping missions by nature, demand

different variety of combat stores vis-a-vis standard armies. Availability of requisite combat and combat support equipment is therefore most important while deploying for United Nations Missions. These stores are generally not 'In Service' and have to be procured commercially. To expedite the procurement process, Government of India has accorded special financial powers for UN procurements to select appointments within the military hierarchy. In addition, all types of 'In Service' equipment are also released on priority to UN contingents whenever required. To further streamline the process new appointments have been created to exclusively coordinate all UN procurements. These initiatives have resulted in an exponential reduction in equipment procurement timelines and ensured the highest level of COE serviceability and availability in mission areas.

Transportation Methodology

One of the biggest challenges in UN sustenance is the transportation of equipment and stores to Mission Area. Contingent stores are dispatched to mission areas utilising all modes of transportation. While stores are moved largely in sea containers, being cost effective, if urgency or security considerations so dictate, air transportation is also arranged. For emergent moves Indian Air force assets are also utilised at times.

Mission Area Logistic Support

Government of India has allotted additional funds to IA for sustaining UN contingents in Mission Area. These funds are expended for

personal kitting of every soldier being deployed, procurement of critical items in Mission Area and additional stores required for maintenance of COE deployed with the units. Special Standard Operating Procedures have been formalised to ensure correct documentation and procedures. In view of the significant fund allocation, strict audit and oversight is exercised and all financial processes are aligned to prevailing Government of India policies and guidelines.

Feedback Mechanism

Logistics Support mechanism is dynamic and ever-evolving to factor ground realities and emergent requirements. A robust feedback mechanism has been instituted through which unit concerns and needs are expeditiously addressed. Flexibility is ensured in the process and necessary independence and financial powers have been accorded to commanders in mission areas to cater for unforeseen contingencies.

Conclusion

The 21st century continues to see an enhancement in UN peacekeeping role, both in quantity and complexity. Such increases directly affect planning and management of peace operations. In this context, logistics must adapt to the dynamic nature and political intricacy of each operational scenario presented for peace operations.

IA, cognizant of this evolution is already working on improving its logistics support mechanism to make it predictive and more efficient. Towards that 'Roll on Plans' for timely COE replacement and upgradation of

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equipment are already under execution. Reserves of COE in form of UN Bricks are planned for procurement to cater for short notice deployments. Greater automation of the entire supply chain is being done to enhance the response timelines of logistics elements.

India is considered one of the primary stakeholders within the UN and therefore, IA has placed UN peacekeeping at the centre of its military diplomacy. To ensure that these peacekeeping efforts generate the desired goodwill and impact, optimum logistics support to the contingents is critical. Towards that IA's end to end logistics model is ideal to achieve the desired end state and optimally showcase the country's military prowess in the international fora.



**Colonel
Rajiv Shekhar**

Colonel Rajiv Shekhar was commissioned into The Brigade of The Guards and has put in 23 years of service. He is presently posted as Colonel Staff Duties 3B (UN Logistics) at Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Army).

STOP PRESS

Achievements of Currently Deployed Units in Missions Across the World



*Force Commander's Unit Citation to Indian
Brigade Headquarters and Signal Company in
MONUSCO, Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)- December 2020*



*Force Commander's Unit Citation to Indian
Rapid Deployment Battalion in MONUSCO
(DRC)- January 2021*

STOP PRESS



Force Commander's Unit Citation to Indian Field Hospital, MONUSCO (DRC)- March 2021



Force Commander's Unit Citation to Indian Battalion-1, MONUSCO (DRC)- October 2021



Force Commander's Unit Citation to Indian Battalion in UNIFIL, Lebanon- September 2021



Force Commander's Unit Citation to Indian Battalion-1 in UNMISS, South Sudan- January 2021

Achievements Of Currently Deployed Units in Missions Across the World



Force Commander's Unit Citation to Indian Battalion-2 in UNMISS, South Sudan – August 2021



Force Commander's Unit Citation to Engineer Company in UNMISS, South Sudan –2021




Force Commander's Unit Citation to Signal Unit in UNMISS, South Sudan – May 2021



Force Commander's Unit Citation to Logistics Company in UNDOF, Golan Heights – September 2021

GONE BUT NEVER FORGOTTEN



GENERAL BIPIN RAWAT

PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, ADC
(16 MARCH 1958 - 08 DECEMBER 2021)

General Bipin Rawat commanded the Indian Brigade Group in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the year 2008 -09; a period of turbulence and violence in a Chapter VII mission where peace enforcement was the norm, albeit with compassion and minimum force being the guiding principles as a modus operandi for Blue Helmets under his command. The multi ethnic conflict with numerous state and non state actors with stakes in the immense natural resources of the country, made it one of the most complex and challenging United Nations peacekeeping missions.

His experience as a Commander North Kivu Brigade was instrumental in shaping his vision and perspective about peacekeeping operations. As Chief of the Indian Army, General Rawat made immense contribution in resuscitation of the equipment profile, human resource as a force multiplier and robust but humane implementation of the mandate for Indian contingents deployed in mission areas; especially UNMISS and MONUSCO.

As Chief of the Defence Staff, the astute leader and visionary provided valuable inputs for formulating this maiden compilation of India's journey in United Nations peacekeeping operations over the last seven decades. This first edition of India's UN Journal is dedicated to him.

LEST WE FORGET



IC-8947 Captain Gurbachan Singh Salaria **Paramvir Chakra (Posthumous)** **3/1 Gorkha Rifles**

On 5th December 1961, 3/1 Gorkha Rifles as part of United Nations peacekeeping Indian contingent, was ordered to clear up a road block established by the Gendarmerie at a strategic roundabout at Elizabethville, Katanga. The plan was that one company with two Swedish armoured cars would attack the position frontally and Captain Gurbachan Singh Salaria with two sections of Gorkhas and two Swedish armoured personnel carriers would act as a cutting off force.

In order to execute the plan, the party of Captain Salaria came under heavy automatic fire from an undetected enemy position. The enemy also had two armoured cars and about 90 men opposing Captain Salaria's small force. To clear the enemy position, he led a charge with bayonets, khukris and grenades supported by a rocket launcher. In this gallant engagement, Captain Salaria killed 40 of the enemy and knocked out the two armoured cars. During the assault, Captain Salaria was wounded by a burst of automatic fire, but continued to fight till he collapsed. Captain Salaria's gallant action and supreme sacrifice prevented any movement of the enemy force towards the main battle scene and thus contributed to the success of the main battalion's action at the roundabout and prevented the encirclement of UN Headquarters in Elizabethville.

Captain Salaria's leadership, boldness and raw courage with disregard to personal safety were in the best traditions of the Indian Army.



"India's spontaneous and unreserved participation in UN peacekeeping operations over the years has been a clear demonstration of the country's commitment to the objectives set out in the UN Charter. Not in terms of rhetoric and symbolism, but in real and practical terms, even to the extent of accepting casualty to personnel."

-Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar,
Padma Bhushan, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retired), Ex Force
Commander and Head of Mission, United Nations
Protection Force for Former Yugoslavia (1992 - 93)